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Abstract. 
The thesis presented and discussed here concerns the law relating to the decisions 
made concerning children when their parents separate using the legal process. It 
is divided into four parts, which consider four separate issues in that -legal 
response. There is an introduction which places the work in a broad academic 
context 
First, The Law Relating to Separation and Children discusses the statutory 
regulation of the process of making decisions about children of separating 
parents. It then discusses the body of case law which has developed to attempt to 
interpret the statutory requirement of the paramountcy of the child's best 
interests. The Children Act 1989 is considered in this part. 
Secondly, The Institution of Separation Law seeks to identify the professionals 
who work in this area of -the law. Further, in this part of the work, the 
theoretical and philosophical positions of the professionals are discussed, 
especially in the context of the critical literature published in this area. A 
major theme of this section is the change in the practice of this area of law from 
an adversarial model to the negotiated settlement, or mediation model. 
-vi"- 
Thirdly, The Practice of Separation Law is a presentation and discussion of the 
findings of an empirical study undertaken to establish the nature of the practice 
of the professionals in this area. The empirical study also sought to. ascertain 
whether the- professionals adopt any definition of the statutory phrase "the 
child's best interests", and the theoretical basis of that definition. 
Finally, The Psychology of Separation Law explores the discipline of 
psychology, to consider first, the effects of separation on children, secondly, a 
theoretical understanding of "the child's best interests", and thirdly, the 
implications on the legal process relating to the parents. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE THESIS AND ITS CONTEXT. 
"There was never any thing by the wit of man so well devised, or so sure 
established, which in continuance of time hath not been corrupted". So began 
Archbishop Cranmer as he observed the state of the common prayer in the 
Church of England. 1 Hobbes opines-that the human condition is "solitary, poor, 
nasty, brutish, and short". 2 No doubt, on reflection, all too many people 
throughout western society, on considering their experience of family life, will 
find consonance with these two sentiments. The romantic love of the advertisers' 
world seems to end so soon in the experience of so many, requiring replacement. 
This transition seems equally. dogged by the perils of isolation in nuclear 
families, and by economic and material hardship, and the decay of other dreams. 
The culmination, or symptom of these pressures can be the collapse of the family 
and the separation of the couple. 
A. Separation Law: A Context. 
It seems almost obligatory to start any discussion on divorce and separation with 
the seemingly catastrophic statistics. -, This will be no exception. It is a useful 
starting point as it gives a sobering context for any discussion, and indeed, the 
statistics themselves pose interesting questions of perception. It would not, 
however, be fruitful to rehearse at any length the work of far greater scholars. 
The most detailed and perceptive account of the history of the family, and 
especially the history of divorce, is found in the work of Professor Lawrence 
Stone (1990). His work shows that the problem of separation is not a modern 
phenomenon, even if it is statistically more prevalent today. 
2 
Professor Stone3 shows that the years from 1857 to the present have seen an 
dramatic change in the divorce rate. In 1860, the rate per thousand of the 
population stood at about 0.1. This remained constant until the period of the 
first world war. By the end of the war, the rate had risen to 0.5 divorces per 
thousand of the population. After a brief decline to 0.3 per thousand in the early 
1920s, the rate started to rise steadily upto the outbreak of the second world 
war, by which time it had reached 0.8-per thousand. 
The duration of the war saw a constant period in the rate, but then the immediate 
post-war years of 1945 - 1950 saw an explosion in the divorce rate, which reached 
a peak of 6 divorces per thousand of the population in 1946/7, and then saw a 
tailing off to around 3 per thousand by 1950. This rate remained fairly constant, 
growing slightly between 1965 and 1970 when the rate had reached about 4 
divorces per thousand. 
Professor Stone suggests4 that the sudden rise in the divorce rate in the 
immediate post-war periods can be attributed to war-time infidelity (two-thirds of 
the petitions were made by husbands). It may also be the case that the adjustment 
of both men and women after the war was too great a tension for many couples 
to bear. The man would have to make the adjustment to civilian life - perhaps 
coping with what is now known to be post-traumatic stress. The wife may even 
have had a greater adjustment. During the war-years women gained considerable 
power in the industrial and agrarian work-place, and therefore throughout their 
lives. The end of the war would bring a challenge to this power, in that it 
required a return to the pre-war attitudes. Jobs were perceived to be rewards for 
returning men, the heroes. Woman's usefulness in the work-place was over, and 
woman's place, in the eyes of the post-war economy, had to be in the home. 
The link between economic and industrial needs for the work-force, and the 
3 
portrayal of the röle of women and children can be seen as a recurrent theme, 
especially in English society from the mid-eighteenth century. The industrial 
revolution changed the power structure from an agrarian base to an industrial 
one, and this was reflected in the family in a number of stages upto the early 
twentieth century. The first change was the movement from the family as a unit 
working equally to provide for itself, to the family as a unit of individuals 
selling their labour to the factories. Increasingly, technological processes in 
manufacturing, and a change from primary to secondary industry, could be seen to 
give the welfare movement an opportunity to influence the legislature over 
factory conditions (e. g. Factories Act 1833) and educational provision (Education 
Act 1870). Alternatively it could be argued that the industrial owners were able 
to use the welfare movement to reduce the work-force, which was no longer 
needed in such great numbers. 
The culmination of these changes in the perception of the equality of the 
members of the family, which started with the extension of the concept of 
childhood from the middle and upper classes to the working class through the 
education and factory legislation, was the change in the perception of the röle of 
women. In the early twentieth century, the trade unions agreed the "Family 
Wage"5, which effectively gave increases in the living wage of the family. The 
hidden effect of the reform . was the formal projection of the image of the man as 
the wage earner and provider. One could argue that the legal notion that the 
women and children were the property of the man, which was a reality in the 
middle and upper classes during the nineteenth century, was forced onto the 
working class. For them, there had been a closer equality of gender until the 
family wage, forged from the need to overcome poverty. 
The two wars of the first half of the twentieth century provided the need to. 
employ women throughout the work-force. At the outbreak of the first world war, 
4 
the early women's movement had agreed with the Government of the day to enter 
the job market in return for the vote at the earliest opportunity, and with the 
suffrage issue closed, the women's movement lost its impetus after the first world 
war. The post-war period saw an initial image of motherhood in the home with 
the male provider, at a time when the work-force could only sustain men. This 
was challenged with another theoretical movement, starting in the 1960s, with a 
reassertion of feminism. 
The changes of the portrayal of women can still be seen in the late twentieth 
century, depending on the needs of the labour force. In the early years of Mrs 
Thatcher's Prime Ministerial office, the positive image of women was of the 
career-mother. The later years, with deepening recession, saw an attempt at the 
restatement of the home-mother to free jobs in the market place. The single 
parent mother was constantly, and still to a large degree is, portrayed as morally 
unacceptable, the most persistent of Thatcher's images of the scrounger-culture. 
This could be because the "single parent" offers a tangible model which stands 
against the nuclear family, and therefore threatens the control over women in the 
work-place. In reality, however, it is not the single parent family, but the 
success of women in finding an alternative philosophy and set of images about 
society, and in moving through the ranks of the male society, which undermines 
the control of the job* market by the manipulation of woman's place in it. 
In the period 1955 - 1960, there was a steady increase in the divorce rate. Stone 
notes6 three factors for this rise: first he notes the change in the status of 
women in that time, and the changes in sexual practices; secondly and thirdly, he 
notes from the Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce (1956) that social 
conditions had a part to play, with housing shortages (causing more young couples 
to live with parents) and a rise in juvenile marriage, and, more importantly, 
there was a shift in the general ethic away from a duty ethic to one of 
5 
self-gratification. The same conclusions were reached by Burgoyne et al. (1987). 
After a period from the 1950s to the late 1960s, the divorce rate, with the 
reforms of 1969, jumped from around six divorces per thousand to 10 per 
thousand. The rate has continued to climb steadily from 1970 to the present day, 
reaching a peak of 14 per thousand in 1985, from which point the rate has calmed 
slightly. Stone indicates7 that the actual numbers for this growth went from some 
24,000 divorces in 1960 to 151,000 in 1987. This was matched by a similar jump in 
the number - of remarriages after divorce. Richards (1991) suggests that this 
perhaps indicates not a disenchantment with the institution but with the partner. 
He also feels that the change. in the pattern of divorce reflects a change in the 
expectations of the spouses towards each other: "There has been' a growing 
expectation that a couple should spend most of their non-working time together 
and share not only the same interests, but all their thoughts and feelings with 
each other". 8 A similar belief in marriage is reported in the survey of Burgoyne 
and Clark in Burgoyne et a1.9 The study sample indicated that 80% knew 
someone who was separated or divorced, and whereas the sample indicated that 
in the 1970s the separated or divorced. would have been perceived as "black 
sheep", by the mid-1980s they were accepted as a part of modern society. The 
study also indicated that those who were getting married (and many still felt the 
need to secure a- formal - relationship when having children, although not 
necessarily before) believed that their marriage would not break-up. This 
optimism was shared by those in the sample who were remarrying after divorce. It 
should be noted, however, that the number of divorced people who do not 
remarry has risen dramatically, from 284,000 in 1961 to 2,245,000 in 1986. 
The statistics indicate that while divorce is on the increase, the optimism for 
the success of marriage, and indeed the rising numbers of couples formalizing 
their relationships in marriage tend to give weight to Richards' argument that the 
6 
recent studies of the incidence of divorce do not support a view that the reform 
of divorce law encourages the ending of marriage as an institution. Indeed, "the 
evidence suggests the opposite, that as divorce has become common, jurisdictions 
have found it necessary to reform their divorce law and to simplify the process in 
order to accommodate the growing numbers". 10 This would be congruent with the 
view of Professor Stone (1990) and of E. P. Thompson (1991) who both see wife 
sales as popular methods of divorce when the law was inaccessible. 11 
The other important statistic which should be considered here is that relating to 
the numbers of children whose parents divorce. This has, of course, also seen a 
dramatic increase, alongside the increase in divorces. In 1970, Stone12 indicates 
that there were approximatelyr-60,000 children under. the age of 11 involved in 
their parents divorce. By 1972, the number had reached 100,000; by 1980 the 
number was 112,000; and by 1984, when the Law Commission published its paper 
"150,000 Children Divorced A Year: Who cares? ", the number had risen to 
144,501. Given the widely accepted fact that parental divorce has the potential 
for causing emotional harm, the implications speak for themselves. 
These statistics have concentrated on divorce. The number -of cohabiting 
unmarried couples has grown enormously, since the 1970s. While it has been noted 
that there is some indication of a desire to marry when a couple have children, 
Stone (1990) reports that there is an interesting growth in the number of births 
registered as illegitimate. Until 1955, the percentage of all births registered as 
illegitimate, hovered consistently for nearly 100 years around the 4-5 % marker, in 
the period 1961-6 the number had grown to some 7%, and then having hovered 
around the 8% marker until 1981, the rate shot to 12 % and then to 21 % in 1986. 
While this does not indicate how many couples then go on and marry, or how 
many single parent families are found in the statistics, the number indicates a. 
large number of children who are born into families whose parents are unmarried 
7 
(or "un-ceremonied", as their relationship may be as stable and long-term as their 
married contemporaries, but without a label of the law: a de facto if not de jure 
marriage). 
The establishment of the same culture which has challenged the duty element of 
marriage, and acknowledged that individuals can grow apart and therefore need to 
be able to end their relationship -in divorce, has led to a culture which 
challenges the need to formalize the union at all. Without embarking on the 
morality of this (and there is much philosophy and theology which would support 
a view that marriage is a social control mechanism with very little to do with the 
nature of the union of the couple), the implication of the growth of the 
un-married family is that there are many more un-ceremonied divorces (the 
formal ending of such relationships). 13 While the number of hearings in the 
magistrates' court, under the only provisions for the un-married couple to settle 
their affairs, has grown dramatically, it is difficult to find the statistics of 
the number of such informal arrangements which separate without the help of a 
system. Thus, the number of children who are open to emotional harm from 
parental separation does not stop at the divorce statistics. The magistrates' 
court statistics, and other unobtainable statistics must be included to gauge a 
true number. 
The emotional hurt, it could be supposed, is only with those who can be identified 
as adversarial cases. This may be the case. It may be that all the cases which do 
not seek legal help find separation an experience in which they can handle their 
emotional difficulties and shield their child from the potential harm into a 
changed, post-separation family. This, it is submitted, must be rare. In divorce, 
all couples, theoretically with all manner of approaches, seek advice. It is only 
sensible to assume that some of the children involved in the hidden separations. 
(those which do not go to law) will be emotionally hurt by divorce. The moral 
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issue is, therefore, whether the law should separate the de jure marriages from 
the de facto marriages, and offer the children of the former some degree of legal 
process designed to help in providing for their best interests, and yet leave out 
the children of the latter. Separation law has arisen through a need to deal with 
children once the concept of divorce is admitted. Where marriage is no longer felt 
to be necessary for some parents, the theoretical implications of enforcing a 
strict interpretation of the parameters of the legal process become very difficult 
to unravel. 
The research of Elliott and Richards (1991) shows a new set of results which 
teachers and speech therapists, and indeed many who work with children, have 
indicated informally for some time. Their work took a sample of children whose 
parents had divorced and systematically compared them with children whose 
parents did not. The separation of the parents occurred when the children were 
between 7 and 16 years. The longitudinal nature of the study allowed an 
observation of the children before and after the separation occurred. The results 
showed that the children of the parents who separated scored consistently lower 
on their ratings than the children of parents who did not separate. As the data 
which was gathered for the children could be compared for the period before the 
parents separated, one fascinating outcome of this was that the children who were 
in the households prior to separation scored lower-in the period before the 
separation: in that period between the breakdown in parental communications and 
the early stages of marriage difficulty before the legal process of divorce was 
entered. Depending on their age, the educational potential of the children can be 
adversely affected by the whole process of pre-separation, separation, and 
post-separation. 
This new material which sits -alongside the established work on the child and 
divorce, which will be explored later in this thesis, is reviewed in Richards and 
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Dyson (1982). The implication for the law is that not only should it be addressing 
the question of which children should be helped in a legal process at the time of 
their parents' separation, but also at what point in the parents' separation 
should the process begin. This begs the question of what the aim of the legal 
process should be. 
The area is rich in questions for research, and there is a desire to attempt to 
answer them all in one work: indeed, it feels as though all the questions have to 
be answered to say anything. This introduction has placed one major issue which 
has to be addressed in the question of the development of the family generally, 
and that is the finding of a common sociological language for the family. The 
analysis of the röle of women in the work place and the language and imagery of 
the family which have been presented above, and the moral question of what 
constitutes a family, and the relationship between that and concepts of sexual and 
social morality all need to be addressed at an interdisciplinary level. Currently 
there is a tendency for each discipline to retreat from such questions, except for 
sociology which has developed impor tant theories of the family through Marxism 
and Feminism. 14 The law has, as yet, not responded to the challenge from 
sociology, but continues with the conservative image of the nuclear family which 
bears little resemblance to the majority of families today. This is a matter for 
interdisciplinary debate, -- and not only one for groups of academics. It is one 
which needs to be presented in a popular medium so as to inform the 
Parliamentary process, and thereby move the reform of the law to a more radical 
set of alternatives to those ordinarily presented. 
This is one debate which is necessary for the development of the family. A further 
debate could concentrate on the material implications of marriage and their 
effects upon separation. Another on finding mechanisms for identifying those who 
will separate and supporting them through the process. The list begins to become 
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endless with exciting research ideas. 
B. The Hypothesis. 
This thesis concerns one small area of the process of separation law. Due to the 
change in terminology from "custody and access" to "residence and contact orders" 
under the Children Act 1989, and also because of the availability of these orders 
to both married and unmarried parents, the term "Separation Law" is used in this 
work as a global term. 
The hypothesis under examination is that the legal requirement, to view the 
child's best interests as paramount in separation law cases, is not interpreted 
with a theoretical understanding of the child's welfare, and that an understanding 
of the child's best interests could be found in psychology. 
C. The Plan of the Thesis. 
The law requires that the child's best interests should be the paramount 
consideration of the court when it makes decisions concerning the child. The first 
aim of the thesis is to identify the definitions of the child's welfare in both 
the statutes and reported cases, and in the practice of the law. This is the major 
part of the thesis. There are many discussions of the case law and statutes, 
however, the analysis here seeks to ask if there is any coherent theory of the 
child's welfare which could be seen to underpin the judges decision-making. While 
this is not necessarily a novel approach, it does contain recent case-law, and 
forms the most useful starting point for examining the hypothesis. 
The traditional presentation of separation law in the legal text-books relates 
solely to the interpretation - in the case-law, with some reference to the 
development of the independent conciliation movement The thesis moves on 
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from the legal definitions of the child's best interests to an examination of the 
major professionals who are involved in the system of separation law. This 
concentrates on the pre-court professionals, as the judges' perception of the 
child's welfare is apparent in case-law, and the barristers only appear at the 
adversarial court stage. In discovering how the child's best interests are 
interpreted, the need is not in the courts, but in the pre-court stage of 
negotiation and mediation. The second part, therefore, is a discussion of the 
literature and concepts concerning the three professionals groups: solicitors, 
court welfare officers, and conciliators. Much of this part of the work is 
concerned with the developement and implications of mediation. 
There is little empirical work which systematically seeks to establish how the 
professionals involved in separation law interpret the concept of the child's best 
interests. The third part of the study is an empirical survey of a sample of the 
three professionals groups in two geographical areas. A great amount of the thesis 
is used to report and consider the data collected in the fieldwork, as its novelty 
lies in using the same research questions with all the professionals. 
The second aim of the. thesis is to contrast the legal approach to the 
interpretation of the child's welfare, with the approach which could be available 
in psychology. This examines the literature specifically relating to the effects 
of divorce on children; questions whether there is any theoretical framework 
which could give an understanding of the child's best interests; and finally 
whether there are any further implications from psychology which could inform 
separation law. 
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PART ONE: THE LAW RELATING TO SEPARATION AND CHILDREN. ' 
1.1 
. 
THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS: THE WELFARE PRINCIPLE. 
A. Statutory Developments in Different Courts: 
i. historical context; 
ii. the High Court; 
iii the county court; 
iv. the magistrates' court. 
B. The Welfare of The Child: 
i. when custody and access of the child is an issue 
for judicial consideration; 
' a. Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, 
b. Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates' Court Act 1978, 
c. Guardianship of Minors Act 1971, 
d. Locus standi, and other issues, 
-e. Children Act 1989. 
ii. the regulation of that consideration; 
a. early statutory interpretation, 
b. Guardianship of Minors Act 1971, 
c. Children Act 1989: implications. 
C. Conclusions. 
- 
1.1 THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS IN SEPARATION LAW. 
A. Statutory Developments in Different Courts. 
i. historical context. 
The issue of the legal treatment of the children of separating parents has a 
relatively short history. Up to the nineteenth century, the child was seen, along 
with a man's wife, as a part of his property. The question of separation was, in 
the eyes of the law, a difficult matter controlled by the man and involving Act of 
Parliamentl. Evidence shows that the question of separation of parents in a 
popular, non-legal sense could well have been somewhat easier, employing the 
vehicle of the wife sale: This, however, was bound up with the economic reality of 
the period which made a family unit a working unit, the children not simply being 
owned by the father, but rather a part of a more complex structure2. The question 
of separation only became an issue when the economic constraints on the family 
allowed it to emerge. This could be seen with the first statute which changed the 
perception of the family, the Married Women's Property Act 1870. This, it will be 
noted came in the same year as the Education Act 1870, which heralded the way 
to a new understanding of childhood, after a more tentative exploration of the 
idea of children's rights in the work place and to education in the Factories Act 
1833. Indeed the nineteenth century saw a more general acceptance that 
childhood existed, a view which can be seen within the context of the general 
moral climate of Victorian England, or as part of a broader economic construction 
in a more automated, and therefore reduced, work-place. 
Alongside this social development, the statutory development of family law in 
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general is complicated by the historical development of the courts. The Children 
Act 1989 is the first legislation which brings together the majority of the law 
relating to children and applies it as one piece of legislation throughout the 
High Court, county court and magistrates' court, under the workloads allocated by 
the Lord Chancellor. Prior to the 1989 Act, the law was largely built up of 
statutes, and therefore powers, relating to separate courts. Thus the development 
of family and child law is a statutory web, providing the rules for a very 
complicated game of legal tactics. 
ii. the High Court. 
The High Court jurisdiction stems from the two branches of the Ecclesiastical 
Courts and the Courts of Chancery. The Ecclesiastical Courts governed the 
question of nullity and the doctrine of a mensa et thoro - what is now judicial 
separation - but there was no divorce law under these courts. The Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1857, in the light of the social and religious developments of the 
nineteenth century transferred the powers of the Ecclesiastical Courts in the area 
of the family, to the Divorce Court, which was also given a power of divorce by 
judicial process. The Act allowed for the first time, divorce without recourse to 
a private Act of Parliament. Such a divorce would be granted on the basis of 
adultery. 
The attempted rationalization of the court system in the mid 1870s3 transferred 
the power from the Divorce court to the Probate, Family, and Admiralty Division 
of the High Court, which later became the Family Division. The power of the 
High Court under this branch was not only concerned with the administration of 
marriage and divorce, but ancillary powers allowed the court to provide for the 
child's financial, custodial, and educational needs. From the power of the Court 
of Chancery, reordered into the Chancery Division of the High Court, the court 
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was endowed with the crown's prerogative power of parens patriae, the power of 
wardship. Thus, the High Court, from two branches, had two sets of power which 
could overlap - for example the request for the custody of a child in a divorce 
which was already the subject of an order made through wardship4. 
iii. the county court. 
The county court also gained a jurisdiction in relation to the family. Growing 
from jurisdiction granted to allow the county court to make orders concerning 
children, by the Guardianship of Infants Acts of 1886 and 1926, the county court 
has also developed through the rapid growth in the number of divorce actions 
after the second world war. The growth in applications to the High Court 
somewhat over-stretched the capacity of that court, and, therefore, "Divorce 
Commissioners" were appointed, largely from the ranks of the county court bench. 
These commissioners, it was found in later years, were hearing some two-thirds of 
all matrimonial causes, at a time when 90% of the applications were undefended. 
Thus, the majority of the work was being performed by county court judges under 
the label - of the High Court. This therefore denied the advantages, such as 
solicitors' audience, to. the cases, which would have been available in the county 
court. The Matrimonial Causes Act 1967 responded to these findings by granting 
the power to hear undefended matrimonial causes to the county court, upon the 
designation of the court as a "divorce county court" by the Lord Chancellor. This 
jurisdiction was followed by the allocation of defended applications to the county 
courts. The system, therefore starts all divorce cases and ancillary applications 
in the county court, moving them to the High Court on the basis of the gravity of 
the case. Although beyond the scope of this research, the county court has also, 
historically, been given jurisdiction in the question of public child care. 
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iv. the magistrates' court 
A third jurisdiction in family law has emerged through the magistrates' court 
Concerned largely with crime, the jurisdiction of the magistrates' court grew up 
from the protection of the wife, and the extraction of financial support from 
putative fathers6. By the Matrimonial Causes Act 1878, the court could relieve the 
wife of her duty to cohabit with her husband if he was a threat to her safety; 
further, having the ability to order maintenance for her, and the custody of 
children under 10 years to her. This power to grant maintenance orders was 
extended to wives deserted by their husbands7. By the Summary Jurisdiction 
(Separation and Maintenance) Acts 1895 - 1949, the magistrates' jurisdiction was 
extended to allow orders for maintenance for wives and children, and finally for 
the husband also. Further reform and extensions of the court's powers were made 
in the Matrimonial Proceedings (Magistrates' Courts) Act 1960, which granted 
powers concerning the custody and maintenance of children. Thus, in its study of 
the jurisdiction of the magistrates' court in the mid 1970s, the Law Commission8 
saw the role of the court as providing "first aid" in families experiencing 
breakdowns, or more. temporary difficulties, by making orders concerning the 
financial needs of the family members, the custody of the children, and the 
protection against violence from the members of the family; this alongside the 
potential of encouraging reconciliation via the probation services. The report was 
largely enacted in the Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates' Court Act 1978. 
This Act brought the magistrates' jurisdiction into line with the philosophy of 
the Divorce Reform Act 1969, which went some way to removing the concept of 
the matrimonial offence. The 1857 divorces were granted on the basis of adultery. 
Matrimonial offences were extended under the 1937 Act to include cruelty, 
desertion and incurable insanity. The 1971 Act theoretically removed the concept . 
of offences, but effectively retained them within the proof of irretrievable 
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breakdown of the marriage. Under the 1978 Act, the previous bar to applicants 
who had committed adultery was removed. The magistrates' court gained powers 
to make orders concerning children through the Guardianship of Infants Acts of 
1925 and 1926, in adoption proceedings, and in care proceedings. 
It can be seen that, even though the above descriptions are by no means a 
complete description of family law , 
from the nineteenth century, there was an 
almost random development of court jurisdictions. It is against this backdrop that 
the concept of the welfare of the child emerged in English separation law. 
B. The Welfare of the Child. 
The concept of the welfare of the child in separation law was first introduced in 
the Guardianship of Infants Act 1925, having been used in earlier caselaw. The 
modern statement of the principle is found in the Guardianship of Minors Act 
1971, which has been adopted into the Children Act 1989. The concern of this 
research is the law before the 1989 Act. However, some implications from the 
new law will be discussed later in this work9. Consideration must be given to the 
statutory provision for separation law on two heads: i) when custody and access of 
a child is an issue for judicial consideration, and ii) the regulation of that 
consideration - the welfare of the child. 
i when custody and access of the child is an issue for judicial 
consideration. 10 
Ordinarily, there is a laissez faire attitude to the care of children, in as much 
as the law stands as a boundary of acceptable parenting, set at significant harm 
to the child, within which parents have a freedom to raise their children as they 
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see fit. The law also sets slightly closer fielders when the parents seek legal 
separation, and it is that close fielding that is the heart of this study. For the 
family where the parents remain together, the parents have equal rights1l; and 
must have regard to the wishes of each other in making decisions concerning the 
child12. Beyond this, there is very little legal regulation, although Lord 
Scarman, in the celebrated Gillick case, wished to impose a general duty on 
parents to act in the best interests . of the child13, this has not been. pursued 
after his initial expression. When a family experiences difficulties needing 
judicial assistance, there are three separate statutory provisions which have 
evolved in private law, empowering the courts to make orders concerning the 
children: i. Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, ii. Domestic Proceedings and 
Magistrates' Court Act 1978, and iii. Guardianship of Minors Act 1971. Each has 
different applications and scope which should be outlined. 
a. Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. 
The 1973 Act governs applications for divorce, nullity, and judicial separation, 
and applications ancillary to these matters. By section 42, the court has power to 
make custody orders concerning any children of the family14, before, alongside, or 
after matrimonial proceedings under the Act The applications are only available 
to married couples seeking matrimonial proceedings, and are made to the divorce 
county court, which then has the option to refer the issues to the Family Division 
of the High Court. The court can also make custody orders when considering the 
question of the failure to provide reasonable maintenance under section 27. 
Under section 41 of the 1973 Act, the court was under a duty to consider the 
arrangements for the children in all cases coming before the courts, and to 
withhold a decree until the court was satisfied as to the suitability of the 
arrangements. This stemmed from the acceptance of the inherent risk in divorce 
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cases for the children. Section 41 was clearly aimed to provide a safeguard for 
the children of parents who separated without a defended - contested - 
application. The parents would have to provide a statement to the court outlining 
the future -care of their children. The weight of cases produced administrative 
difficulties for the courts, and, in effect, the section 41 hearing became a 
formality; in effect the procedure was maintained to pay lip-service to the 
statutory requirement. . 
This intervention was seen as rather invasive to the parents freedom, given that 
parents -who were not seeking separation as partners were not scrutinized as 
parents. Thus, following the Children Act 1989 principle of non-intervention, 
section 1(5), the 1973 Act procedure was amended to remove the duty of the 
court to scrutinize every case15. This can be justified on the basis that the 
practice had become offensive to parents, however, as Bromley points out16, the 
inclusion of the original section 41 duty was to provide "a means of ensuring that 
proper arrangements [had been] made for them [the children]", because "it is a 
notorious and lamentable fact that the persons most likely to suffer when a 
marriage breaks down are the children". Thus, it could be argued, and this will be 
developed later in this work, that the need to protect the children is challenged 
by the move away from the section 41 principle, and that an administrative 
problem should have been reformed more creatively than by arguing that the 
principle was distastefu117. The basic power to make orders relating to children 
remains after the 1989 Act 
The orders that could be made under the 1973 Act were custody, care and control, 
and access under section 42; care orders under section 43; and supervision 
orders under section 44. Care and control orders relate to the day-to-day care of 
the child, where and with whom the child should live, and the daily decisions that 
occur. Access relates to the continued contact between the child and the other 
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parent. Custody, however, changed the parental position from that equal parenting 
common to all parents under the Guardianship Act 1973, to parental rights vested 
in one parent alone. Clearly this could cause a great deal of distress between 
separating parents, who, in seeking to sever their ties as partners found that 
they could be forced to lose their parenthood in the eyes of the law. This process 
was rejected by the Law Commission, and altered in the 1989 Act18. Under the 
new law, the parents retain parental responsibility, and the orders available to 
the court relate to the previous issues of care and control. This development must 
be seen as apositive development in family law. However, the old law did allow 
for the creation of joint custody orders, but it was found by Priest and Whybrowl9 
that courts and practitioners were reluctant to employ joint custody orders as the 
parties found them to be. unworkable. This was also the reaction of the 
participants in the authors study. This may prove to be a difficulty for the new 
law, in that the real issue for the parents is not the lack of the largely 
academic custody of their child, but rather the more immediate and painful care 
and control of the child. It seems quite likely that there will still be a large 
number of "fights" over residence and contact orders under the new law as the 
parents try to remain active parents once they have physically separated from the 
family home. 
The care order allowed the court to place the. child of separating parents into the 
care of the local authority in exceptional circumstances. This power was rarely 
used, certainly in the experience of the practitioners in author's study, as the 
courts tended to divert such cases into the orthodox procedure for care under 
other statutory provisions should it appear to be necessary. The supervision order 
was more widely used, allowing the court to monitor the progress of families in 
exceptional circumstances, by either a court welfare officer or local authority 
appointee, who would help and work with the family and report to the court. 
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b. Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates' Court Act 1978. 
This Act allows for financial orders to be made while the marriage is on foot, as 
a more emergency or "first aid" measure. Available only to spouses, an application 
can be accompanied by a request for an order in relation to a child of the 
family20. Thus, again this does not allow an application solely for the discussion 
of an order for the child. 
The orders available to the court differ from those available under the 1973 Act, 
above, in that the magistrates' court can only make "legal custody" orders as 
opposed to "custody" orders. The former are the same as the latter except that 
they do not confer rights over. the child's property, and do not confer a right to 
apply for the court's permission to allow the child to emigrate from the United 
Kingdom. No order can be made if an order from any court in England or Wales 
already exists. If an order for legal custody exists, the court can make care and 
supervision orders in exceptional circumstances. 
c. Guardianship of Minors Act 1971. 
The 1971 Act is the most far reaching of the three Acts in relation to the 
availability of orders for children. Applications can be made to any of the three 
courts by any parent - biological and not married - specifically for an order of 
the court in relation to the child. The orders available are the same as those 
under the 1978 Act. Thus this is an important Act in that it extends the 
availability of court help to unmarried parents who are separating. 
__ 
The choice of the court where married parties are involved could, in some 
circumstances, be a tactical balance between the cost of the proceedings, and the 
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need for the scrutiny of the higher courts. 
d. Locus standi, and other issues. 
It will be noted that in each of the above cases, an application could only be 
made by the parents with whom the-child was a "child of the family". Once an 
application had been made to the court, the court could make an order in favour 
of a third party to whom it felt custody etc. would be appropriate. Thus, while a 
grandparent could not apply under the three Acts, a court could grant him or her 
custody if the parent applied. It could, however, be the case that a child who had 
lived with his or her grandparents for a time, could become a child of that 
family. The test is an objective one for the courts to apply on the basis of locus 
standi. It must also be noted that the Family Law Act 1986 sought to avoid the 
inevitable overlap of applications and orders which arise from a three-headed 
system such as that outlined above. This has largely been overtaken by the 
codifying nature of the Children Act 1989 which provides that all applications 
concerning orders for children must use the process outlined in the 1989 Act. 
e. Children Act 1989 21. 
In terms of the instances where the issue of the custody of the child can be 
brought before the court, the Children Act 1989 can be seen, on its face, to 
change separation law dramatically. As has already been seen, the Act changes the 
process of divorce, in that parents who have reached an agreement as to the 
future parenting of their child do not have to present that arrangement to the 
court before a decree concerning their partnership is granted. This stems from the 
underlying themes of the Act of non-intervention and parental responsibility. The 
former is a very old question which hounded the courts of equity - when is it 
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justifiable for the court to intervene in the family? - and is given statutory 
clothing in section 1(5): the court shall only make an order if it is better to do 
so than not intervening, where "better" is defined in terms of the child's 
welfare. The actions which can be brought in the courts - divorce, separation, 
etc. - remain largely untouched by the Act, the only major change being the 
codification of the Guardianship of Minors Act 1971 into the Children Act 1989. 
The impact of the Children Act 1989 on separation law can be seen most clearly 
in the orders which are available for the courts to consider for the child. Gone 
are the concepts and orders of custody and access, which were considered to inject 
the proceedings with the idea of winning and losing, and therefore stirring up the 
fights between the parents. They have been replaced with parental responsibility 
(section 2) and Residence, Contact, Specific Issue, and Prohibited Steps orders 
(section 8). Parental responsibility rests with both married parents, and the 
mother if unmarried, from the birth of the child. Unmarried fathers are able to 
gain the responsibility through a relatively easy process. Parental responsibility 
rests with the parents throughout the childhood, or until broken in adoption. 
Thus, two concepts- emerge: first, the parent no longer has "rights" over the 
child, allowing the child to become more than a possession; and, secondly, the 
parenting of the child, while normally conducted uninterrupted, should become a 
partnership between the parents and, anywhere its intervention is necessary, the 
state. The parental "rights" under the old law were always difficult to identify, 
save perhaps the obvious rights over the child's name, and were conceptually very 
difficult to reconcile with the independent personality of the child. The 
replacement of the concept with the duties of the parent must be seen as valuable 
in the development of the child's individual rights, which are increasingly at 
issue on the wider stages of Europe and the United Nations. However, to the 
parent, a tension will still be felt in trying to understand the concept, as the 
child is essentially dependent upon him or her. 
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Perhaps the most useful part of the concept of parental responsibility is the 
acknowledgement of partnership in the care of children. This does not simply 
apply to separation law, but applies throughout child law. Should a 'local 
authority intervene in the life of the family, the parents would not lose their 
parental responsibility, perhaps ironically, strengthening the parental rights 
over the child. Likewise, on separation, the parents both retain their duties over 
the child. This is reflected in the orders available to the parents. Under section 
8, the court. can make orders defining where the child should live, the time it 
should spend with both its parents, resolution of disputes over particular 
problems, for example which school the child should attend, or prohibitions on 
certain actions proposed by one parent against the will of the other. Thus the 
orders are clearly intended to allow the court to assist the parents in their 
continued responsibility. As was noted in the consideration of the section 41 
changes, this may be fanciful on the part of the legislators. The Lord Chancellor 
has indicated that he sees the Children Act and its new provisions, not only as 
"the most comprehensive and far-reaching reform of child law in living 
memory"22, but also that the Act creates "a new code about the upbringing of 
children". He envisages that one of the fruits of the success will be "divorcing 
parents who feel able to take decisions about the children's future without 
resorting to the courts"23. There could be a dangerous misconception in adopting 
such a law-centred perception of the world, in that the reforms may well prove to 
be irrelevant to the parents whose dispute was not that the court was going to 
take their legal status away, but rather was borne in the pain and suffering of 
understanding that so many of their goals and images of the world have been 
shattered by the collapse of their relationship. Indeed it may well be irrelevant 
who has legal control of the children, compared with the devastation of having to 
live separated from them. This is not to say that the law cannot play a part in 
rearranging family life, it is simply to indicate that the question of reform is 
not answered by the Children Act 1989. 
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Thus it has been established that the courts have powers to intervene in family 
life on the separation of the parents. The issue is therefore opened as to the 
considerations that the courts must make in exercising their powers of 
intervention. 
ii. the regulation of that-consideration. 
a. early statutory interpretation 
While the outline above gives an indication of when the courts may intervene to 
make orders concerning the private arrangements for children within a family, the 
question arises of how the court should exercise its discretion, for, indeed, in 
this area the courts have considerable discretion. For example the wording of 
section 42 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 gave the following power to the 
court in section 42(1): 
The court may make such order as it thinks fit for the custody and 
education of any child of the family who is under the age of eighteen ... 
and in any case in which the court has power by virtue of this subsection to 
make an order in respect of a child it may instead, if it thinks fit, direct 
that proper proceedings be taken for making the child a ward of court. 
The concept regulating the exercise of the courts discretion is that of the 
welfare of the child. This is a relatively old and established concept in family 
law, dating back to the mid-nineteenth century, and arguably stemming from the 
industrial development of the labour market. A shift occurred in the perception of 
family life, from the early agrarian family, which was concerned very strongly 
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with the whole family as an income producing unit, to the early industrial family, 
in which the children still became working members of the family at an early age, 
and then onto a more automated industrial work-place, requiring fewer people. 
This allowed for the emergence of the radical view that childhood was, in some 
ways special, or at least fragile and different to adulthood, a privilege 
previously only afforded to the upper-classes. One aspect of this change was the 
need for a more social education policy, as the families could not . support 
individual teaching for their children. The perception of vulnerability produced 
the concept of the protection of the child's welfare24. 
Before tracing the development of the welfare principle in English law, it is 
worth noting the adoption- of the concept of the welfare of the child 
internationally. In its report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
entitled Parental Rights and Duties, including Guardianship, the Commission on 
the Status of Women found, after a general historical introduction in the rights 
of family life in Roman Law - the pater familias -a wide acceptance of the 
concept of the welfare of the child in both codified and common law systems25. 
The statutory regulation of the judicial discretion in making orders concerning 
the child develops slowly over the period of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. Maidment (1984) shows the intricate nature of the development 
of the concept of the welfare of the child, suggesting that the concept grew up in 
the light of two phenomena, the increasing awareness of childhood, and the 
question of the rights of the woman26. The statutory inclusion of the concept of 
the child's welfare stems from the gradual acceptance of the concept in Equity. 
The concept can be seen in the statutes first, in Serjeant Telfourd's Infants' 
Custody Act 1839. However, the development must be seen from case law, 
starting in the eighteenth century. At Common Law, the custody of the child 
vested in the father from the child's birth. This was enforced through the King's 
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Bench by the writ of habeas corpus, which allowed the legal custodian to enforce 
his rights against all others. This was rigidly applied, as in the case of R v. De 
Mannev[Ile (1804)27. While custody applications by the mother were usually 
defeated, the courts would uphold access agreements made in Separation Deeds, 
as in Ex parte. Lytton (1781). 
Equity, operating in the Court of Chancery, began to develop a judicial interest 
in the child independently of the common law. In Smith v. Smith (1745), the 
traditional use of parens patriae to protect a child's property, was broken to 
allow a mother to prevent her daughter from marrying. This followed Ex parte 
Hopkins (1732) where the Lord Chancellor, accepting that the common law 
prescribed the return of. a child of 13 to her father, felt that, in Equity, the 
court should hear the girls wishes, and ordered. . she should live in her deceased 
uncle's property accordingly. The cases as between the mother and father 
remained generally in favour of the father, however, although the welfare of the 
child can be seen to be emerging as a doctrine of the court. 
By the time of the Custody of Infants Act 1839, it was accepted that a mother 
could apply for custody and access of her child at Equity. From this, a child's 
welfare as an independent consideration for the court can be seen to emerge in 
cases in the mid-nineteenth century. In cases of a mother's adultery, the courts 
adopted a very strict rule that custody and access would be denied to the guilty 
woman, as in Clout v. Clout (1861) and Codrington v. Codrington (1864). This rule 
can be seen to change, and with it the line of legislation can be seen to change. 
In Heathcote v. Heathcote (1864) a drunken and violent mother was denied access 
to her child on the grounds that the application was not made out of love and 
affection for the child, and that her visits were injurious to the health of the 
child. A similar development came through cases challenging the father's right to 
custody of his children. Re Fynn (1848) stated that the principle directing a 
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court in removing a father's right to custody was the "welfare of the child", 
although being such an open-textured principle, it received a very strict reading 
resulting in few decisions against the father. Re Curtis (1859) saw the 
modification of the principle to define it in terms of physical, intellectual and 
moral harm 
Philip v. Philip (1872) saw expression of the judicial position that the "leading 
principle of the court [was] to consider the welfare of the child before the 
indulgence of the parents..... whenever the welfare of children is likely to be 
seriously jeopardised by that indulgence, the court gives precedence to the 
interest of the children". The year 1873 saw the acceptance of the welfare 
principle in statutory form. Section 25(10) of the Judicature Act 1873 held that 
the rules of equity prevailed in disputes concerning the custody and education of 
infants; further, the Custody of Infants Act 1873 saw three developments in the 
statutory expression of those rules, following the case of Hamilton v. Hector 
(1872). By the Custody of Infants Act, the mother could apply for custody of her 
children up to the age of 16 years, where the bar had previously been at seven 
years; the rules barring adulterous mothers were lifted; and Separation Deeds 
giving custody, to the mother would only be unenforceable if it. was not to the 
benefit of the child. Thus, in the statutes the development of the rights of 
mothers and children were apparently moving on. However, the case of Re 
Agar-Ellis (1883) showed the continued acceptance in practice of the "sacred 
rights" of the father. In that case, the interests of the child were said to be 
found in "natural law", which dictated that the custody should be with the father. 
The outcry against this decision produced further legislation on the rights of the 
woman. Maidment28" suggests that the Parliamentary debates show that the 
children's welfare was used to smooth the way of reducing the father's rights. The 
Guardianship of Infants Act 1886 allowed a mother, in a marriage experiencing 
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difficulties, to apply for custody of her children, even though the father was 
still living. The welfare of the child became the first of three conditions to 
which a court should have regard in making an order, the second and third being 
the conduct and wishes of the mother and father, which were to be considered 
equally. The importance of the child's welfare over the rights of his or her 
parent can be seen in the Children Act 1891. In cases where the parent had given 
up the child to be brought up by another person, or had caused the . same by 
abandoning the child, then the parent had to satisfy the court that he was a fit 
person to regain custody of the child. This, therefore, gave a different emphasis 
concerning the child's rights in their own development as against the parents. 
Bromley indicates that the power was to be exercised by the court in cases of 
moral turpitude, and shows cases where the courts did not penalize a parents who 
passed care to another. temporarily because it was best for the child in the 
circumstances29. 
Thus, by 1900, the law showed a twofold change of position. First, the mother and 
father were to be seen as equals, effectively removing the doctrine of the "sacred 
rights" of the father, and secondly the welfare of the child became the 
"paramount" condition. Indeed the term 
_"paramount" was 
being used in the 
judgements to describe the importance given to the-welfare -of the child, as in 
D'Alton v. D'Alton (1878) and* Re -Newton (1896). Thus the courts had prepared 
the way for the most familiar and enduring procedure for the interests of the 
child, namely that found in the Guardianship of Infants Act 1925. This directed 
the courts that in decision-making concerning custody and access of children the 
welfare of the child should be the first and paramount consideration, and that the 
mother and father were equal before the law. 
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b. Guardianship of Minors Act 1971. 
The Guardianship of Minors Act 1971 accepted the 1925 Act as the guide for the 
exercise of the courts' power. Section 1 stated: 
Where in any proceedings before any court ( .. ) - 
(a) the legal custody-or upbringing of a minor; or 
(b) the administration of any property belonging to or held on 
trust for a minor, or the application of the income thereof, 
is in question, the court, in deciding that question, shall have regard to 
the welfare of the minor as the first and paramount consideration, and shall 
not take into consideration whether from any other point of view the claim 
of the father, in respect of such upbringing, administration or application 
is superior to that of the mother, or the claim of the mother is superior to 
that of the father. 
It is clear from the 1971 Act, that the provision is not limited to applications 
made under that Act, but rather that its scope includes all three of the statutory 
vehicles outlined above by which the question of the child's custody becomes an 
issue for the court. The principle is not expanded by parliament in this Act. The 
courts are ý directed on the basis that they understand the concept and practical 
meaning of "welfare" and "paramountcy" without further elaboration. 
From the wording of the 1971 Act, it appears that the principle applies to both 
private and public law: to all issues of custody and the upbringing of the child - 
the areas of public care and adoption. This is not the case. The Act does not 
apply to public law, which has its own requirements concerning the child's 
welfare. The piecemeal development of the law relating to children is highlighted 
in this respect. In relation to child care, the Child Care Act 1980 indicates, at 
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section 3(6), that the welfare of the child should be considered in deciding 
whether a resolution by the local authority to assume parental rights and duties 
should lapse by virtue of the service of a counter notice. Indeed, the duty 
imposed on the local authority by the 1980 Act is to promote the welfare of the 
child. However, this differs from the 1971 Act, in that the consideration is not 
the paramount consideration for the courts. Again, the welfare of the child is to 
be considered in the Children Act -1975 and the Adoption Act 1976 when the 
court is considering adoption for the child, however it is not the first and 
paramount consideration of the court In the 1975 Act section 3 and the 1976 Act 
section 6, the duty of the -court is to "have regard to all circumstances, first 
consideration being given to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of the 
child throughout his childhood". Further, as is seen in A v. Liverpool City 
Council (1982) and Re W (1985), the courts are reluctant to allow an appeal 
against the way a local authority exercises its statutory rights through the 
welfare principle. 
On its face, these distinctions appear to be semantic differences; the effect 
seeming to be the same in each case. However, this has not been the 
interpretation of the courts, or indeed of the commentators30. The Guardianship 
of Minors Act 1971 principle is seen as excluding all other considerations beyond 
the welfare of the child, whereas the other formulations are seen to give a wider 
opportunity for the court to hear other issues. It remains to be seen, in the 
empirical study, how the practitioners devising arguments to secure victory for 
their clients, in the private law, perceive the relationship between the interests 
of the child and the interests of the parents involved. Further, it may be 
impossible to detach the consideration of the interests of the parents from those 
of the child. 
The overriding nature of the paramountcy principle as regards the "upbringing" of 
the child has also been challenged. One could argue, as indeed it was in Richards 
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v. Richards (1984), that the upbringing of the child should include the arguments 
concerning the matrimonial home in which the child was living. In the Richards 
case, an ouster injunction was sought under section 1(3) of the Matrimonial 
Homes Act 1967. The defence involved the argument that, given the home in 
question was that of the child, the court was bound by the 1971 Act to consider 
the welfare of the child as first and paramount consideration. The court found 
that this was not the case as the issue before the court was not one which 
directly concerned the welfare of the child as, for example, a custody dispute 
would be. Therefore the court could take wider considerations into account in 
reaching its decision. Lord Scarman, perhaps taking a more realistic view than the 
rest of the House of Lords, felt that such a detachment could not be made as the 
question of making an order about where the child lived would necessarily be 
bound up with considerations about his or her custody. 
The difference between the public and private application of the welfare principle 
is not clear, but falls outside the scope of this study. The law is doing two very 
different things in public and private law, or it would seem to be doing separate 
things. In public child law, the emphasis is solely on the intervention of the 
state to prevent harm to the child by changing the - parenting actors for the 
individual child. For example, moving the child from the natural parent to local 
.. authority parenting 
In private law, the traditional explanation for the intervention is on the basis 
of management of the child's future parenting needs in a changed family dynamic. 
An alternative explanation could stem from the perception of the harm that 
parental separation can cause to the child and the need to protect the child, as 
has already been noted from Bromley31. Clearly this is of interest, given the 
evidence already presented on section 41 hearings, and when considering the 
number of unmarried couples who separate outside the scope of the law. This 
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distinction will become a crucial factor in the question of the röle of the law in 
family separation: whether separating children need protection, and how the law 
can or should intervene in family life within the boundary of good parenting. ' 
c. Children Act 1989: implications 
The Children Act 1989 embraces the concept of the welfare of the child, adopting 
it from the 1971 Act, in section 1. The 1989 Act removes the requirement that the 
consideration be the first made by the courts; the Law Commission believed that 
the term was superfluous, as the concept was expressed in paramountcy. Parry32 
indicates that the Law Commission's original purpose was to change the statutory 
requirement to the welfare of the child being the only consideration of the 
courts, but this was not adopted by the government in framing the Children Bill. 
It is worth noting that the early sections on the 1989 Act were not questioned in 
detail, if at all, in the debates in either of the Houses of Parliament at 
Committee Stage, but were accepted as concepts to be included in the Act. This is 
interesting, as the concepts, following the 1925 and 1971 Acts are very vague and 
allow the practitioners and judiciary to make their own interpretations of the 
nebulous concept of the child's welfare. The Children Bill did not question what 
the understanding of the concept should. be under the new law. Further, the Law 
Commission, in Working Paper no. 93, decided against producing a detailed 
definition of the meaning of welfare in their recommendations. With regard to 
guidelines, the view was that "the only guidelines which could be developed to 
resolve such cases would have potentially arbitrary and undesirable results"33. 
Given their preference that the child's welfare be the only consideration, the Law 
Commission doubted the need for detailed definition of the concept. 
The Commission preferred that the courts could be assisted in their 
decision-making by a checklist of matters which should be considered in applying 
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the welfare principle. The checklist appears at section 1(3) of the 1989 Act. This 
instructs the court in considering the child's welfare, to "have regard in 
particular to - 
(a) the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child concerned 
(considered in the light of his age and understanding); 
(b) his physical, emotional and educational needs; 
(c) the likely effect on him of any change in his circumstances; 
(d) his age, sex, background and any characteristics of his which the 
court considers relevant; 
(e) any harm which he has suffered or is at risk of suffering; 
(f) how capable each of his parents, and any other person in relation to 
whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of meeting 
his needs; 
(g) the range of powers available to the court under this Act in the 
proceedings in question. 
This checklist will be considered in greater detail in the light of the findings 
of this research, and the discussion of the meaning of the welfare of the child. 
It is sufficient to suggest-'that the checklist is disappointing as it simply 
produces a further set of terms and concepts which need clarification and an 
underpinning philosophy before they become informative to the courts in the 
question of the understanding of "the child's welfare". 
Alongside the welfare of the child, the 1989 Act places two further principles. By 
section 1(5), the courts are only to make orders when such an action would be 
better than not making an order. The second principle is the retention of parental 
responsibility. The latter has already been noted in the context of joint orders. 
The former again suffers from the lack of definition in the welfare concept. It 
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could be that this will be seen as an invitation for the court to apply a strong 
managerial röle in separation law - that the decision of the parents will be taken 
as final in all cases - but it could equally be interpreted on a "harm" basis - 
that the courts should investigate the quality of the decisions. The indication 
from the Act, in replacing section 4134 on a quasi-managerial basis, while not 
removing the need to resolve the two definitions, is that the interpretation of 
the child's welfare has a hidden meaning of "the parents know best". If that is 
the case, which may well be justifiable, it throws into some confusion the 
requirement that the courts seek the 
_ 
welfare of the child as the paramount 
consideration, unless one of the guidelines is understood to be "the parents 
decisions are always in the child's best interests", which clearly invites the 
courts to make value judgements about the quality of the parents' 
decision-making. Indeed, Maidment identifies the lack of definition of the 
statutory provision. She finds, referring to the statutory development, that 
"there [was no] essential understanding of what the welfare principle meant other 
than as a reference to existing judicial values"35. 
There are two further issues raised in the Act which, although envisaged to have a 
great impact in public child law, could have effects in the private sphere of 
separation law, namely "timetables" (section 11(1)), and "provision for children 
in need" (section 17). 
The concept. of timetables introduced in section 11(1) is a practical attempt to 
deal with procedural delays in bringing issues to court. Section 1(2) of the Act 
indicates the legislative belief that the best interests of the child are 
fulfilled by expediency in practice. Thus, under section 11, the court is 
empowered when any question of making a section 8 order, to set a timetable to 
ensure that the question is heard without delay. Clearly, this is an excellent 
idea. Delays in bringing custody and access disputes to the court in divorce added 
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to the distress of the parties. However, there are two issues which suggest a 
cautionary use of the power should be adopted. First, the timetables must take 
account of work-loads of the professionals. Clearly, the resources question in the 
court welfare office is a parallel issue for the welfare of the child. In order 
that cases be heard more quickly, the child does not need a timetable from the 
court, rather he or she needs an appropriate number of welfare officers to meet 
the demands placed on the service. Secondly, the process of conciliation, if it is 
to work for the parents, must be given a very flexible timescale. This will be 
most relevant to the court welfare based mediation, as voluntary conciliation most 
often occurs before a court timetable might be envisaged. The view of the judges 
as to the propriety of the welfare officers engaging in mediation will clearly 
influence the judge's view of the timetable needed for the process of welfare 
reporting, and the conduct of individual cases. 
By section 17, the local authority is placed under a duty to safeguard and promote 
the welfare of children within their area. This, in the section and in Schedule 
2, part 1, creates a duty of care, the breadth of which has enormous implications 
for local authorities. Clearly, under the. Act it is envisaged that a very narrow 
view of welfare will be taken, reflecting that the concept originally came from 
the public provisions for children. There is, however, a need for help to be 
extended to children experiencing parental separation, and the number of such 
children is very high. The "family centre", found in Schedule 2 part 9, would 
clearly be of great use to such. children and their families. Such a radical 
interpretation of welfare could be supported in the Act. However, the financial 
resources required would be massive. This, as in so many issues relating to 
financial provision for children, becomes a question of political will, which 
would suggest radicalism will not figure on the agenda for the implementation of 
these sections. 
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C. Conclusions. 
The regulation of the courts' powers to intervene in the family are based around a 
concept which, from its adoption in the statutes, has been lacking in definition. 
It can easily be seen that the requirement of the child's best interests, even 
with the addition of the "checklist", is merely a conduit, carrying the social and 
moral values of judges, lawyers, para-legals, and parents seeking the courts' 
ruling at any given time. Having established in the various statutory 
requirements that the welfare of the child is the court's paramount consideration, 
the crucial issue at this stage of the work is to develop an understanding of the 
way in which the statutory requirements are applied in the case-law and practice 
of separation law. 
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PART ONE: THE LAW RELATING TO SEPARATION AND CHILDREN., 
1.2 THE APPLICATION OF THE WELFARE PRINCIPLE. 
A. The Precedent Value of Case Law. 
B. The Courts' Interpretation of Welfare: A Thematic Approach: 
i. the interpretation of paramount; _ 
ii. the interpretation of the child's welfare; 
iii. the. themes and considerations of the court in custody, 
care and control, and access... 
a. status quo 
b. maternal instinct 
c. conduct: 
i. general, 
ii. conduct and abduction: an issue of enforcement 
iii. conduct and lesbianism: an issue of prejudice? 
d. natural parents v stranger 
e. material advantages 
f. religion 
g. siblings 
h. child's wishes 
i joint orders 
j. court welfare officers' opinions, and other expert testimony 
k. appeals, and conduct of cases 
Access and Contact Issues: 
L access: whose right? 
M. access: enforcement 
a access: suitability 
o. access: removal from jurisdiction 
C. The Court's Interpretation of Welfare: A Chronological Approach: 
i. the reduction in reported litigation; 
ii. new themes. 
D. Conclusions. 
1.2 THE APPLICATION OF THE WELFARE PRINCIPLE. 
A. The Precedent Value of Case Law. 
The reported case law on separation law - decisions relating to custody, care and 
control, access, and now residence, and contact orders - is interpreted in two 
main ways. On the one hand it is the concern of the, courts deciding new cases, 
and -on the other it is the concern of academic analysis. 
The judicial analysis of the case occurs within two constraints or factors. First, 
the process of separation law and the decision making concerning the children 
occurs within an adversarial framework Contrasting with continental models of 
inquisition, which perhaps offer a more flexible framework within which to 
examine what are essentially emotional problems, the English courts remain 
adversarial, despite calls for a new structure within a family court. As the name 
suggests, the process depends on the presentation of the arguments for each side 
before the judge who then makes his or her decision on the presented facts and 
law, the courts only being able to step beyond the issues raised by the parties in 
wardship cases. Thus, in court, the forum could be said to resemble a battle, 
soldiered by solicitors and barristers whose weapons are the eloquence of their 
arguments. 
The second factor within which separation law occurs in the courts is that the 
precedent value of decided cases is slight, in the sense that the courts will not 
cite decided cases as authority for their new decisionsl. As Professor H. K. Bevan 
argues, "the circumstances of each case and their possible impact are so variable 
that earlier decisions should be treated circumspectly, and the older they are the 
less reliable they may eventually become through changing social attitudes 
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towards parental responsibility in bringing up children. "2 This is easily 
understood when one considers the nature of family cases. The statutory 
requirement is that the court makes its decision holding the child's welfare as 
paramount consideration. Clearly this relates to a specific family dynamic; the 
question before the courts is one of the suitability of different proposals for 
the child given the individuals involved in the family. Therefore, to accept a 
previous decision as justification for. the proposed arrangements could be akin to 
fettering the discretion of the courts, given their statutory charge. 
The sum of these two elements is that the courts in separation decisions 
concerning the child, because there is very little "law", are consumed with 
arguments concerning facts - arrangements - which are presented in the language 
of the child's "best interests". The lawyers' concern in the cases, given an 
adversarial system, is to present their clients' proposals to the court as the 
best available, and hence, the analogy with the battle becomes more prominent as 
the two sides argue to show the child's welfare lies with their particular 
perception of the situation. Indeed within such a climate of argument, the 
interpretation of the child's welfare, as Bevan argues, "is not free from 
uncertainty and the likely result of its application in a particular case is 
sometimes difficult to predict. "3 
While the development of the case law does not show a traditional common law 
development of the law, with decisions building and accepting the past as 
conventional precedents, the academic study of the cases classically shows the 
decisions falling within thematic groups. This thematic approach can show the 
development of the judicial understanding of the statutory term, "the welfare of 
the child". Hence, the first part of this analysis of the decided cases centres on 
the conventional interpretation of the cases, - accepting a thematic approach, 
However, this, it is suggested, may be complemented by a chronological analysis 
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of the reported cases. Such an analysis would allow for a reading of the approach 
taken by the courts in deciding the child's welfare alongside social concerns 
contemporary with the courts' activity. It may also clarify the importance which 
the courts place on certain themes, and indeed chart that impact over time. 
Alternatively, it may show that the courts are constantly faced with the same 
themes in the decisions that are reported in the law reports and the journals. 
B. The Courts' Interpretation of Welfare: A Thematic Approach. 
Two issues arise for consideration here, both concerned with statutory 
interpretation. First, the interpretation placed on the word "paramount" must be 
explored, and secondly, and here the issue is märe complicated, the interpretation 
of "welfare" must be investigated. 
i. the interpretation of paramount. 
Described4 as the "golden thread" running through the whole of the courts' 
custodial jurisdiction, the question of "paramountcy" of the welfare principle is 
central to the understanding of the way the courts make decisions in questions of 
custody, care and control, and access. A distinction has already been drawn 
between the statutory requirements in this area and in care and adoption, and 
indeed in the separation of the issues as directly and indirectly concerned with 
the welfare of the child in the eyes of the court It is clearly a matter of 
argument as to what is and what is not in the interests of the child, and also 
what is the interest of the child, and what is the interest of the parent clothed 
in the language of the interest of the child. 
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Both the 1925 and 1971 Acts, after directing the courts to consider the welfare of 
the child as first and paramount consideration, go on to include a direction that 
the consideration of the whether the father's rights outweigh the mother's, or 
vice versa, are secondary to the main endeavour of the court, which focuses on 
the child. Maidment (1984) suggests that the thrust for the inclusion of the 
paramountcy principle was not so much the concern for the child but rather a 
"play-off' for the inclusion in the 
. 
1925 statute of the equal rights of the 
woman5. This may well be the case. The preamble to the 1925 Act was at pains to 
draw attention to the fact that the legislation brought custody law in line with 
the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act 1919. However, granting the power to 
women as subordinate to the welfare of the child could have helped to secure the 
passage of the Bill. 
Despite the statutory indication that the parental claims were secondary to the 
child's welfare, the meaning of the terms "first and paramount" were not 
immediately clear. The classic statement of the judicial interpretation of 
"paramountcy", and its derivation, is found in J v. C (1970). The case, heard 
prior to the 1971 Act under the Guardianship of Infants Act 1925, concerned the 
welfare of the child of a Spanish family, born in England. The child had been 
placed with foster parents, and it was the refusal by the lower court, before Mr 
Justice Ungoed-Thomas, to grant an order to the parents giving them custody, 
care and control of their son, which was at issue before the House of Lords. The 
submission of the appellant parents was that the law compelled the courts to find 
in favour of the natural parents by virtue of that sole qualification, effectively 
challenging the paramountcy principle of the 1925 Act. 
The judgement of Lord Justice Guest concentrated on the issue of the power of 
the courts to place the welfare of the child before the rights of the natural 
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parents - essentially, the question of paramountcy. He explained the historical 
development. of the power of the court in custody cases, examining the caselaw 
already discussed5. His exposition of the rights of the parents against strangers 
will be considered as part of the discussion on the meaning of the child's 
welfare, however, regarding paramountcy Lord Guest indicated that there had 
been an initial preference for the interests of the parents before the court was 
willing to intervene on behalf of the child's interests. However, under the 1925 
Act, the emphasis and practice of the court had moved squarely onto a primary 
place for the child's welfare by In re Carroll (1931). Citing Morton J. in In re 
B's Settlement (1940) and Danckwerts LJ in In re Adoption Application 41161 
(1963) Lord Guest accepted Lord Danckwerts' explanation of the meaning of 
"paramountcy", that "first and paramount" necessarily implied that all other 
issues "must be subordinate. The mere desire of a parent to have his child must be 
subordinate to the consideration of the welfare of the child, and can be effective 
only if it coincides with the welfare of the child. "6 
While Lord Guest concentrated on the practical application of the principle, and 
the rights of the parents, Lord MacDermott considered "paramountcy" in a more 
abstract way, giving what has been accepted in both cases and text-books as the 
leading explanation of the question.? The appellant parents argued that there was 
a necessary presumption to be made in the law that compelled the court to decide 
for natural parents over strangers - in this case foster parents. For Lord 
MacDermott, "the question of law under discussion is therefore whether there 
now is such a presumption as that contended for by the appellants, or whether the 
correct process of adjudication is, instead, to consider all material aspects of 
the case, including the claims of the parents, and then to decide in the exercise 
of a judicial discretion what is best for the welfare of the child". 8 
Lord MacDermott rehearsed the line of cases which showed the development of 
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the right of the Court to intervene on behalf of the Crown, and the acceptance of 
the welfare of the child over the right of the parent. Therefore, he saw In re 
Carroll (1931) as wrongly decided, as it suggested that the paramountcy principle 
applied only when the dispute was between the two parents and not in cases 
concerning the parents and a stranger. In Lord MacDermott's opinion, and 
following the earlier caselaw, the 1925 Act principle was to apply in all cases 
concerning the-custody or upbringing of the child. However, there remained the 
second question, the meaning of "first and paramount" consideration. On this 
point, a simple reading of the statute was required: 
"reading these words in their ordinary significance, and relating them to 
the various classes of proceedings which the section has already mentioned, 
it seems to me that they must mean more than that the child's welfare is to 
be treated as the top item in a list of items relevant to the matter in 
question. I think they connote a process whereby, when all the relevant 
facts, relationships, claims and wishes of parents, risks, choices and other 
circumstances are taken into account and weighed, the course to be followed 
will be that which is most in the interests of the child's welfare as that 
term has now to be understood. That is first consideration because it is of 
first importance and the paramount consideration because it rules upon or 
determines the course to be followed ". g 
He then indicated the practical application of this, using In re Thain (1926) as 
his example. The court, in that case, held the welfare of the child as paramount 
consideration, but saw that as being met both by the father, and his deceased 
wife's sister and her husband. The view taken by the court, and supported by Lord 
MacDermott, was that "first and paramount" consideration did not amount to 
"sole" consideration. Other considerations should be taken into account and used 
to inform the welfare of the child. Thus, in Thain the court felt that the welfare 
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of the child would be met equally by her present family and by her father and his 
new wife, and that in deciding between the two, the fact that the father was 
unimpeachable would weigh heavily in his favour. 
Paramountcy was again given the straight forward meaning of the words by Lord 
Donovan who felt that "this [was] a statute which is almost refreshing in its 
clarity", 10 again applying the simple- meaning of the words and not contorting 
them by reference to the preamble, or the statutory reference to the dispute 
between the mother and the father's views. Lord Upjohn followed this view. il 
Given that the welfare of the child is the court's primary consideration to which 
all others are subordinate, the question of how the rule is interpreted moves to 
focus on how the court interprets the term the "welfare of the child". 
ii the interpretation of the child's welfare. 
In In re McGrath (Infants) (1893), Lord Justice Lindley explained the 
interpretation of the child's welfare thus: 
"The dominant matter for consideration of the court is the welfare of the 
child. But the welfare of a child is not to be measured by money only, nor 
by physical comfort only. The word welfare must be taken in its widest 
sense. The moral and religious welfare of the child must be considered as 
well as its physical well-being. Nor can the ties of affection be 
disregarded. " 
The crucial element in establishing how the courts move from statements such as 
this to a decision in the case is the theoretical framework within which the 
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judges make their decision. It is, however, difficult to find a statement of the 
framework from the judges. Lord Upjohn, in his comments on how the courts 
determine the issues and their relevance, opined that the tool was the judge's 
general knowledge and experience in "infancy matters", and that medical evidence 
of "physical, neurological or psychological malady or condition" should only be 
accepted with any weight in cases where the child is being treated for such a 
condition. 'For the "normal" child, the judge should be prepared to "take risks" 
and follow his common sense in seeing what is in the child's welfare. This 
principle of the ability of the judges to understand the child's needs by hearing 
the evidence and relying on their worldly experience is also widely accepted in 
the case law. This is supported throughout the caselaw. Therefore, the theoretical 
framework is the "common sense" of the judges, and not a theoretical definition of 
the needs of a child especially in relation to parental separation. 
The judiciary are often criticised as aloof from the real lives of the people 
before them, however it is not always the case that the judges believe they know 
all things. The eagerness of the courts to encourage extra judicial settlement of 
custody disputes could be seen as one reaction to the public feeling that judges 
do not always understand the dynamics of family disputes. Indeed the courts do 
not always follow the same, almost arrogant, line expressed by Lord Upjohn. In 
the American case of Garska v. McCoy (1981) the court expressed its reservations 
as to its competence to determine a child's welfare, saying: 
"in the average divorce proceedings intelligent determination of relative 
degrees of fitness requires a precision measurement which is not possible 
given the tools available to judges. Certainly it is no more reprehensible 
for judges to admit that they cannot measure minute gradations of 
psychological capacity between two fit parents than it is for a physicist to 
concede that it is impossible for him to measure the speed of an electron. " 
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Close attention must therefore be paid to the beliefs of the judiciary about the 
needs and welfare of children. Secondly, and further complicating the analysis of, 
the cases by both courts and academics, is the individuality of the actors in each 
case and the interplay of different interpretations of the child's best interests. 
Thus, what may appear to be a case concerning, as in the case of J v. C studied 
above, the rights of the natural parents as against the foster parents, will also 
be about issues of whether the child. is settled in one routine, the competence of 
the parents to offer a better upbringing for the child, whether the child has a 
circle of friends and contacts which could be broken, and a host of other 
conscious decisions. There may well also be issues of the subconscious; the 
approach of counsel for one parent or the other, the appearance of the parties, 
the judge's personal beliefs about class, nationality, age. These will be 
imperceptible from the transcripts of the cases, and yet will have as much, if not 
more relevance about the actual decisions as the stated reasons and the homilies 
from the bench about good parenting. 
The judgements could be, on the one hand and, indeed as they claim to be, an 
accurate description of the logical process of determining the order of competing 
interests and therefore the child's best interests. On the other hand, however, 
the transcripts may be concerned with justifying hard decisions - decisions 
complicated by the lack of logic and overbearing presence of emotion, the 
subconscious beliefs and prejudices of all the participants, - and the needs of the 
judges and the legal process to give authority to decisions which are largely 
based on a guess as to how the parties will react with their changing 
circumstances. These claims will be explored later in the work, but should be a 
consideration in the mind of the reader while considering the following exposition 
which seeks to examine the meaning of the child's best interests. The approach is 
the thematic analysis of the textbooks, taking the decisions at their face value. 
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iii. the themes and considerations of the court in custody, care and 
control, and access. 
The themes represent competing interests of the parties which form the balancing 
exercise which the court must perform in deciding cases where the parents cannot 
agree for themselves. The first themes arise under the consideration of custody, 
and care and control, under the pre-Children Act 1989 law. Custody refers to the 
parental rights and duties surrounding the child, care and control to where the 
child lives and the day-to-day decisions for him or her. Exactly what should be 
included under this umberella -term is not fixed12, as was seen in the Gillick 
case, however the consensus is that the parent has responsibilities to the child 
which respect not only the. vulnerability of the- child, but also the individuality 
and development of the child towards adulthood. Thus, the responsibility is 
complete at the child's birth, but by the teenage years, the child should be 
allowed to participate in decisions concerning his or her life. 
The shift which has occurred from parental rights to parental responsibility could 
be seen as a passage from the child as the property of first the father, and then 
the mother and father together, to a charter allowing the child progressively to 
gain ownership of his or her own life under the protection of the family. Indeed 
this is the philosophy behind the changes to the parent child relationship in the 
Children Act 1989. Hoggett (1987) indicates13 that the question is a "tripartite" 
relationship between the parents, the child and the state. Professor Steven 
Cretney14 argues from a more conservative view point that the parents' authority 
is observable as a concept throughoput English law, but sees it as eroded by the 
paramountcy of the welfare of the child, the ability of the child to reach his or 
her own decisions, and by the state's intervention in care proceedings. 
Alternatively, the changes could be seen in terms of the focus which is placed 
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upon the same essential services. Thus both definitions, rights or 
responsibilities, are concerned with the child's education, religion, care and 
possession, name and identity15, health and control of medical treatment, 
behaviour and discipline, travel, marriage, finance and property, adoption, to act 
on behalf of the child in legal proceedings, and the day-today decisions such as 
diet and television. Essentially all these issues concern the child's physical 
well being, but above all it is a question of the control of the environment 
within which the child will gain the experiences necessary for independent living 
within society. 
A second element, which can be seen clearly in the Gillick decision, concerns the 
relationship between the parent and the child as the child makes the transition 
from birth to adulthood. Gill[ck, - which concerned the right of a mother to 
determine an aspect of the medical care of her daughter prior to her sixteenth 
birthday, accepts that over the course of "childhood", the child moves from total 
reliance upon the parents, to total independence from the parents, and that this 
should be a gradual development over time. Thus, one of the most important 
rights for the child, perhaps even a right for the parent, is the right for the 
child to make the transition to adult That seems to be what the parenting is 
concerned with regardless of whether the "services" are rights or duties. 
Essentially then, the issues . under 
debate are the elements which each set of 
parents and child - family - must work out as they experience the years from birth 
to 16. The law, when considering parental rights, does not provide answers to the 
question of how the family should interact within itself; it does not seek to 
prescribe the values which the individuals should develop. Indeed, how could it 
from both the question of consensus or enforcement? Society does not need to 
control the family at such a micro level. The question of parental duties or 
responsibilities stands within the boundary of macro standards maintained by 
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society. Thus, if the parent decides that the child does not need education, or 
clothing the state reserves a right to step in an enforce what could be said to be 
the child's rights, or societies expectations. 
Custody is concerned with the major decisions of family life within the boundary 
of state intervention. The label placed on those decisions does not concern the 
content of the decisions, in as much. as the decisions are unique to each family, 
and unless they cross the boundary, the state is not concerned with them. Further, 
if the conflict between the parents and the child become such that the parent 
seeks one end, while the child seeks the other, resolution would not be found in 
exercising rights in court, but rather in taking action such as leaving home. 
Thus, if the debate does not concern the content of the rights or duties, the 
question emerges: why is the law and the political community so concerned with a 
linguistic issue? This will be addressed later in the work. 
Custody concerns the large decisions which parents must make concerning the 
upbringing of their child. Care and control concerns where the child will live, 
and the day-to-day decisions which accompany living with children. Custody, on 
parental separation under the pre-1989 law, would' be awarded to one of the 
parents unless a joint custody order was made, and custody and care and control 
could be split as was determined in Wild v. Wild (1969). Dipper v. Dipper (1980), 
considered whether the effect of awarding custody to one parent effectively 
excluded the other from all future decisions concerning the child. It was held 
that the custody order did not give one parent exclusive or "absolute" rights over 
the child and decisions concerning him or her. Rather, it found that the other 
parent should always be consulted, and an ultimate right over decisions vested 
only in the court. However, a winning and losing element could be felt when both 
parents wished to retain the children. Likewise, and perhaps more importantly, the 
issue of care and control, determining where the child would live, would be the 
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most devastating to a relationship with a child, and thus a point of fierce 
contention between the separating couple. Because the majority of orders did not 
split the custody and the care and control, the reports concern applications for 
"custody" of the children, which concerned both. In the vast majority of the cases 
the endeavour of the parties is to secure the children with them. 
The second group of themes concern- access, or contact. Again as thorny- an issue 
as custody, the cases represent the attempts of a non-custodial party to retain a 
relationship with his or her child. Perhaps this is the more difficult as it 
concerns the continued contact of the parents. It will be seen that the courts on 
the problem of enforcement of access orders are virtually powerless. 
The Themes. 
a. status quo 
Perhaps the most important factor for the courts is the principle expressed by 
Lord Justice Ormrod in Re B (a Minor) (1983)16 , when 
he stated that a 
"fundamental rule of child care is that stability is all important and the 
maintenance of some sort of routine crucial". Clearly, in the period after the 
parents have separated a new family order will have emerged. This may be by 
circumstances or by interim court order. The courts seem to start from an 
acceptance of the present position and then weigh other factors alongside the 
basic premise that to disrupt the child's established circumstances would be 
detrimental. Further, maintaining the status quo is accepted as a means of 
maintaining the continuity of care of the child, as in S(BD) v. S(DJ) (Children: 
Care and Control) (1977) and Dicocco V. Milne (1983). This may even extend to 
the courts accepting that the child is stable within what the courts believe is an 
unorthodox environment, asin B v. B (Minors) (Custody, Care and Control) (1991). 
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The status quo argument is used mainly to protect the custody of the child with 
one parent or effect the return of the child to a former position. However, in In 
re A (Minors: Access) (1991) the father was denied reinstatement of access after a 
two year gap, as this would cause distress to the two young children in their 
newly established family life. 
The strength of the arrangements, and especially the length of time that they have 
been in place, is seen by the courts to strengthen the court's duty to uphold the 
situation, and resist the temptation to interfere. This is widely accepted in the 
cases, as in Re C (Minors) (1978), and S v. W (1981). Again this argument can be 
seen in Stephenson v. Stephenson (1985). Here a young girl lived with her father 
after the separation of her parents, and a strong bond had grown. The mother left 
the family home and the child. The father's sister helped him for a time before 
the father started cohabiting with a new partner, who gave up her work to look 
after the child. The mother had some access, and after the Christmas period did 
not return the child, alleging abuse of the child by the father. The courts heard 
the case in January, and found no abuse, but excellent care and relationships 
within the father's home. The mother was in a relationship with a convicted 
criminal, having a child by him. The court ordered custody to the father, care and 
control to the mother. 
On the father's appeal it was found that the judge had erred by failing to give 
reasons for departing from the welfare officer's advice, failing to give proper 
weight to the limited access which the mother had exercised over the previous two 
and a half years, and to the child's established relationship with the father and 
father's new partner. Further, the mother showed no real interest in the child 
when she was in her care, and the mother's partner was not to be trusted. The 
courts accepted a similar argument in B v. B (Custody of Children) (1985). Here a 
young girl lived with her father from birth, and after the parental separation, 
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the father's sister assisted with the child's care. The mother sought care and 
control, but the court found that the changes in her live, and the strong bond ' 
with the child did not warrant the removal of the child from the father. 
In Stephenson, it will be noted that the period of time, one month, that the 
mother had the child after the access visit was too short to allow her to claim 
the new situation merited preservation. The period of time must be substantial in 
order to establish the argument. In Bowley v. Bowley (1984), a period of two 
months was described as "almost vanishingly thin" as a period to establish a 
status quo argument. In Allington v. Allington (1985), the argument for 
maintaining the status quo was weakened due to the short duration of the 
arrangement, and the non-custodial parent's regular contact with the child. Here 
the mother left the child with the father in the family home for some ten weeks, 
during which time she maintained a high degree of contact with the child. The 
mother had a new partner and at first instance the status quo was preferred to the 
mother having custody. On appeal, Lord Cumming-Bruce felt that consideration 
of the child's relationship during the separation from the mother was inadequate, 
and the presence of the new partner as offering a stronger family situation with 
the mother was not explored. Given the length of time since the mother had left, 
the permanence of the status quo was questioned, and, on balance, it was felt that 
the child could and should be moved to the care of the mother. The8 importance 
of the maternal love and bond with the child was stressed in theory and applied, 
perhaps at the expense of the father, who was offering care and love to the child. 
The status quo will not be upheld in cases where it has been established 
wrongfully in the first instance, as in Edwards v. Edwards (1986), and Townson v. 
Mahon (1984). These cases concerned abduction inside this country (rather than 
an international abduction) which, as will be seen later in the thesis, is an area 
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where the removal of the child could be interpreted as a punishment of the 
offending parent. The court is charged to examine the best interests of the child. 
In both Townson and Edwards the period of the new arrangement could be 
argued to be relatively short. However, the question must arise, given the courts' 
belief that the status quo is one of the most important factors in a child's 
welfare, whether an abduction which was challenged after a longer period of time 
would still warrant the removal of the child. This would not happen often, as the 
practice of a lawyer would be to seek an interlocutory injunction to restore the 
child before the hearing commenced. 
A challenge to a status quo agreement may be made as an attempt by a 
non-custodial parent, who is ; consistently, refused -access' 46 his or her- child by 
the custodial parent, to gain an order in their favour for custody. - Clearly, a 
strong case can be made, especially if the non-custodial parent was offering good 
access arrangements in the future. However, in cases concerning such access 
"blocking", the courts have shown great reluctance to overturn existing custodial 
arrangements, as in M v. M (1980). 
Nevertheless, it is not impossible to convince the courts to change a strong 
status quo argument, as was established in Greer v. Greer (1974). Further, if the 
court believes a change of custody is in the child's best interests, the fact that 
there is a bond which will be broken should not deter the court from acting, as in 
W v. P (Justices' Reasons) (1988), and Faulkner v. Faulkner (1981), where the 
court accepted that moving the child could entail a "risk". The children had been 
with the mother for two years after the separation, then lived for six months with 
their father. The welfare report indicated the children should stay with their 
father, and the courts accepted this against the mother's status quo claims. This 
case shows that the status quo argument is not as clear as Lord Ormrod suggests. 
There can be contradictions in the cases, using diferent interests as the 
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justifications, which show the concern that was expressed above that the courts 
are not solely concerned with the logical ranking or consistency of interests. 
In Adams v. Adams (1984) the younger children of the family lived with their 
father, although the arrangement split up the siblings. The court upheld the 
status quo over the argument that the siblings should remain together. In direct 
contrast to this, the court in C V. C (Minors Custody) (1988) decided. that the 
argument for the siblings to remain together was stronger than maintaining the 
continuity of care of the children, and made the emphatic statement that the 
status quo should not be upheld in preference to keeping siblings together. 
b. maternal instinct 
The status quo argument can be seen as one of principles which the courts hold to 
be most important to the interpretation of the child's welfare, but the pull 
between interests can be seen. Perhaps the other major principle is there is a 
natural maternal instinct, and that it is in the interests of the child, and 
especially the young child, to be with his or her mother. Although it is not a 
rule17, and is only claimed as one of the interests to be taken into consideration 
in the balance, the courts clearly accept that -mothering Is essential to the 
development of the child, seeing the female parent as provider of 
"mothering". [This doctrine is not unique to English law. For example, see the 
Australian case, Epperson v. Dampney (1976) and Gronow v. Gronow (1979). The 
principle could be traced to the prominent psychologist, John Bowlby18, in the 
1950s. However, the courts, as part of the reluctance to accept that there are 
theoretical justifications for their decisions beyond the judge's own beliefs, 
have not attributed the origin of the principle. The strain between the visibility 
of a rule and the reluctance to attribute it may well stem from the fact that the 
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rule would stand against the statutory principle that the parents are equal before 
the law (from 1925 onwards), or equally it could stem from the fact that the rule 
is not fully developed, having been assimilated into judicial thinking not by 
theory but by chance, and with a prejudice that the raising of children is women's 
work. It is interesting to note the courts view that the father's röle at best can 
be fulfilled through access, if there is any developed rule about the role of the 
father at all. It also links to the reluctance of the court to allow the father to 
give up work to care for the children, whether this is supported by his wife, or 
drawing unemployment benefit. 19 
The evidence for the assertion that there is a preference for the care of children 
by the mother runs throughout the cases and, essentially, a father must prove that 
the mother is an unfit person to have custody in order to break that preference. 
In such cases, the father, as Bevan suggests, will be in a stronger position if he 
can point to a stable, custodial relationship with his children - returning to the 
interplay between the interests, and especially the status quo argument, to 
justify a judicial feeling in a particular case. It can be seen that question of 
maternal preference can be hugely important in custody disputes. It may also have 
a "knock on" effect in questions of matrimonial property, as in K v. K (1992), 
where the mother, after leaving the father initially gained a joint custody order. 
Later she claimed the relationship with the father was over, although he disputed 
this. The Judge ordered custody and care and control to the mother, access to 
father. The father, still believing reconciliation could occur refused to leave 
the home and the family lived together in it The Judge and the mother had 
assumed the father would leave when the second custody order was granted. The 
mother then applied to the court for an order under section 11 of the 
Guardianship of Minors Act 1971, which allowed the court to make a property 
order in the interests of the child., The court ordered that the property be 
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transferred to the mother's sole name, as she was made unhappy at having to 
remain living with the father and, while the children were not unhappy in 
themselves, their mother's continued unhappiness would not be in their interests. 
On the father's appeal, a retrial was ordered on the dual grounds that the section 
12A requirement had not been observed, as the Judge had not considered whether 
the father's right to buy the property could have been saved by an alternative 
order; and that the welfare of the children, the basis of the order, had not been 
established on the evidence. This is a good example of how the interests of the 
children can be given a rather contorted definition. Here the welfare report found 
both the parents to be devoted to the children. - 
The strength of the mother's position in custody cases is perhaps a reaction in 
the courts to the structured position of the law prior to 1925. Before the 1925 
Act, the child was the property of the father, indeed this position was seen as a 
"high and sacred right" by the Lord Chancellor, Lord Selbourne in Syminton v. 
Symington (1875). In that case, the father had committed adultery but had 
stopped, and the court felt it in the boys "material and moral interest" that they 
should live in the care of their natural and legal guardian, the father. 
The extent of the acceptance of the maternal argument can be seen as well 
established in modern cases. The courts acceptance of the basic principle that the 
child, especially the young child, is best placed with the mother is clearly 
stated as a good working rule in H v. H (1984), M v. M (1980), and M V. M 
(Custody of Children) (1983). In Cossey v. Cossey (1981) the court followed a 
general assertion that girls should live with their mothers. 
M v. M (1980) shows the basic principle very clearly. The court found that the 
parents offered equal love and care to the 4 1/2-year old child, who on the 
parents' separation had gone to live with the mother. The father had applied for 
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custody, and had been granted the order, as the court felt that he could provide a 
more reliable access opportunity for the mother. On appeal, it was felt that this 
could not justify removing the child. The court felt that there was a "natural 
link" between the care of children and the mother, and that the mother could give 
up work more easily to look after the child. Also, regardless of the qualities 
that the man could offer, he could not offer the mother's röle to a young girl. 
The case is interesting in two respects; first, as it accepted that the mother 
would be more awkward in allowing the child to have access visits, but this should 
not overpower the balance against the mother as defined access orders could be 
made, and. secondly, because the case depended so heavily on the mother's röle, 
rather than the strength of the status quo argument. 
In Allington v. Allington (1985) again the court felt very strongly that young 
girls need to be with their mothers. An 18 month old girl lived with her father 
for some 10 weeks, being cared for by both parents to the extent that her bond 
with her mother was considered to be unimpaired. Lord Justice Cumming-Bruce 
felt that at that stage in the child's development the fact that a girl needs her 
mother's care was prima facie established. Further, the court felt that had the 
father continued to have custody, the importance of the status quo argument 
would develop, rendering a later transfer of care more traumatic. In the majority 
of the cases what is apparent is not just the preference exhibited towards the 
mother, but the fact that the father's love and care of the child is considered as 
equal, and yet the preference is applied. Allington seems to expose the courts use 
of a doctrine of the child with the woman in the indication that it was better to 
move the child now rather than to wait until a status quo argument would have to 
be overturned. 
The difficult balance between the status quo and the importance of placing a child 
with the mother is the centre of the following three cases. In Re C (1981), the 
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mother left the family home, and the child remained with the father and the 
grandmother. The mother brought a custody action, however a joint custody 
order was made with care and control to the father. This was contrary to the 
welfare officer's report, which appeared to accept that the mother had a natural 
quality in the care of children. On appeal, the court stressed both that if the 
welfare report was not followed, the court must give reasons for the departure, 
and also the principle of a special maternal bond. 
In Re W (1983) the 19 month old child lived with the father and his cohabitee, 
and had only known that home: The mother applied for custody, and the High 
Court reversed the initial order that the child live with the father. The court 
felt that, in the father's favour, the child had only ever known that household, 
which was a stable one. However, it felt that, at the child's age, people were 
more important than a sense of place, and the mother was willing to undertake 
the care of the child. Again, in In re A (a Minor) (1991) the daughter, K, aged 
six years, and three of her brothers (the younger was nine years old), lived with 
her father and their housekeeper, who had cared for the K and her youngest 
brother since their births. The judge awarded custody of K's 11 year old sister to 
her mother, and in what he described as an "acute balance of arguments", 
concluded that the status quo argument should give way to the mother's case to 
have the care of her young daughter. The Appeal Court, having disapproved of 
the judge's reading of In re H (a Minor) (1990), stated that it felt that a bond 
between a mother and young child which had been unbroken would be difficult to 
displace, unless the mother's care of the child was unsuitable. If that link had 
been broken, then there was no presumption for the mother. There is no equal 
recognition of the possibility of an established paternal bond. The father, even 
in the position of custodial parent, must show the mother is unfit or has left her 
children, and essentially broken the primary bond. This is further supported in 
Stephenson v. Stephenson (1985). The effect runs the risk of making the dispute 
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more acrimonious. The father, seeking essentially the same ends as his former 
partner, is almost forced to slur the mother. Yet it must be borne in mind that 
the success of any future arrangements for access for the children, whether he 
gains custody or not, depends upon the two parents working together. 
The need of the child to live with his or her mother is also a potent argument 
where the father offers custody, but the child would be living on a day-to-day 
basis with either the father's new partner or a variety of carers. In such cases, 
despite a duty to approach the conflict from the consideration of the child's 
welfare, the courts appear to follow the maternal argument This can be defended 
by suggesting that the welfare of the child is better protected by the natural 
mother, however, this suggests a bias which does not examine the needs of the 
individual children but rather applies a strict rule. The courts are rightly 
concerned with the presence of a new partner who would have care of the child, 
as in Allen v. Allen (1974), Hutchinson v. Hutchinson. (1981), and Scott v. Scott 
(1986). 
In Re K (1977), when considering the day to day care of the child, the duty of the 
court was held to be to promote the child's well-being, the court preferring the 
care of the child to be undertaken by one person on a full-time basis wherever 
possible. The provision of daily care for the child by the father's new partner 
was a major factor in the decision in Re W (1983). The child spent the day at the 
father's home not with the father, but with his cohabitee. This was crucial, and 
despite the welfare report's opinion that there was nothing special in the 
maternal, biological bond, the court ordered the child to the care of his mother. 
Thus, there is a strong suggestion in the cases that the mother's care is 
quantifiably different to that offered by the father, and that the courts are 
interpreting the need for mothering as the need to be with the natural, female 
parent 
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The position of the maternal preference is however contested by the courts. The 
courts, and especially the appeal courts have stated that there should be no 
automatic preference to the mother, which seems to offer a contradictory view to 
the statements of the courts, including the appeal courts, in the above cases. In 
Pountney v. Morris (1984), Re W (a Minor) (Custody) (1984) and A v. A (Custody 
Appeal: Role of the Appellate Court) (1988). the courts stressed that there was no 
presumption that a young child was best placed with his or her mother. 
In Re S (a Minor)(Custody) (1991), the parents of a two year old girl lived 
together for two years before the mother left the father on account of his 
violence. The girl was left with the father, and the mother sought to gain her 
custody. Two welfare reports indicated that-the girl should live with her mother, 
but two justices decisions gave custody to the father and access to the mother. On 
an access visit, the mother failed to return the child, and sought custody. The 
judge granted the request. However, on appeal, the Appeal Court held that the 
judge was wrong to overturn the justices' decision, as the domestic court had been 
best placed to decide the child's welfare. The case was ordered to be heard before 
a new bench of justices with new welfare reports. Lord Justice Butler-Sloss 
indicated that there was no presumption as to which parent was suited to caring 
for the child at any age. However, she indicated that "it was likely that a young 
child, particularly a little girl, would be expected to be with her mother, but 
that was subject to the overriding factor that the child's welfare was the 
paramount consideration". Even where the courts are at pains to rebut the 
allegation of bias to the mother, the equality of the parties is not wholly 
convincing. 
Perhaps the most distressing of all the cases concerning maternal preference is Re 
DW (1984). The parents separated and the mother left the child with the father. 
The father remarried and the child lived in the new and, by all accounts, secure 
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family for some 81 /2 years. The father and the stepmother then separated and 
agreed that the child should remain with the stepmother. This was also noted to 
be the wish of the child who at the time was 10 years old and mature for his age. 
The court noted that the stepmother offered exceptional qualities in caring for 
the child and in educating him. The natural mother could offer a better quality of 
home life, but could not offer the same level of personal or academic stimulation 
for the child. Lord Cumming-Bruce felt that the issue of giving custody to the 
stepmother could prove difficult should anything happen to the stepmother. He 
also felt that the stepmother would not disappear from the child's life should the 
custody be changed. He further decided that the mother could offer a more secure 
future for the child, and that the boy was mature enough to cope with the 
emotions surrounding a move . to 
his natural mother. Here the natural mother 
argument triumphs over an almost overwhelming status quo-consideratibn. It also 
flies against the child's wishes. The appalling consequences seem to be created by 
the reluctance of the court to allow the stepmother to become anything more than 
an outsider - and one is left wondering how such a decision can be justified as 
the best interests of the child, unless one accepts that the maternal preference 
is an unshakeable belief that cannot be questioned. This case is difficult to 
reconcile with any suggestion other than that which asserts that the natural 
mother has a trump card in any custody proceedings. 
c. conduct 
i general 
The conduct of the parties has changed its meaning over the last 150 years, 
however, it can be said to remain important to the interpretation of the child's 
best interests. Initially refering to the matrimonial offences, the conduct which 
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is important is now concerned with the lifestyle and behaviour of the parent, as 
it is relevant to the child. 
Initially, the conduct of the parents largely concerned the conduct of the mother. 
In Symington v. Symington (1875), an adulterous father who had reformed his 
conduct could still retain the custody of his children, and this was a common 
feature of custody law. Likewise, it was not necessarily the case that violent 
fathers would lose the custody of their children. This was in marked contrast to 
the attitude to the mother. In an atmosphere of a patriarchal society, the 
separation of the parents was largely seen as the fault of the woman, often 
grounded in her infidelity. Thus, it was the case that an adulterous mother could 
never, in the eyes of the court, be granted custody of her children, as was the 
case in Clout v. 'Clout (1861) and Codington v. Codington (1864). 
The importance of matrimonial conduct can be seen in custody law throughout 
the first half of the twentieth century, indeed until the reform of divorce law in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s. As late as 1969, in Re L, it was held that the 
guilty mother should not gain custody against the unimpeachable father. This 
reflected the fact that, although social attitudes to divorce and indeed to 
marriage changed after the second world war, the law maintained a stance which 
was based on a previous morality which was given authority by the reluctance of 
the Church of England to respond to the change in social attitudes. Following the 
Archbishop of Canterbury's report on Divorce (1966), the reform of the law to 
consider irretrievable breakdown allowed a similar reform in custody cases. The 
shift was made to accepting completely the doctrine of the paramountcy of the 
child's welfare, rather than fettering it by viewing the care offered by parties 
guilty of matrimonial offences as second rate per se. This acceptance can be seen 
to make a clear separation between being a partner and being a parent. 
The change in the attitude to the matrimonial offence was clear. Matrimonial 
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conduct is irrelevant unless it is detrimental to the welfare of the child. The 
welfare of the child depended on a consideration of the present and future 
arrangements for the child, and not the past, an interpretation stressed by Mr 
Justice Lincoln in In re L (Minors) (1989). Thus, in Re K (1977) the father, a 
parish priest, was left with his child when the mother left him to form a 
relationship with another man. The court felt that the conduct of the mother had 
no place in the question of the custody of the child. Lord Justice Ormrod 
suggested that the justice offered by including marital conduct was simplistic, as 
it could not be assessed on a superficial reading of the facts offered in custody 
cases. This line followed the earlier cases of Allen v. Allen (1948) and 
Willoughby v. Willoughby (1957), and was followed in B v. B (1973), where the 
woman left to live with her husband's brother. 
This line was followed in S(BD) v. S(DJ) (1977). The mother had a series of 
partners during and after the marriage, and then married a 26 year old man. The 
mother's conduct was relevant to the consideration of the welfare of the children; 
would the children have a stable life if they lived with their mother? The cases 
therefore shifted to reading the parents' actions in terms of their fitness to 
care for the child. 
As was indicated in the discussion of the maternal preference cases, the fitness 
of the mother is often the argument used by the father to attempt to gain access. 
Therefore the cases of interest turn not on drunken mothers, but on the mother's 
lifestyle and behaviour. However, a line of cases concerning violence by fathers 
can be traced from Re Curtis (1859). The issue of maternal fitness was not new 
either, as is seen in Philip v. Philip (1872) where an excitable, violent mother 
was denied access to her child, aged seven, as such visits would impede the 
child's recovery of health. However, the range of behaviour has changed. In 
Stanwick v. Stanwick (1970), the mother was persistently dishonest. The court 
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considered that this behaviour amounted to cruelty. Further, in this case the 
mother had deserted the children, a factor which always casts a slur over the 
woman's character in the eyes of the court, unless she is in some way provoked, 
Re S (a Minor) (Custody) (1991). 
The court has been keen to show that consideration of the conduct of the parents, 
or their fitness, is focussed on the children and is not concerned with punishment 
or reward, as in the case of Re C (Custody of Child) (1981). Here the parent had 
a history of brief, unsuccessful relationships. The conduct of the parent was only 
relevant if it showed inadequacy, negligence, or unsuitability to perform parental 
duties. 
The courts, in assessing the relevance of the parents behaviour to the welfare of 
the child are presented with three problems. The first difficulty is whether or 
not the allegation is true. Discussions with solicitors as part of this empirical 
survey suggested that after the Cleveland sexual abuse cases, the number of 
allegations of sexual abuse made, especially in relation to access disputes 
dramatically increased. Secondly, the courts must determine the level of the risk, 
if they accept that there is a risk. This is not at the boundary which would 
warrant care proceedings, rather it is part of a balance between parents, and the 
importance of stability in the child's life has already been noted. Thirdly, 
neither side is without faults as a parent, and the risks that the child may have 
in the new home must also be weighed. The last two points are not helped as the 
courts are largely guessing what will happen. The following are cases chosen to 
illustrate the factual difficulties experienced by the court. Again, the caveat 
must be remembered that these are based on the interpretation of the characters 
involved by the judges and the lawyers, and tend to oversimplify the issues and 
emotions involved. 
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In L v. L (1981) the mother had attempted suicide by taking an overdose; she was 
depressed and drank heavily. The child was in the care of his father and aunt. 
There was evidence, in the form of bruising, that the child was overly chastised. 
The court in this case awarded custody to the mother, ordering that she be 
allowed back into the matrimonial home, and making a supervision order to 
secure the child's welfare. The case of Re W; Re L (1987) concerned three 
daughters born to one mother by two different fathers. The girls lived with their 
mother, however their fathers sought custody of them under the Guardianship of 
Minors Act 1971. Before that hearing, the daughters were taken into the care of 
their fathers, and wardship proceedings were started by one of the fathers. 
The father alleged that the mother and her new boyfriend had a drink problem 
and were unfit to have custody of the children. It was further alleged that the 
girls were left alone. Two months prior to the hearing, the youngest daughter was 
the subject of a place of safety order. The judge found that welfare reports would 
take some three to four months to prepare. However, evidence was given by a 
social worker that the fathers should have the care of the children. The judge, 
however, found that the children should be returned to their mother, ordering her 
not to leave them unattended, and not to bring them into contact with her 
boyfriend. On appeal the court found that the judge had erred on two issues. The 
judge did not give weight to the allegations of the danger which the mother 
presented to the children, or the care that the fathers could offer. While the 
long term care of the daughters needed investigation, the advice of the social 
worker for the short term should have been accepted. The undertaking of the 
mother not to leave the children alone should not have been sufficient to convince 
the judge of the children's welfare, and further evidence should have been 
requested. The appeal court made orders in the interim that the children should 
stay with their fathers before the issue could go to the High Court. 
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In Re R (1986), the mother was originally given custody of the children. She then 
took them, without the leave of the court, to the Channel Islands, where she met 
Mr S. She then left the children with their father. The father commenced 
wardship proceedings. The welfare officer could only see the father and the 
children, and recommended an adjournment to gain more information. The judge 
felt that the mother's care had been adequate, but the period with their father 
had given them stability, their mother having continually moved them from place 
to place. The judge was also doubtful as to the permanence of the mother's 
relationship. with Mr S, and the children were settled at their school The father 
had had drink problems and had a criminal record, but the judge did not have any 
information concerning these matters beyond 1979. In the mean time the father 
and the children were re-housed, causing them to change school, and the father 
was charged with being drunk in charge of a bicycle. The court of appeal felt that 
they should only interfere where the first decision falls into error. In the first 
hearing, the material facts were incomplete. The appeal court felt that all 
reports should be made available to the judge. They were also mindful of the 
changes that had occurred since the first decision, and granted an interim order 
to the mother, and ordered a retrial on the grounds of the father's drinking and 
criminal record. 
The case of Re S (a Minor)(Custody) (1991), the facts of which have already been 
outlined above, the father's violence was found by the justices to be an 
insufficient reason to place the child with her mother, the mother having left the 
child with the father, notwithstanding the fact that the mother left on account 
of the father's violence towards her. 
While the law claims to have moved on to a view of the behaviour which is solely 
concerned with the future welfare of the child, two issues, the abduction of 
children, and the issue of lesbian custody, seem to suggest that the courts can 
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place the welfare of the child as second considerations to other purposes. In the 
first instance the effort is to deter parents from abducting their children, and 
in the second it is as a judgement of the value of the parent's lifestyle. Both 
are secondary to the quality of parenting, and the needs of the child. 
ii. conduct and abduction: an issue of enforcement 
The issue of enforcing custody orders on an international stage has become a 
major concern of the courts over the last decade. It is a problem which is 
growing. In 1991, according to H. M. Government statistics, there were over 200 
foreign abduction cases, which .. according 
to workers in the field was a five fold 
underestimation, which, with the removal of -European travel constraints in 1992, 
is set to increase. 20 The issue is: how should the courts react when the child is 
removed from one parent, especially a parent who may offer better care in all 
respects except the method by which the custody started? The concept largely 
stems from ownership, in that an accepted right of the parent is the protection of 
the child against kidnapping by third parties. Here the issue is complicated in 
that the kidnap is the work of the other parent against the enforced denial of 
that basic right by a court. 
The 1980s saw three initiatives concerning the difficulties of abduction; the 
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, signed 
on 25th October 1980, the European Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Decisions Concerning the Custody of Children, both being 
incorporated into English law by the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985, and 
thirdly, the Family Law Reform Act 1986. This defined in statute the duties 
between jurisdictions both within the United Kingdom, and on a wider stage. It 
also caused a flurry of academic activity into what could be seen as a major 
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development in family law. 21 Given this interest, it is not proposed that this 
study should dwell on the issue, however it must be considered in so far as it can 
be argued to be a new issue of conduct which challenges the paramountcy 
principle. 
Abduction is the removal of the child without right or consent of a person who 
has the right to remove a child from a jurisdiction The issue is divided between 
those jurisdictions which are party to the conventions, and those outside them. 
Prior to the conventions, and indeed for those places outside the conventions, the 
issue of whether a child abducted and brought to the English courts should be 
returned to his or her custodial parents is subject to the normal principles of 
the welfare of the child as, the . paramount consideration.. 
In. such circumstances, 
the abduction becomes one factor to weigh in : the balance of the 'child's needs. 
This was seen in Jenkins v. Jenkins (1980) where the child was "snatched" by the 
non-custodial parent Although the court strongly disapproved of the action, and 
ordered the return of the child, it was still a matter to show the child's best 
interests lay in returning to the custodial parent. Clearly the issue of the 
abduction is taken very seriously by the courts even outside the contracting 
states to the conventions. Where the abductions took place prior to the 
commencement of the Convention, applications cannot be made under the 
conventions, as in In re H (Minors) (Abduction: Custody Rights); In re S 
(Minors) (Abduction: Custody Rights) (1991). 
Concerning the contracting states, the English courts are bound to respect the 
custody decisions made in other jurisdictions. This is also the case throughout 
the United Kingdom. Thus, when a court is approached by a custodial parent for 
the return of their child from within the court's jurisdiction, unless the 
non-custodial parent can show that the custodial parent was not exercising their 
role at the time of the abduction, or that the child is in "grave risk... of 
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physical or psychological harm, or would otherwise be placed in an intolerable 
position"22, the child should be returned to the custodial parent. 
The application must be made to the jurisdiction where the child has been take to. 
In England, the courts may make interim orders concerning the custody, these are 
decided on the consideration of the child's welfare and it was established in In 
re J (1989) that there was no automatic return of child prior to full hearing. 
The fact that the hearing must take place overseas and could therefore result in 
considerable costs was considered in Richardson v. Richardson (1989). On their 
parental divorce, the children were made wards of court, with an order that they 
should only be removed from the court's jurisdiction with an order of the court. 
The mother took the children to Eire without permission. The court considered 
whether the mother's assets could be sequestrated while she was in contempt of 
court, and found that they could, and that they could be sold and the funds could 
be released as necessary to the father to allow him to pursue the mother through 
the Irish courts. 
The courts are bound to return the child who is not under the risk outlined above, 
and who was not removed with. consent The issue of consent, the acquiescence of 
the custodial parent in the actions of the non-custodial parent can therefore be 
used in argument to justify the actions of the abductor. This is shown in the 
following pair of cases, one which is general concerning how the courts determine 
acquiescence, the other which is more difficult as the acquiescence was found by 
the court in actions made after the child had been initially removed by the 
mother. In re A (Minors) (1991) The question of whether the actions of a person 
amounted to acquiescence to the wrongful retention of a child was one of fact 
under article 13 of the Hague Convention. Thus, the judge was entitled to draw 
her conclusions from the facts before her at the hearing, and the appeal court 
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supported that reading of them. 
In In re A (Minors) (Abduction: Acquiescence) (1992) it was held - that 
acquiescence might be active or passive, and could be constituted by a single 
event, providing the parent was aware of his or her general rights against the 
abducting parent. Here a father, after the mother had abducted the children and 
taken them from Australia, wrote to her and stated that while the action was 
illegal, he would not fight it in the courts. He subsequently sought an order for 
the return of the children, which was granted. Thee mother appealed on the basis 
that the father had acquiesced by writing to her. The mother's appeal was 
successful, the court finding the father's action had been sufficient to remove 
his rights under the Hague convention. 
Thus, the application of a strict approach to those who abduct children, even, as 
the cases recognize, out of frustration at being separated from them, must be seen 
as a separate issue to that of determining the initial decision of where the child 
lives. If the courts took a softer line, examining the best interests of the 
child, the effect would be that a last attempt to gain custody would be abduction. 
Of itself, perhaps the welfare principle' is not far away from the courts' 
reasoning, given that stability is a watchword in custody cases. The risks of 
further abductions were the court's concern in balancing the welfare issue in Re 
K (a Minor) (1990). The father and mother were, respectively, Pakistani and Irish, 
both having lived in England for many years. They had one child, born in 
December 1983. The couple separated, gaining a divorce in 1987. The mother 
gained an order denying the father any access, and the father appealed on the 
grounds that it was in the child's interests to know both his parents, even though 
they were divorced. The court felt that the circumstances had not changed from 
the trial, and the judge's order was correct. The case showed a history of the 
father abducting the child. In 1984, when the marriage first hit difficulties, the 
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father would not allow the mother to take the child with her to her mother's 
home in Ireland. She went, leaving the child with the father, and while she was 
away, the father removed the child to Pakistan. The mother, by a wardship action, 
had the child returned to her custody. 
In 1986, during an unsupervised access visit, the father again removed the child 
to Pakistan, where he remained for. 18 months. During that time the mother 
visited the child for one month; the father sharing in the expenses of the visit. 
Lord Justice Dillon found it "intolerable that a child should be twice taken away 
from his mother who was bringing him up and with whom he had, until the first 
occasion that he was taken away, been living since birth". The father undertook 
between the first and second kidnappings, that he would not remove the child a 
second time; an undertaking made in writing and supported by depositing his 
passport with his solicitor. Lord Dillon summed up much of the difficulty in the 
area of abduction in his description of the father: "I do not suggest that the 
father is a bad man or a villain in any general sense, but he appears to be a man 
who rushes into impetuous action, possibly on the spur of the moment, without 
thinking what a terrible effect that action may have both on his former wife and 
on the child". The judge upheld the order of no access, agreeing with the first 
hearing judge that the issue was a balance between the benefit of access and the 
dangers of abduction, and finding that the risk of abduction outweighed the 
possible gains of access. Lord Dillon could not foresee the reinstatement of 
access until either the child was much older, or the father had a more stable 
position in England with no desire to return to Pakistan. 
iii. conduct and lesbianism: an issue of prejudice? 
Whereas the inclusion of one parties abduction of a child can be justfied as 
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ranking before the welfare of the child, as to avoid a courts order would throw 
the judicial system into chaos, the treatment of lesbian mothers can also be seen 
as the courts placing the conduct of the parties before the paramountcy principle. 
In this latter case, it is submitted that the courts have seemed to be little more 
than prejudiced. This is especially pertinent at a time when even the Anglican 
Church is beginning to open its mind to the question of recognising 
homosexuality23, and mainstream family law journals carry a discusion on the 
recognition of homosexual marriage24. 
There are relatively few cases reported concerning custody disputes where the 
mother is lesbian, perhaps because the gay community see the reaction of the 
courts to their applications and are reluctant to pursue, or are advised against 
pursuing custody actions. The approach adopted by the courts is reminiscent of 
the tone adopted to mothers accused of adultery in the ninteenth century. Perhaps 
this is because again women are seen by the judges as avoiding their motherly 
duties, not only by retreating from marriage, but retreating from the husband's 
rights; a snub to the judicial ego? 
The classic treatment of the lesbian mother is found in S v. S (1980) Here the 
mother after the separation of the marriage, was in a lesbian relationship. The 
children were thought to be at danger if they were exposed to the mother's 
deviant behaviour. The deviance argument was again followed in the case of In re 
C (a Minor) (1990, The Guardian). 
The mother, a lesbian and a prison officer, started a relationship with a woman 
who was serving 12 months for theft and wounding. The mother left the Prison 
Service, took a flat and another job, and on the release of the woman, lived with 
her. Throughout, the daughter lived with her mother and had good, regular 
contact with her father. The father remarried and applied for care and control of 
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the child. Following G v. G (1985), Lord Justice Glidewell indicated that the 
House of Lords could intervene in custody issues when the trial judge was "plainly 
wrong". Concerning the mother's lesbianism, the judge had been plainly wrong. 
Despite the sexual liberation of recent years, Lord Glidewell felt "it was 
axiomatic that the ideal environment for a child's upbringing was the home of 
loving sensible parents, her father and her mother. That ideal could not be 
achieved when the parents' marriage. ended. The court's task in deciding which of 
two possible alternatives was preferable for the child's welfare, was to choose 
the alternative closest to that ideal". 
The judge felt that while the child would learn the nature of her mother's 
relationship if she lived full-time with her mother, she would equally learn of 
its nature if she had staying access periodically. On this point, Lord Glidewell 
thought the judge to be wrong. Further, he felt a wrong conclusion was drawn 
over the effect on the child at school if she lived with her lesbian mother - the 
judge had disregarded the distress and embarrassment it may cause her. Living 
with her heterosexual father would reduce her exposure to such difficulties. His 
Lordship, however, did not believe the mother's lesbianism per se was conclusive, 
or disqualified her. A loving, sensitive lesbian home may well be more 
satisfactory than an unloving alternative. The judge had failed to consider the 
nature of the relationship, and especially the conviction of the mother's partner 
for violence. 
Lord Justice Balcombe felt that the court's consideration should be the welfare of 
the child. This was not to be influenced by subjective views, but rather the 
prevailing morality of society at the time. "in our society it is still the norm 
that children are brought up in a home with a father, mother, and siblings, if 
any, and, other things being equal, such an upbringing is more likely to be 
conducive to their welfare. A very material factor in considering where a child's 
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welfare lies is which of two parents can offer the nearest approach to that norm". 
The judge was in error for failing to bring the lesbian nature of the mother's 
relationship into the balance. The father's appeal was allowed, but the outcome of 
the retrial did not necessarily follow. Interim care was, however, given to the 
father. Lord Justice Balcombe's claims here are unsubstantiated by theory: one 
wonders why the case concentrated on the mother's sexuality, when her partner 
had been convicted of assault, which was surely an issue of far greater relevance. 
When the courts do make an order in favour of a lesbian mother, it is often 
portrayed as a last resort. -Re P (a Minor)(Custody) (1983). The child lived with 
the mother in a lesbian household. The father could not look after the child, so 
the court had to decide if it was better to place the child- in . 
local -authority 
care. Lord Justice Watkins felt that "it was not right to say that a child should 
in no circumstances live with a [lesbian] mother... it can only be countenanced by 
the court when it is driven to the conclusion that there is in the interests of 
the child no other acceptable form of custody". 
With the aid of a psychiatrists report, Mr Justice Callman gave the most positive 
order in favour of a lesbian mother in B v. B (Minors) (Custody, Care and 
Control) (1991). The mother. lived in a lesbian relationship, the father with 
another woman. The case concerned three children, aged 10, nine, and two. The 
older two children lived with their father, the younger child with her mother. It 
was decided that there would be an order for joint custody of the children, with 
the care and control reflecting the existing arrangements. A psychiatrist's 
evidence indicated that the fact that the mother was a lesbian did not interfere 
with her ability as a mother, and the youngest child should remain with her. The 
court welfare officer was of the opinion that the fact that the mother was lesbian 
was bad for the child, and if the youngster lived with the father, there would be 
the added advantage that the siblings would be together. Mr Justice Callman 
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followed the advice of the psychiatrist who considered that siblings within five 
years of age should be kept together. Here the children's ages were spread much 
wider than five years, and thereby justified the possibility of splitting them up. 
He also found that the mother was not a "militant" lesbian, and otherwise was a 
faultless mother. He could not justify the removal of the youngest child from her 
mother, especially as there was a two years and four month bond between them, 
and the child would go to a child-minder if she lived with her father. 
What is being suggested here is that the courts, rather than following the well 
accepted principle of assessing the custody issues from the point of view of the 
child's welfare, place the conduct of the mother before them as justification for 
withholding custody except, in the most exceptional circumstances. This allegation 
could be justified in two ways. First, in relation to the treatment of parental 
sexual morality generally, and secondly, with reference to the claims as to the 
dangers of exposing children to such relationships. 
Heterosexual sexual morality does not figure in the case law in the same way that 
the courts scrutinize lesbians. Only when the parent, and especially the mother, 
has so many partners that the stability of the child's home is upset, and the 
child is neglected does it appear relevant. The debate does not explore the 
potential harm of promiscuity as against a monogomous parent. In relation to 
-" lesbians, the whole concern of the courts is their sexual morality. What is missed 
is that the cases seem to arise where the mother seeks to care for the children 
within a stable "lesbian household". There is at least a disparity between the 
views taken of heterosexuals and homosexuals, and this is not in the form of a 
debate as to the morality of the two positions, but is left to the common sense of 
the judges. 
More influentially, the claims that the courts use to justify the apparant 
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discrimination have been the subject of numerous studies both in this country and 
in the United States of America. Tasker and Golombok (1991) studied the 
caselaw relating to lesbian custody and found that the three arguments advanced 
against lesbian custody were: first that the child's moral well being would be 
affected; secondly, that children raised in lesbian households were less masculine 
or feminine; and thirdly, public prejudice would harm the children. 25 They found 
that "all three arguments against awarding custody to lesbian mothers remain 
unsubstantiated - or even contradicted - by the empirical evidence currently 
available". 26 [page 184] Following a systematic review of the evidence they 
conclude "empirical evidence demonstrates that the mother's sexual orientation 
does not appear to influence the child's well-being. Legal decisions concerning 
where the child should reside post-divorce should focus instead on the quality of 
parenting"-26 
d. natural parents v stranger 
J v. C (1970), while offering the definitive statement of the meaning of the 
paramountcy principle, also offers something of the dilemma which the courts 
have as to the weight which should be attributed to the fact that an applicant is 
the child's natural parent The case concerned the fostering of a child whose 
Spanish parents had been judged as unable to provide adequate care, and who 
sought to block the adoption of the child by seeking the custody of their child. 
Their argument was that they could offer care, but most importantly, that they 
had a right to the custody of their child which the statutory provision of the 
welfare principle did not seek to challenge. This, as has been seen, was judged 
not to be the case; the fact that the applicants were the natural parents did not 
make them best able to provide for the child. The paramountcy principle should 
prevail. 
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This is not a new problem for the courts, as was seen in In re O'hara (an Infant) 
(1900), neither is it resolved. In cases after J v. C, the courts have had to 
consider the value of the biological link between parents and children when 
considering the welfare of the child generally. The case of Re KD (a 
Minor)(Ward: Termination of Access) (1988) renewed the question of the 
paramountcy of the child's welfare, using the rights of the parent under the 
European Convention to the respect-for family life. Lord Templeman indicates 
the understanding of the respect of the family in English law thus, "the best 
person to bring up a child is the natural parent. It matters not whether the 
parent is wise or foolish, rich or poor, educated or illiterate, provided the 
child's moral and. physical health are not endangered". 
The issue for the courts concerned the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, article 8,27 which states that, as per 
Lord Templeman at page 578: 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary... 
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others. 
The court's intervention is to "rescue the child when the parental tie is broken 
by abuse or separation", and the intervention is according to the court's 
perception of the needs and welfare of the child. In the case, the child had been 
removed from his 16 year old mother and integrated into a foster family. The 
court felt that it was "distressingly inevitable" that the child's ties to his 
mother should be severed in preference to the care of his new family; it was in 
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his welfare that such an order be made. The mother was immature, and was not 
reliable in the care she offered to the child. She had originally agreed to the 
fostering of the child, but then sought to retain access when the local authority 
tried to move towards adoption. Lord Oliver hinted at the emotional despair felt 
in the courts at this, and so many other family cases, saying: when I say that it 
is indeed a case which saddens the heart I shall merely be echoing what has been 
said by all six judges who, over the past three years, have been called on to 
consider it". 
This case shows that the courts generally accept that parents have the right to 
determine the direction of their family life, seemingly very willingly, as in the 
separation cases where the parents present an agreement, as it removes the need 
to make difficult emotional decisions from the court. However, three areas 
present themselves where the courts accept that they must intervene in the privacy 
of family life to resolve seemingly unresolvable disputes. The three disputes are, 
first, outright orders of custody to third parties - which can occur either 
between the parents and the local authority, or between the natural parents and 
third parties, perhaps grandparents or informal foster parents. The other two 
issues occur within the context of the two parents and their new partners. The 
courts may have to address the question of the fitness of a parent's new partner 
to share in the custody of a child. Alternatively, the issue may concern the 
situation where the daily care of the child is being left to a new partner. rather 
than the natural parent. These three issues are met with three different 
approaches by the courts, reflecting the ability of the courts to deal with the 
interpretation of the child's needs. The first issue deals with the legal issue of 
the authority of the particular body to make decisions, the second concerns the 
adult character, and the third concerns the question of the child's needs. 
The classic position as between the local authority and the parent attempting to 
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challenge the decision can be seen in A v. Liverpool City Council (1982). The 
courts adopt the line that the local authority has been given the delegated power 
to make decisions and unless they have erred in the process of making that 
decision, the content of the decision can only be challenged in the forum 
prescribed alongside the delegation of the authority. Thus, parents seeking to 
challenge care decisions through wardship were blocked by the courts. This line 
has been followed where parents sought to challenge care orders by custody 
proceedings, as in In re G (1989), and in In re M&H (Minors) (1988) where it 
was held that under the Guardianship of Minors Act 1971, the father of an 
illegitimate child could apply for custody and access, but could not apply for a 
review of a local authority decision. 
Further, Re K D, above, indicates that even if the courts have authority, the 
position of the local authority is taken more as an expert witness than as a 
defendant Where the natural parents seek to challenge the local authority the 
task is very great, the courts being reluctant to overrule the findings of the 
local authority and thereby open the floodgates to challenges to local authority 
decisions. 
The second situation which occurs under this head of the outright removal of the 
child from the natural parent or parents tends to involve other family members. 
The law is clear28 that if the court believes it to be in the best interests of 
the child, it can order the custody to parties other than the natural parents. 
This has been held to be the case for grandparents, as in Cahill v. Cahill and 
Others (1975), or aunts and uncles, as in Morgan v. Morgan and Others (1974). 
The cases indicate the importance placed on the maintenance of a stable situation, 
as in Re H (a Minor: Custody) (1989) The mother was able and willing to care for 
her son, however this could mean a return to India. The boy lived with his aunt 
and uncle, and attended an school in England. The boy was thriving in his 
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education. Prior to their divorce, the parents had agreed that their son should go 
to school in England. The first instance court found that, whilst the mother was 
capable of looking after the boy (indeed she had found accommodation in, the 
U. K and was prepared to remain here to look after the child), he was doing well 
in his new environment, and it was in his best interests to remain there, with 
custody being granted to the aunt and uncle, and generous access to the mother. 
On appeal, the court found that the trial judge had acted meticulously and that 
the decision he had made was within his discretion. The appeal court found that 
they could not question the decision, following G v. G (1985). 
The cases under the old law could not be initiated by third parties, but depended 
on an action being brought. by, a. parent. Thus, many of the cases concerned 
situations where the child already lived with the third parties, and the challenge 
was against the status quo, a well established doctrine for the child's welfare. 
Under the Children Act 1989, any person with a genuine interest in the child's 
welfare can apply for section 8 orders with the leave of the court. 29 Bainham 
feels it unlikely that grandparents or other relatives "would experience any 
difficulty in obtaining leave where their application is motivated by a genuine 
concern for the child". 30 This may produce a greater number of challenges to 
natural parents which will require the courts to give further consideration to the 
question of the importance of the biological link 
In the case of tragedy, the courts can be seen to take the biological link very 
firmly, as in Re K (a Minor)(Ward: Care and Control) (1990) The child's mother 
took her own life when the child was three, and the child was placed with foster 
parents, Mr and Mrs E, the mother's half sister. The father maintained regular 
access, and then applied for care and control of the child, showing that he could 
care for child with the help of his grandmother. The judge felt that the child had 
"blossomed" in the new surroundings, having an "excellent" mother, and a family 
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with another boy and a girl. The judge saw it as no criticism of the father, but 
much of the care he offered fell on the grandmother. Mr and Mrs E could offer 
far better care than the father, and it was in the child's welfare to remain- with 
the foster parents. 
On appeal, the judge followed the decision in Re KD (a Minor)(Ward: 
Termination of Access) (1988) which held that the best person to bring up the 
child was the natural parent, provided that the child's moral and physical health 
are not endangered. The judge at first instance applied the correct principles, in 
the view of the appeal court, but then erred by asking which home would be 
better materially. The judge had considered three points: that moving the child 
would cause trauma; that the parental care would not be of the same quality as 
the foster parent's care; and that the father may find a new partner and change 
the child's place in the home. The appeal court found that the father was in 
steady work, had good contact with his son, and had the support of the paternal 
grandparents. The child would also retain contact with all the parties involved. 
It was felt that the evidence was not strong enough to displace the natural 
father, and that the judge had not properly directed himself, but had been very 
sensitive and child centred. The case is clear, that the question is not who will 
give the best home for the child, but whether the welfare of the child positively 
demands that the natural parent's normal role in the care and upbringing of the 
child should be displaced by the foster parents, thus suggesting that the 
biological link, in cases of tragedy at least, is a very important factor in the 
balance. 
The importance of the biological link in parenting can be seen with devastating 
consequences in the case of Re DW (1984), which was discussed in the context of 
the maternal preference of the judges. The court took the view that the 10 year 
old boy who had lived with his step-mother for eight and a half years, would be 
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better placed with his natural mother than in the same situation on the separation 
of his father and his step-mother. Here, the quality of care offered by the step 
mother was accepted to be of a very high standard, however the courts felt that 
-the natural mother was best placed to care for the child in the long term. Again 
the courts seemed to suggest that the quality of the care experienced by the 
child, in this case educational and social stimulation which it was admitted the 
mother could not match, was the same as material differences. In the situation 
where the court's intervention is concerned with the physical, moral and emotional 
well being of the child, the issue of the child's welfare should surely concern 
the quality of the care available to the child, especially where the alternative 
also involves the disruption of the stability in the child's life. Again the 
courts show that they have A 'difficulty in formulating the questions which need to 
be asked in understanding the best interests of the child. 
The second and third issues differ from the first in that the child is being 
placed with one of its natural parents as opposed to the other. In the cases 
concerning the question of the character of a new partner, the courts accept the 
rights of both partners to form new relationships and families. The courts have 
limited their intervention into this right first where the new partner is a 
potential risk to the child, and secondly where the new partner deprives the 
natural parent of the child. 
The "risk" question is relatively easy for the courts to assess, and tends to 
concern the relevance of the character of a new partner when considering the 
application of the parent. Another factor in these cases is that the challenge is 
either to lifestyle, as in the case of an new partner with a drink problem as in 
Re W; Re L (1987), or where the new partner is violent, as in Hutchinson v. 
Hutchinson (1981). Here the mother's new partner was a dangerous man, and this 
was relevant to the court's consideration of the child's welfare. 
87 
When a child lives in a new household, especially with the father, and the care of 
the child is by a new partner or depends heavily upon the grandparents, the courts. 
are often approached by the non-custodial natural parent who argues that the 
child- should not be in the care of strangers when its natural mother is willing 
and able to care for the child. This challenge goes to the heart of the man's 
ability to retain custody of his children, especially when the courts belief is 
that the father's main role is to work, while the mother's is to care. These 
attitudes can be seen in the cases of M v. M (1980), Re C (1981), and Re W 
(1983). These cases show the reluctance of the courts to leave the child in the 
daily care of a step-parent when the natural parent seeks the infant's custody. 
The courts even adopted this principle in B v. B (1991), where a lesbian mother 
with a strong bond was favoured over the father and a child-minder. It is 
difficult to establish whether the courts are applying a belief that the 
biological link is always superior, but in the cases which concern a decision 
between the alternative homes of the two natural parents, the statutory position 
must be to examine the quality of the care offered in relation to the child's 
needs. 
A pattern could be seen to be emerging in the cases examined so far. Where the 
courts are involved with technical issues of law, they are trained and on familiar 
ground. Where the courts are charged with a wide discretion, such as the "child's 
best interests", it is difficult to avoid personal beliefs and the courts seem to 
encounter problems. In relation to the importance of care being given by a natural 
parent the courts are finding the issues particularly complicated. Indeed, there 
does not seem to be a single interpretation available. The quality of care 
argument can be relied upon for the families involved in care and the local 
authority. However, when confronted by a mother displaced by the father's new 
partner, the quality of the care given by a natural mother seems to be 
biologically better than that offered by the new partner. This position was 
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contradicted in Re DW however, as the courts admitted that the care offered by 
the step-mother was better than that which the mother could offer. Again the 
focus of the courts seems to be away from the child's welfare and more concerned 
with issues of justice between the parties. 
e. material advantages . 
The influence of the material position of the parents has moved on considerably 
from F v. F (1959) where, following the mother and father's divorce, the mother 
moved into squalid accommodation. The father was not considered a fit and 
proper person to have custody of the child. Initially the child lived. with his own 
elder brother and his wife, until the brother moved and there was no longer room 
for the child to live with them. The boy was not placed with his mother, due to 
the state of her accomodation, instead being placed into council care. Today, 
material advantage is held not to carry any weight in the balance of the child's 
welfare, not that it is no longer a welfare issue, but rather, the courts are keen 
to attempt to redress this balance through housing and maintenance orders. 
Whether these are successful or . not, and research shows. that economic 
disadvantage is widespread after divorce, the majority of custodial cases hold 
that the child's welfare cannot be won by material advantages as between parents. 
The present position is seen clearly in Stephenson v. Stephenson (1985), the court 
holding that custody cannot be resolved merely on the basis of the standard of 
living each parent enjoys. The argument is equally applied as between natural 
parents and foster parents, as in Re K (a Minor)(Ward: Care and Control) (1990). 
In deciding between natural parents and foster parents, the question is not a 
question of the material standards offered by each party, rather it is that the 
welfare of the child demands that the natural parents be displaced. 
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The question of the relevance of material considerations in questions which are 
peripheral to the custody issue are somewhat different In K v. K (1992), the 
material effect on the father was considered in terms of the need for the courts 
to consider all the effects of a particular order. The case concerned the removal 
of the father from the home, a council house in his name, in the interests of his 
children. On appeal, a retrial was ordered on the grounds that the judge had erred 
in his discretion, by failing to consider whether an order could be made which 
would not result in the loss of the father's right to buy the property, and also 
due to the force of the submission that the children's welfare was not established 
on the evidence. Further, the material effect of the order was considered in 
Walker v. Walker (1978), and in Brent v. Brent (1974). In Brent the husband was a 
council tenant By the terms of the divorce, he was ordered to leave the 
matrimonial home, but after the decree nisi he remained in the home. The court 
had to consider granting an injunction to remove the man from his tenancy. Given 
the reluctance in other areas of family and property law to oust the property 
owner, for example in domestic violence, this use of removal from property in the 
child's best interests is particularly noteworthy. 
This radical approach will only be used in a narrow interpretation of welfare 
however, as was seen in the traditional statement of the law in Richards v. 
Richards (1984). In this case, the proceedings in which such an approach would be 
available were held to be only those which touch directly the child's best 
interests. Richards concerned the material consideration of who should live in the 
matrimonial home. As the custody issue was not before the court, the child's 
welfare was not the paramount consideration of the court, even though it had an 
effect on the mother and child's enjoyment of the matrimonial home. When seen 
alongside Re W (1983) the claims of the court both to ignore material differences 
in terms of the question of which parent should have custody, and redress 
material differences between the parties, in order to provide for the child's 
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upbringing, could be questionned. Here the mother had to show grounds of 
violence to gain an ouster order, and the court felt that the mother may lose 
custody of the child if she could not provide a home having left her own. It would 
remain to be seen if the courts would hold in favour of the mother who was in 
local authority homeless accommodation, often no more than a bed-and-breakfast 
hotel room, should the father seek custody. One would suspect that the 
application would be served with a counter application for custody and 
accomodation, which would force the court to examine the accommodation issue. 
Given the provisions of the court to make orders for maintenance, if the welfare 
of the child pointed towards the mother being the best parent in all other 
respects, then it is submitted that the Re W decision would be seen as rogue, the 
courts being in a position never to allow a mother to be unable to provide a home 
as against the father who has the means to do so. 
However, as was indicated in the last section, the courts may be presented with 
one party who offers the earth to the child in terms of material possessions while 
the other party offers little in comparison. The temptation would be to see the 
child's welfare in the material life that can be offered. The cases indicate that 
courts are less equivocal when presented with arguments of a material benefit for 
the child than they are when considering how to deal with a higher quality of care 
from the "wrong" person. 
f religion 
One of the elements which the sources agree to be present in the parents' rights 
over the child is that of the freedom to bring up the child in their chosen 
religion. This can present a further battleground for the parents to find dispute 
with each other. The courts are reluctant to become embroiled in debates as to 
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the relative merits of competing religions, in a similar way to religious cases in 
charitable trusts. The courts take a view that their intervention should be only 
where the child faces harm from following a particular creed. Cases tend to 
concern the "fringe" of religious life, especially rounding on the Jehovah's 
Witnesses. The courts will not pass judgement on the quality of the faith which a 
parent chooses to follow, but will examine the repercussions for the child. 
The issues for the court can be seen in Wright v. Wright (1981). The overreaction 
of the mother to the father's access visits caused the child such emotional 
distress that the father's access was terminated. Here there was a religious 
dimension. The father joined the Jehovah's Witnesses after the marriage ended. 
The courts would not pass judgement on the faith on that church, but were 
prepared to accept the mother's fears that the children would be indoctrinated. 
Similarly, in Jane v. Jane (1983) the mother joined the Jehovah's Witnesses, and 
the father was concerned that these beliefs would endanger the physical health of 
the children, given that the faith rejected the practice of blood transfusion. The 
court accepted the father's concern, but would not change the care and control of 
the children away from the mother. The father was given custody, and thereby 
effective control over decisions concerning medical treatment of the children. 
The, courts have been more critical of other churches which the judges perceive to 
be dangerous. This is the current view of the Church of Scientology, as seen in Re 
B&G (1985). The father was a member of the Church of Scientology, but was 
the more suitable custodial parent for the children in all other respects. The 
courts saw the faith as an "evil", from which the children should be protected, 
and from which they would be at risk in the care of their father. The faith would 
effectively isolate the children, amongst other difficulties. The courts felt it 
in the children's interests to remove them from their father and place them with 
their mother. 
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The difficulty is not only faced by the English courts as can be seen in the 
Austrian, case of Hoffmann (1992), where the European Convention of Human 
Rights is being invoked to. allow religious freedom. The mother, a practising 
member of the Jehovah's Witnesses is, at this time, challenging the decision of 
the Innsbruck Regional Court which overruled the custody order granting her 
custody of her children, and placing them with their father. The court held that 
the sect's education programme violated the Religious Education Act, and that the 
effect of the sect upon the children risked their becoming socially marginalized 
and, further, risked a potential danger to their health by the refusal of blood 
transfusion. The mother's appeal is based on her right under the European 
Convention of Human Rights articles 8, concerning religious freedom, and article 
9, allowing her to educate her, children according to her religious beliefs. The 
Commission found a breach of her religious and family rights, and referred the 
matter to the European Court for Human Rights. Should this be successful, there 
may be a resurgence of pressure in an area of separation law which has largely 
accepted the judge's views of the sects. 
g. siblings 
Where the family contains two or more children, the courts generally see a need 
to keep the siblings together, rather than make orders which separate the 
children. The general principle can be seen in Cossey v. Cossey (1981), Guery v. 
Guery (1982) and C v. C (1988) where the court accepted that it was best to keep 
siblings together, if possible, as a family unit. This, however is not always the 
case in practice, and the strength of the status quo can be seen in some cases to 
prevail where the siblings are separated. This argument prevailed in Adams v. 
Adams (1984). 
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As in all the issues accepted as arguments for the welfare of the child, avoiding 
sibling separation is not a theoretical position held by the courts, but has 
emerged from judicial common sense. However, the court, in B v. B 
(Minors) (Custody, Care and Control) (1991), accepted the opinion of a 
psychiatrist who testified that -keeping siblings together was important only if 
the siblings were no more than five years different in age. 
h. child's wishes 
The courts have always seen the wishes of the child as a difficult consideration 
to place in the balance. In some cases, some being very early decisions, - the 
child's views have been taken into consideration. Other judges refuse to place any 
weight on the child's views. Under the Children Act 1989 section 1(3) the courts 
will have to "have regard in particular to... the ascertainable wishes and 
feelings of the child concerned (considered in the light of his age and 
understanding)". The reported cases stress, in the perception of the higher 
courts, that normally the wishes of the child should be ascertained by the Court 
Welfare Officer, and that the child should not be placed before the court. The 
practice is, however, unclear and is the most important in a set of difficulties 
of practice and ethics concerning the wishes of the child which will be discussed 
later in the work 
The early case of Ex pane Hopkins (1732) shows what could be seen as a very 
modern view of the participation of the child. The court had to decide the custody 
of a girl aged 13 who had lived with her uncle until his death. Her father now 
sought custody by habeas corpus. The Lord Chancellor, Lord King, considered the 
duty on the court at common law, which was to grant the father's request 
However, the court being the Court of Chancery, Lord King considered he was 
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not bound by common law, and took the view that the girl's wishes should be 
considered by the court. On the strength of those wishes, he ordered that the girl 
be allowed to remain living in her uncle's house, and that her parents be given 
access to her. 
Cases prior to the Children Act 1989, while accepting the principle, are more 
likely to suggest that the views of the child were to be treated with caution both 
as to the content of what a child would say, and from the impact that the weight 
of decision making would have on the child. The latter point is shown clearly in 
Re C (1985) where the first court hearing postponed the decision concerning 
access until the child could give its opinion, essentially making the decision for 
the court. This was held to place too much of a burden upon the child by the 
appeal court. The cautious nature of the court can be seen in Doncheff v. 
Doncheff (1978), Cossey v. Cossey (1981), and Re S (an Infant) (1967). The issue 
may arise when a child is reluctant to continue to see a parent. The court in B 
v. B (1971) accepted the child's wish. The child did not wish to continue access 
to the non-custodial parent, and the wish was supported even where there were no 
other objections to the access. 
The courts will not always follow the wishes of the child, which will in turn need 
to be explained to the child so that the child will understand his or her röle. 
The decision of Re DW (1984) is particularly notable for the participation of the 
child and the action of the court against his wishes. In In re B (Minors: Access) 
(1991) the children aged 12 and 11 expressed the view that they no longer wished 
to see their father, whose behaviour was described as eccentric and bizarre. The 
welfare officer, however, felt that contact should continue, lest the father 
became an unknown quantity to the children. The court held, it was in their best 
interests that they should come to know their father and become acquainted with 
his attributes, without being ashamed of him. 
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In In re P (Minors) (Wardship) (1992) the court saw that it had a duty to listen 
to the child's wishes. However, it stated that they were not binding on the court, 
and, where the court felt the child's welfare lay elsewhere, it should disregard 
the child's wishes. The duty to consider the child's wishes was imposed by the 
Children Act 1989 in all family cases. In In re P (a Minor) (1991), the boy, a 
"mature" 14 year old, wished to remain with his father and continue to attend a 
day school, rather than become a boarder at a major public school. The original 
plan which had been taken to the first hearing, had been for the boy to go to the 
boarding school, having gained a music bursary, but the father claimed in court to 
be unable to pay the fees. The court did not accept his -protestation, and ordered 
the child to the school. Between the first and second hearings, the boy met the 
headmaster of the day school, and was persuaded as to its charms. Via the welfare 
officer, the boy informed the court that he wanted to attend the day school and 
live with his father so that he could spend as much time with him "to make up for 
the five years he had lived with his mother". The court gave effect to the boys 
wishes, having accepted that it was under a duty to listen to and pay respect to 
his views. The Appeal Court felt that "older children often had an appreciation of 
their situation that was worthy of being respected by adults and by the courts". 
Re J (a Minor) (1992) indicates that the checklist in the Children Act 1989, does 
not place any priority between elements of the checklist. That the need to 
ascertain the wishes of the child are noted first does not give them any priority. 
The implications of the process of ascertaining the wishes of the child will be 
considered below. 
Another interesting departure in the child's rights to be heard in the process of 
family breakdown is the child's right to initiate proceedings. The first of a 
small number of cases of children "divorcing" their parents was seen in Autumn, 
1992. The case attracted much media interest. However, it was noted31 that the 
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case was settled quietly when the 14 year old girl was reconciled to her parents. 
i. joint orders 
The quantitative evidence of the reluctance of the courts to give joint orders has 
already been noted in the work of Priest and Whybrow (1986), even though the 
courts have attempted to regulate joint orders so as to produce a uniform 
geographical approach in Practice Direction (Child: Joint Custody Order) (1980). 
However, given the imposition of joint -parental responsibility, - which is 
effectively an unspoken joint order, it is worth noting the reactions of the 
courts in the reported caselaw as an indication of how the courts must change 
their approach when dealing with the new legislation. In the reports, the courts 
are sceptical as to the value of the joint order, even though according to 
Halsbury's Laws [Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition, para- 936.1 it is no 
longer exceptional to grant joint orders. Perhaps sensibly, in Jussa v. Jussa 
(1972), the court felt that joint custody orders could only be a reality where the 
parents were in real agreement. Mr Justice Bridge indicated that joint orders 
needed parents "capable of cooperating sensibly". Caffell v. Caffell (1984) shows 
a similar approach to the order. Here, although Lord Justice Ormrod indicated 
that, in many cases it was sensible to say that joint custody orders would not 
work, and they ought not to be made unless there was a chance that they would 
work, such an order was upheld where the parents were acrimonious and unable 
to agree. 
Very recently, in In re J (a Minor) (1991) Mr Justice Scott Baker held that, save 
in the most exceptional circumstances, joint care and control orders should not be 
made, as the "vice" of such an action would be that the children would not know 
where he or she was really based. However, in this case the court made a joint 
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order as the parents had agreed terms which left the child in no doubt as to where 
she would be based. Moreover, there were advantages to the parents in reflecting 
their agreed equality. It was in the best interests of the child to approve the 
parents request. Given this description, the courts will have to move a long way 
to approach parental responsibility with the same hope as the Law Commission. 
The courts are particularly concerned to see split orders, where the care and 
control of the child is shared. The position is seen in Riley v. Riley (1987) 
where, on the separation of the parents, a joint custody order was made for the 
child. The parents shared care and control of the-child: the child lived with the 
mother for a week and then with the father for the next week. After some five 
years, the mother sought a qare and control order alone... The jkIdge felt that it 
was pilma facie not in the child's best interests to move so frequently, and that 
given the girl was a teenager, she needed the care of her mother. The order was 
made for joint custody, and for care and control to the mother and access to the 
father. The editorial comment in the journal points out the difference between 
English joint custody, which concerns the legal decisions concerning the child, 
and the American interpretation of joint custody which is concerned with the joint 
day-to-day care of the child. Riley proposes that the child should have a home 
base, and that two homes can be confusing rather than progressive. 
j. court welfare officers' opinions, and other expert testimony 
Parties to the proceedings can rely on expert witnesses to support their claims. 
The courts seem to be sceptical of any fettering of their general discretion, but 
some judges have relied upon expert testimony to justify their findings, as has 
already been noted in B v. B (Minors) (Custody, Care and Control) (1991). The 
court in In re J (a Minor)(Expert Evidence) (1990) outlined the duties of the 
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expert witness. It was felt that they should only express genuinely held opinions 
which were not biased in favour of one party. Further, they should not mislead 
the court by omission. Beyond this, the practice. as will be seen later, is largely 
in its infancy in separation cases, and the constraints and potentials are still 
very much to be explored. 
The Court Welfare Service, however,, is a well established expert service for the 
court, although the precise direction of its work is also currently developing, as 
will be discussed later. The courts are very keen to maintain the traditional role 
for the welfare officer, that of gathering information for the court In Scott v. 
Scott (1986) the Court Welfare Officer saw his duty primarily to attempt 
conciliation between the parents. The court held that this was not the primary 
duty, which was to provide factual assistance to the judge. This follows the 
perception of the welfare officer's röle in Practice Direction (Divorce: Welfare 
Report) (1981) where it was established that when ordering a court welfare 
report, the court should indicate to the officer the matters on which the report 
should be based, and the welfare officer should attend the hearing. Thus, the 
report should concentrate on the areas about which the court is unclear. 
Webb v. Webb (1986) accepted that the court welfare report, in order to do its 
job, will necessarily contain hearsay evidence, and in Re H (1986) the court in a 
similar way accepted that the report would have to contain the officers opinions. 
However, in Thompson v. Thompson (1986) where a report gave 21 peoples' 
opinion of the individuals and not the Welfare officers' own opinions, the report 
was considered unreliable. 
Two issues emerge in the reports which are of concern to the practice of court 
welfare reporting. First is the issue of whether the reports are necessary, which 
carries with it the question of whether the courts are committed to decisions or 
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to process in separation law; and, secondly, how the reports are used. 
In the first instance, the courts are not discussing the changes occurring in 
court welfare practice, but are imposing the traditional model of fact finding. In 
M v. M (1989) the appeal court decided that up. to date welfare reports are not 
always needed on appeal, except where the first instance finding is plainly wrong. 
This simply reflects the fact that on appeal the concern of the court is the 
legality of the process adopted by the first judge. If the facts must be reheard, 
then that is for the lower court. If an emergency measure is needed, then the 
courts could order a report, or call on the welfare officer who made the' original 
report. 
In Re H (1986) the courts found that where a court welfare officer had been 
involved in conciliation with the parents, then another officer should gather the 
evidence and make a report should a report remain necessary. This was accepted 
as good practice by the court welfare officers in this study. Further, concerning 
conciliation, Registrar's Direction (1986) indicates that good practice dictates 
that if there is a local conciliation service, referral should be made to that 
agency before a report. is ordered. The. practice of in-court conciliation, 
involving a discussion of the custody issues- informally between the parents, the 
registrar and the welfare officer were set up at the Principal Registry by 
Practice Direction (1982) a practice which was extended by Practice Direction 
(1984), to cover section 41 cases and guardianship and wardship proceedings. 
The case of Re H (Minors) (Welfare Reports) (1990) poses more difficult issues. It 
concerned three children, two born to the mother by her deceased husband, and 
the third born to the mother and her new partner. The family lived together in the 
mother's house for some five years before the relationship broke down, and the 
mother sought to remove the father from the house. Proceedings for custody of 
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the children were started in June 1989, when a registrar ordered a welfare report. 
In August 1989 the mother sought an injunction ousting the father from the house 
and restraining him from seeing the children; it was acknowledged that the three 
children were fond of the man. The order was refused by Mr Justice Ward who 
set a hearing date for 6th November 1989. In September, the father's solicitor 
realised that there was no welfare report and before Mr Justice Kirkler, the 
hearing date was set back The mother appealed on the ground that the-welfare 
report was not essential. 
on appeal, Lord Justice Balcombe found- that Mr Justice Ward was concerned 
that the hearing should be before Christmas, and that the local welfare 
difficulties meant a delay in proceedings until the New Year. Lord Balcombe was 
not prepared to say that the welfare report was not essential, even though the 
parents in the case had points of agreement. The welfare officer may not forge an 
agreement, but could indicate the extent of the parental accord. The welfare 
report also gave the court the views of the older children, which Lord Balcombe 
thought to be essential. The issue for the court was the best interests of the 
child. He accepted th at the tension within the house was undesirable, indeed, 
detrimental, and the case should ideally be completed by Chrisfmas. Given that 
the issue was not simply'the 'custody of the children, 'ýut the father's property 
right in the home, it was felt that the hearing should proceed. Howe ver, the judge 
should delay it for the welfare reports, should it be impossible to continue 
without them. Clearly a six month delay would be detrimental, but it must depend. 
on the type of welfare approach which is adopted. 
The Children Act 1989, s 1(2) indicates a general philosophy that delay is not in 
the child's welfare. Section 11 of the Act seeks to aid this by requiring a 
timetable to be drawn up for the passage of a case through the court, outlining 
the expectation for when parts of the process, for example reports, will be 
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achieved. Clearly, there can be a tension here between the focus of the court and 
that of the court welfare officers. If the court adopts an investigative 
understanding of the welfare officers' job, then timetables would have a fixed 
nature. If however, a mediation approach was taken, the timetable would have to 
allow for a more fluid approach to sessions. The danger is that the court is one 
step removed from the families and the professionals, and therefore the manner 
in which the timetables are implemented could have a serious implication on the 
mediation process in court welfare teams. It is not clear that all judges are 
sympathetic to such an approach by the court welfare officers. 
The problem of how the report and the officer are used by the court is an issue 
which concerns the credibility of the officer. In the first case, concerning the 
necessity of reports, the issue was solely about the tactical relationship between 
the lawyers, judge and officer. However, in this second issue confidentiality of 
the report, and therefore the integrity of the process of compiling the report, is 
challenged. In In re C (a Minor) (1990) the mother and father were unmarried, 
and the mother refused to allow the father access. The welfare officer felt that 
it would be correct to recommence access, but the mother's express feeling was 
that it would be better to go to prison than to allow the father access. Given 
that the question of imprisonment was before the court, the judge did not want to 
raise certain questions in open court 
Four Court of Appeal cases were cited. In re K (Infants) (1963), which was 
applied in Fowler v. Fowler and Sine (1963), Lord Justice Upjohn held that a 
party had a right to hear and comment on all information before the judge. Lords 
Justices Davies and Harman suggested in K that there may be exceptional 
circumstances which would overrule this principle. However, Lord Harman felt 
that he could not envisage such circumstances 
-at -that 
time. Lord Justice Willmer 
followed Lord Upjohn in Fowler. In H v. H (Irregularity: Effect on Order) (1983) 
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the principle of justice being seen to be done was invoked, a principle that was 
followed in In re B (a Minor) (Irregularity of Practice) (1990). These cases 
seemed to overlook the appeal of K, Official Solicitor to the Supreme Court v. K 
(1965). The House of Lords considered that the Welfare of the child was the 
paramount consideration, and that circumstances may arise which could require 
the judge to use his discretion to see parties in private, but this was only to be 
undertaken with great circumspection. In the case before the court, Lord Justice 
Dillon felt that the action of the judge had not been correct, and that the 
welfare officer should have been questioned in open court. The case was set aside 
for a rehearing. 
In B v. M (1990) the proceedings related to the use and confidentiality of the 
welfa re report. The plaintiff, the divorced husband, sought to show that the 
defendant, the wife's father, had intended to give him a share in the matrimonial 
house which the father had purchased. The defendant had intimated to the Court 
Welfare Officer that, on purchasing the property, he had intended to give his wife 
and son-in-law an interest in the property as their matrimonial home. The 
plaintiff sought to rely on this statement, the defence claiming it to be 
inadmissible as the remarks were made in a confidential discussion which should 
not have been shown to a third party without causing a contempt of courL The 
judge granted an injunction to prevent the use of the welfare report in the 
property case. On appeal it was suggested that the confidentiality of the report 
referred to the child and not to the property issues, and that the material could 
be included in subsequent hearings, with the leave of the court. Further, the 
welfare officer should be called in reference to the ancillary matters if the 
evidence was of great relevance to the proceedings. The matter did not affect the 
welfare of the child, and the risk of the breach of confidentiality was slight and 
did not amount to a justification for excluding the relevant evidence. The concern 
of the judge at first instance was that the court welfare officer should be given 
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full and frank information; that the decision concerning the admissibility of the 
report should not impede the reporting process. On appeal, Lord Justice Ralph 
Gibson felt that the issue was for the court which was involved with the custody 
dispute as that was the only court which could consider the appropriateness of 
making an order for the release of the document, and it was to that court to which 
any contempt would be committed. That court should consider the relevant 
factors, particularly including the importance of the evidence which was to be 
released, and whether justice demanded the release. Thus, the appeal would not 
allow disclosure, but removed the injunction; it be came a matter to be pursued in 
the custody court. 
In his comment32, Nigel Lowe points out that the discretion to -allow 
disclosure of 
reports is unfettered in wardship proceedings - Re F (Wards) (Disclosure of 
Evidence) (1988) - and for the juvenile court to disclose Guardian ad Litem. 
reports - R. v. Sunderland Juvenile Court, ex parre G. (1988) Here, however, the 
confidentiality of the welfare report is prized, and indeed seems strong in law, 
given section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960, and the Practice 
Direction (Minor., Welfare Officer's Report) (1984). The position seemed to be 
accepted in Re G (a Minor)(Welfare OfjTcer's Report) (1989). However, B v. M 
seems to drive straight 'through this. Thus, the courts will be interested to 
define when the balance of the need to maintain the welfare report system and 
the welfare of the child against the needs for evidence in other cases where the 
welfare principle will not guide - Re F (Wards) (Disclosure of Evidence) (1988). 
k. appeals, and conduct of cases 
The conduct of the cases includes many threads-of the development of separation 
law. One of the most important factors in good practice as perceived by the 
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courts, and accepted into the Children Act 1989, s. 1(2), is that cases should be 
heard as expeditiously as possible33. Clearly there will be constraints, not 
least the question of the time that is necessary to produce a welfare report or 
pursue conciliation. However, the courts clearly see the early hearing of cases as 
in the child's best interest, In re A (a Minor) (1991). This is the case at first 
instance or on appeal, Re W&W (Minors) (1984). Likewise, where an application 
is. made for a divorce, if an interim custody order is sought under other 
proceedings, these should be heard without delay, Jones (EG) v. Jones (EF) 
(1974). The courts must give reasons for their decisions after considering all the 
relevant factors and must state all the findings of fact, Hoey v. Hoey (1984). 
T he courts have given special consideration to the appropriateness and practice of 
interim and ex parte injunctions, matters which seek to avoid delay in protracted 
proceedings and emergencies. When making interim orders the courts' concern 
must be the child's welfare. Challenges to this can arise where a child has been 
snatched and wrongfully retained by a non-custodial parent In such cases the 
issue of justice between the parties should not concern the court, only the 
child's welfare. Hence, in In re J (a Minor)(Interim Custody: Appeal) (1989). the 
court held that there is no automatic rule that the child should be returned prior 
to a full hearing. This is not an unconfused position, as both the cases of W v. 
D (Interim Custody Order) (1980) and Witter v. Drummond (1980) held that when 
child is snatched, he or she should be returned to the custodial parent prior to 
the full hearing by an interim order. The courts would now favour. the 
paramountcy test, given the changes in abduction law already discussed. 
When faced with an ex pane application, the court of appeal in In re H (a Minor) 
(1991) wished to apply a strict rule that only in exceptional circumstances should 
the custody of a child be transferred on an ex pane application. Such exceptional 
circumstances, according to Lord Justice Butler-Sloss, would need strong evidence 
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and require the child to be in immediate danger, or exceptional circumstances as 
would justify a place of safety order. In the meantime, in the particular case the 
order was not reversed, but was left until an urgent inter partes hearing could be 
arranged. However, the father - who had gained the ex pane order by 'phone - 
would not be able to rely on a status quo argument. 
Likewise, the issue of which jurisdiction, forum conveniens, has been held to be a 
consideration in the child's welfare and therefore governed by the paramountcy 
rule. In In re H Winors) (1992), the question was said to be inevitably one in 
"respect to the upbringing of the child". Further, on this point, orders from 
other jurisdictions cannot be resurrected once superceded in the English court, as 
in T v. T (1991) where an order made in an English court superceded an order 
made in the Scottish courts. The English courts had no jurisdiction to entertain 
an application to enforce a Scottish order, under the Family Law Act 1986, section 
15. 
A further and important development in the court process occurred in the early 
1970s concerning the judges who hear family cases. Prior to that time there had 
been little formal recognition that family law required a particularly different 
approach. By Practice Direction (Infants: Magistrates' Courts)(No. 2) (1972) 
children's hearings at the Royal Courts of Justice were to be allocated to 
specific Circuit Court Judges. Further, by the practice direction, appeals 
concerning children were similarly allocated to certain High Court Judges. While 
the effect was far, and remains far, from the provision of a family court, the 
recognition that family law needs special skills from the judiciary downwards is a 
crucial development. 
In terms of the conduct of cases, the courts have given most consideration to the 
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question of the r6le of the appeal court. The deliberations have produced an 
accepted understanding of the questions which an appeal court should consider. 
The temptation would be in an area of law which is so unregulated and based on 
discretion for appeals to rake over the content of the decision. The courts have 
been asked to assess the merits of particular custody or access decisions made in 
the lower courts. However the consistent line is explained in G v. G (1985) where 
the House of Lords held that appeals'should be confined to questions of law and 
not fact. Thus, the court can and should ask if the discretion of the courts has 
been exercised within general principles of public law, however the courts must 
not ask whether the decision itself would be the one which the appeal court would 
make. This stems from the widely accepted theory that the court of first instance 
hears first hand evidence and is charged with the authority to make the balance 
according to those facts as the judge sees fit The appeal court does -not share 
that insight, and to question the exercise of discretion would undermine the 
authority of the lower court and effectively open the floodgates through which 
would pour the parties who did not agree with the decision, and who were trying 
to overturn orders. 
This principle can be seen very clearly in a selection of cases made below which 
show the courts' approach to the findings of fact of the lower court. The r6le of 
the appeal court was outlined in the case of 
J v. C in a discussion initiated by Robert Alexander, who appeared for the 
parents. Alexander opened thus, "if the courts below applied the right principles, 
their decision cannot be altered-34, accepting that the appeal was available to 
question the process adopted by the court in reaching its decision - the use of 
the discretion - rather than questioning the actual decision which the court made. 
This understanding of the purpose of the appeal was accepted by Lord Justice 
Guest: "Counsel for the appellants accepted that he could not ask the House to 
overrule the discretion which has been exercised by the trial judge unless he 
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could show that it had been exercised upon some wrong principle. This could not 
have been withheld. It is not for this House to retry the case on the facts. "35 
The court had a discretion to consider what was in the child's interests and it 
was the concern of the appeal to examine the method the court had adopted in 
determining the facts pertinent to the decision, not the facts themselves. If the 
court had made the appropriate inquiries, the outcome it adduced could not be 
challenged by way of appeal. In that situation, the correct procedure would be to 
seek a new order on the basis of a fresh case. 
Hutchinson v. Hutchinson (1981) again applies the principle. Here the trial judge 
heard evidence to the effect that the step-father was a danger to the child, but 
left the child with the mother. The court held that it was within his discretion 
to interpret the facts. The issue was further discussed and accepted in P v. P 
(Minors: Custody Appeal) (1984), in T v. T (Minors: Custody Appeal) (1987), and 
In re B (Minors) (1989) where the court held that in appeal cases, the appeal 
court should not find the first instance court wrong on matters of fact. In Re H 
(a Minor: Custody) (1989), on appeal, the court found that the trial judge had 
acted meticulously and that the decision he had made was within his discretion, 
and they could not question the decision. 
The question of the correct weight given to certain factors can, however be seen 
as a question of the correct application of the law, as in Blair v. Blair (1986). 
Here the court found that, to interfere with the decision of the first instance 
judge, the appeal had to show that the judge was clearly wrong in the decision or 
in the method used to reach the decision. The basic issue was did the judge err in 
his discretion, or did he simply reach a different decision to that of the opinion 
of the appeal court judges. 
In cases where the courts feel the judge is clearly wrong in his decision the 
108 
appeal courts have been wiling to intervene, as in Re R (1986). In the first 
hearing, the material facts were incomplete. The appeal court felt that all 
reports should be made available to the judge. They were also mindful of the 
changes that had occurred since the first decision, and granted an interim order 
to the mother, and ordered a retrial on the grounds of the father's drinking and 
criminal record. Similarly, the judge at first instance was found to have erred in 
his judgement in Re W; Re L (1987) by making an inappropriate decision as to the 
weight to be given to evidence of dangers to the children. 
In Re W (Minors) (1992), Mrs Justice Booth indicates that the Family Proceedings 
Courts (Children Act 1989) Rules 1991, r 21(5)(6) apply throughout the system of 
courts. Therefore, an order made without giving reasons and findings of fact must 
be set aside. 
Access and Contact Issues. 
The remaining four issues all concern access. While the concept of access has been 
removed by the Children Act, contact orders will be very similar as in both cases 
they are the means by which a parent with whom the child does not live will 
retain a relationship with the child. There is an enormous ammount -of bitterness 
surrounding access, and indeed research shows that access orders very often 
collapse as the situation is so difficult to maintain. The courts response is 
initially to make orders in the imposing solutions or one-off remedy approach- 
However, ultimately the courts accept that they are relatively powerless in the 
face of access which has collapsed. 
The four issues to be addressed here are: whose right?, enforcement, suitability, 
and removal from the jurisdiction. 
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1. access: whose right? 
Alongside the movement to see parental rights in terms of parental 
responsibilities, there has been a corresponding change which suggests that the 
right of access belongs no longer to the parent, but to the child. This could also 
appear to be semantic as the question arises as to how a parent who will not turn 
up for access visits and will not respond to letters can be made to have' contact 
with the child, let alone a relationship with him or her. This, however, is not 
the concern of principles which are largely academic. It is a good thing to see 
the contact in terms of the benefit it has to the child, and the relation it has 
to the child's welfare, as this could be a point of leverage in dealing with 
parents whose own conflict is such that they see the access in terms. personal to 
the breakup of their partnership. Perhaps the only value the Principles of 
parental responsibility and child's right to access is this potential they offer 
in negotiation with parents. 
The courts acceptance that access is the right of the child is clear in the cases 
as in M v. M (Child: Access) (1973). (which contrasts well with the right under 
Children Act 1975, section 65(l). ) The acceptance of the principle comes from a 
perception that it is in the child's welfare to maintain contact, as was explained 
in Re B (a Minor)(Access) (1984) where the contact between a child and the 
non-custodial parent was considered by the court to be very important to the 
child's emotional health. 
Access should be seen as such, and not concerned with the development of a 
relationship between the parent and the child which is on a par with the custodial 
parent. This difficult concept is seen in Re C (Minor)(Access) (1991) "Here the 
Child was born to unmarried parents who never lived together as a family with 
the child, having separated before the birth. The father had always had contact 
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with the child, however the mother placed the child with a child-minder when she 
worked, thus reducing the father's contact with the child. A magistrates' court 
gave the father weekly access of one afternoon, and half of each weekend. The 
mother appealed, on the grounds that this was excessive for the child. Mr Justice 
Ewbank felt that the concept of access was not, as the justices had reasoned, to 
allow the child to get to know the non-custodial parent as well as the custodial 
parent Rather, he felt it implicit in the differentiation between custody and 
access that the relationship was weighted towards the custodial parent. Here the 
stress was too greatly w-eighed in favour of the father, especially as the parents 
were not married, and the judge agreed that access was excessive. He changed the 
order to one afternoon and alternate weekends. Gillian Douglas36 sees this as 
indicative that the blood tie carries little weight in assessing the custody or 
access. Perhaps that is the case, but here the difference is highlighted between 
the rights of the unmarried father with a history of contact with the child and no 
strong "new family" argument for the mother, and-his counterpart seeking to have 
access with his child where the mother has a new partner. 
The issues appear to be the same regardless of the parents' marital status, as in 
S v. 0 (1982). Here the order was granted even though the parents had not lived 
together. It was felt to be in the best interests of the child that the father's 
interest in the child and his continued payment of maintenance be maintained. As 
the child had no father figure, Sir George Baker, President of the Family 
Division, saw the father's access as a benefit to the child. Further, in Re C 
(Minors) (Access) (1985) the mother and father were unmarried, and the mother 
had married a new partner. The argument for maintaining contact with the father 
depended upon the depth of the relationship between the father and the child. 
The unmarried parent can be presented with problems in that they may not be 
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able to exercise access rights immediately. This should not preclude the granting 
of an order. In In re C (Minors) (Parental Rights) (1991) it was held that the 
unmarried father of two boys should never be refused a parental rights order 
under section 4, Family Law Reform Act 1987, simply on the basis that he could 
not exercise the rights immediately. Here the mother and father had split up, and 
the mother refused to allow the father access to the boys. Similarly, in Re H 
(Minors) (1991) where the children were in council care, and were to be placed 
for adoption, effectively removing some of the rights for which the father had 
applied. The council soughi an order to release the children for adoption, having 
stopped parental access. The father sought a parental rights order. The council's 
order was granted. On appeal, the father's request was granted, but the council's 
request was also upheld. Therefore, the father's order would give certain rights 
to him, whilst the order freeing the children for adoption was in place. 
The courts favour respecting the wishes of the child where the child does not wish 
to have access. In B v. B (1971) the court would not force a child to have access 
visits with the non-custodial parent where the child was implacable to it. The 
court felt that this would be the case even if there were no other objections to 
the access. Similarly, in Churchard v. Churchard (1984) boys aged 10 and eight 
had taken their mother's "side" in the marital conflict, to the point that they 
were implacably opposed to seeing their father. The court also took the view that 
in this situation it was correct to end access. It also took the opinion that 
where a parent was obstinate over refusing to allow access to take place, it would 
be unlikely to be in the child's best interests to imprison him or her. 
That the child's welfare is the guiding principle in deciding who should be 
granted access to the child can be seen in Dicocco v. Milne (1983), Re F (1976), 
and Scott v. Scott (1986) where the courts held that they should look to past, 
present and future attitudes to access in determining the best interests of the 
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child. In H v. H (1988) the court extended its thinking concerning the child's 
best interests, where the court found no principle in law that prevented a father 
who sexually abused the child from having access to the child. The court saw that 
contact was still desirable, and granted supervised access to protect the child. 
Where access has lapsed and the non-custodial parent is attempting to reassert an 
agangement, the courts take the new- situation of the child into considefation in 
determining his or her welfare, and have not been afraid to suggest that a 
biological link here is not necessarilY-a justification for disrupting a new home. 
This is seen in In re A (Minors., Access) (1991). The father lost contact with two 
children when they were 21 months and four months respectively. Two years later 
he attempted to restart access. The Judge held that notwithstanding the-principle 
of law and nature that a child had a right to benefit from contact with both his 
or her parents, in exceptional circumstances this should not be applied. Here, it 
was in the children's best interests to deny the father's application and thus 
preserve the "peace and security of their home life with the mother, without the 
disruption of the father's reappearance. A similar line was taken in Re W (a 
Minor)(Access) (1989). Here, the natural father wished to have access to his child 
to build their relationship. The mother had rein4rried and there was stability with 
the new husband. The court held that it was in the child's best interests to have 
a clean break from the father and concentrate on the stability of the new 
marriage. 
m. access: enforcement 
Closely linked to the major difficulty of establishing exactly who has the right 
to access is the difficulty of enforcement. This stems from the cases where due to 
fear or simple obstruction, the custodial parent will not allow access to take 
113 
place. The courts are divided between admitting that they are powerless as their 
ultimate sanction, a fine or imprisonment, is opposed to the child's best 
interests, or making orders in the hope that organised access might produce a 
workable situation. Here the courts rely heavily upon the court welfare office and 
some conciliation services to supervise access visits. 
Numerous cases display the first position. In B v. A (Illegitimate Children: 
Access) (1982) the mother's fear of the father was a sufficient ground for her to 
stop the access, if that fear affected the quality of the mother's care of the 
child. Again, in Sheppard v. Millar (1982). the mother would not cooperate with 
access for the father. The court took the view that access should be refused as it 
was not in the five year old child's best interests; the child was upset by seeing 
the friction between the parents. The child did not want to offend the mother. 
The court was forced to admit that access failed, indeed it had never really 
started. 
Further, in Re BC (a Minor) (Access) (1985) The courts found that the father 
was using access, not as a vehicle to develop his relationship with the child, but 
rather to get to the mother-as he could not accept the relationship was over. The 
mother's fear of the father was to be considered. And again, in A v. C (1985) the 
court showed that it will refuse access to a non-custodial parent if the custodial 
parent fears that such access impedes the care of the child. In Wright v. Wright 
(1981) the overreaction of the mother to the father's access visits caused the 
child such emotional distress that the father's access was terminated. 
However, the courts will take a hard line on some occasions, and order that access 
be attempted. In Re E (a Minor: Access) (1987) the court felt that an access order 
should not be considered inimical by the mother's, refusal to comply therewith, nor 
by the emotional harm that her actions caused to the child. The court thought that 
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it may be advantageous to remind the uncooperative parent of the court's power 
to enforce the order. Here the mother had refused to allow the father access, in 
breach of the order in his favour. Similarly, in Evans v. Jackson (1986) the court 
ordered access to the father despite the complaints of the mother and her new 
partner. The court found that it must have good reason to stop access, not just 
the complaints of the other party. 
The courts find their power to fine and imprison difficult to reconcile with the 
welfare of the child, as in Churchard (1984) and I v. D (Access Order: 
Enforcement) (1988). In Brewer v. Brewer (1989) the court was clear that a 
committal to prison for a first breach would be exceptional. Further, the courts 
are divided as to the value of indicating that a custody decision could be changed 
in the face of an obstinate custodial parent and an able non-custodial parent. In 
Re E (a Minor: Access) (1987) and V-P v. V-P (Access to Child) (1980) the courts 
felt it may be useful to remind a parent of the power to reorder custody, a line 
that was accepted in Williams v. Williams (1985). Here the children were aged 
five and four, and lived with their mother who was uncooperative to the father's 
access. The mother also -indoctrinated the children concerning their father, 
stimulating fears in the children- concerning him. The court felt that it was in 
the children's interests to terminate access, due to the climate it created in 
their lives. However, it also felt that threatening to reassess custody decisions 
may be useful in such cases. 
The prime concern of the courts is not to punish, Thomason v. Thomason (1985), 
but is the welfare of the child. In M v. M (1980) the courts challenged the use of 
threats as against the child's welfare. The attitude to access is no reason to 
remove the child from the custody of, say the mother, if in all other respects she 
ig the person most suited to have_custody. Clearly this must be, correct in the 
light of the welfare principle. However, the courts seem to use the threat to 
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lever the parties towards an agreement over access. 
The difficulty faced by the court can be seen in Re S (Minors) (Access: Appeal) 
(1990). The parents separated when the children were five and two years old 
respectively. An interim custody order was granted to the mother with reasonable 
access to the father. Access was difficult, the mother being terrified of the 
father; there were allegations that the father beat and abused her. The access 
having failed, the father applied for an access order, and was granted a"defined 
order. The mother, having consented to the order, then refused to comply with the 
terms of the order, remaining terrified of any contact with the father. Two months 
later, the older child went to live with his father. Shortly after this, the 
mother commenced cohabitation with another man, and gave birth to his child. 
Her first partner then sought custody of both his sons. The judge found no reason 
to move the older child from the father, however it was felt that moving the 
younger child would cause serious disruption in his life. This was an acute 
concern, as the father had not seen the child for some two years, and the mother 
was unlikely to seek access to the child. The judge at first instance felt that 
there was no point in making an access order in favour of either parent, as the 
history showed that it would not be implemented. In effect, the judge felt that he 
should admit the reality of the relationship. The question of access to the 
younger child was appealed by the father. Lord Justice Balcombe felt that the 
judge was plainly wrong in principle and in the exercise of his discretion. The 
principles were well established that the concern of the court was the child's 
welfare, and that access was the right of the child and not of the parent. The 
child had a right to know the non-custodial parent, and an even greater right to 
know his or her siblings. The first judge's order effectively denied this right. 
It was felt to be more appropriate to make orders of reasonable access for the 
father to see the younger son, and the mother to see the older boy. The welfare of 
the child should have been considered objectively, and, regarding the older boy, 
it did not matter that the mother had not sought access. If the mother remained 
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obdurate, it was his Lordship's opinion that the court should consider moving the 
custody from the mother to the father, after the sanction of imprisonment was 
attempted. Hence, the appeal court ordered reasonable access to both parents. 
Nigel Lowe37 draws attention to Maidment's work on the issue of whether or not 
this is the court's view - that access is the child's right - and then further 
tackles the issue of changing the custody order as a method for enforcing access, 
given that the consideration would have to be the welfare of the child, and the 
courts have already made a decision that custody should rest with the intransigent 
parent. Lowe sees this case as a "neat reminder that the child's perspective is 
of real importance". He indicates that courts should only deny access. if it is in 
the child's best interests to do so, and the court should not allow any problems 
the parents might pose to detract from this principle. This case further raises 
the question as to the merit in alleging that the right is the child's when the 
court is relatively powerless to control the parents' actions. If the right is 
truly the child's, would the court seek to punish the access parent who loses 
contact with the child? 
n. access: suitability 
Clearly, if the right of access is the child's, stemming from an interpretation of 
his or her welfare, the suitability or fitness of the parent to participate is 
crucial- This, again, is a problem which the courts have addressed for many years, 
as in Philip v. Philip (1872). The court refused to grant access to an excitable, 
violent mother. In the opinion of the court the seven year old child's recovery of 
his health would be impeded by her access. Today, the issue of suitability can be 
helped by the facilities for supervised access which greatly reduces the risks to 
the child. However the issue may concern the custodial parent to the point that 
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the tension surrounding access is detrimental to the child's well being. 
In M v. J (1982) the parents had lived together for two years, during which the 
father had a drink problem and attempted suicide. The court felt in the 
consideration of access, that there must be some positive and compelling evidence 
to justify refusing access. In In re B (Minors: Access) (1991) bizarre and 
eccentric behaviour on the part of the father was insufficient to stop the access. 
It had been argued that the behaviour distressed and baffled the children. 
However, the overall assumption that the child should be allowed to enjoy the 
benefits of access to the parent was not negated. The court granted supervised 
access to the father. The children had expressed the view that they no longer 
wished to see the-father. However, the court welfare officer believed that contact 
should continue to stop the father becoming an unknown quantity. 
While the issue of alleged abuse does not always warrant the termination of 
access, as in Re R (a Minor)(Child Abuse: Access) (1988), S v. S (Child Abuse: 
Access) (1988) and H v. H (1988), the courts will not always allow access to 
continue in serious cases. In B v. B (Declaration of Unfitness) (1982), the father 
had sexually abused the mother's child by a previous marriage, aged nine years, 
and then the child of their own marriage, aged six years. There was a fear that 
such abuse would continue in the future if he took on the care of a child. A 
section 42(3) declaration of unfitness was passed against him. Further, in C v. C 
(Child Abuse., Access) (1988). The father was suspected of abusing the child, 
therefore access was terminated. 
o. access: removal, from jurisdiction 
There are a large number of cases where the parents have found new partners, 
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and then made plans for a "new life" in another country. The concern of the 
courts have been torn between the desire to respect the integrity of the new 
family, and not to add to the sense of bitterness against the ex-partner and the 
system by destroying the opportunities for the new family, while on the other 
hand seeing the integrity of the ex-partner's desire to remain a parent for the 
child, which is seen as an equally important principle. Thus, the courts seek to 
justify their hard decisions by allotting weight to the quality of the two 
elements. The central dilemma again appears to be, how can the child's interests 
be isolated from those of the people around them, and one is left with the 
inevitable feeling that, since the judiciary are relying solely on their own 
intuition to determine the individual child's needs, the presentation and 
personalities of the actors within each case become the guiding factor. Thus, the 
rhetoric of the merits and demerits of a particular request appears to depend as 
much on the external factors of presentation as the internal factors of content, 
solely because the judges are not equipped with the necessary tools to discern the 
welfare of the child on the internal issues alone. The fine distinction approach 
used to determine these cases are perhaps more pronounced in this area, because 
the impact of the decision is most immediate; the family essentially gains a clean 
break away from the other parent or its plans are dashed. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, given the impact a negative result would have on the family, the 
tendancy seems to favour granting the departure. 
In Poel v. Poel (1970) the mother had custody of the two year old daughter, had 
remarried and was carrying the child of that marriage. She and her new husband 
wished to emigrate to New Zealand- The father had regular access to his 
daughter, but the judge felt that where the new family had been established, the 
strain on that new relationship would be very great should the plan be denied, and 
that would have a detrimental effect on the-child's welfare. The new partner was 
ordered to make a financial contribution to the father's access in New Zealand. In 
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Lonslow v. Henning (1986). The judge observed the bitterness in such cases which 
could be created by the judge interfering with the new family's decisions and 
chances. 
Similarly, in Nash v. Nash (1973), the mother and her new partner had the 
opportunity to live and work in South Africa. The father had written against 
apartheid, and was concerned that the child's moral welfare was endangered, and 
that because of his views, he would be unable to visit during the proposed stay. 
The court -felt that 
it was a major decision to 
-interfere 
with the custodial 
parents plans, and that the father's fears were insufficient grounds so to do. 
Again the courts in Chamberlain v. De la Mere (1983) saw the bitterness that the 
denial of the application to emigrate to the United States of America-would 
cause, and that it would adversely affect the welfare of the child. The appeal was 
granted, allowing the emigration to go ahead. Belton v. Belton (1987) indicates 
that the courts should not hide from making the decisions. The court should not 
adjourn its decision as this too would add to the bitterness, and make separation 
harder. 
However, the cases do not always favour the new family. In Godfrey v. Godfrey 
(1980) the father's real and substantial" access reduced the usually strong 
4rgýment that the family be allowed to leave the jurisdiction. Similarly, in In re 
M (minors) (1991) an order allowing the children's removal from England to go to 
France could not stand, as the judge had not taken into account the father's 
justifiable fears that he would lose contact with his children. The matter was to 
be reconsidered in a retrial. The request of the mother was a reasonable one, and 
the criteria for refusal should be the child's welfare. The balance which the 
judge had undertaken did not take account of the father's inability to afford the 
t rips to continue contact with his daughters, and-neither did it take account of 
the one-sided view that growing up with only the mother may give the girls of 
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their father. 
Each of these cases highlights the dilemma which was identified in the 
introduction to this section (o. ). It can be seen that the courts are placed in a 
stalemate situation in each. 
C, The Court's Interpretation of Welfare: A Chronological Approach. 
The classic statement of the case law on the interpretation is the thematic 
approach outlined above. If one adopts a chronological approach, a number of 
insights are more easily available. 
L the reduction in reported litigation. 
The most obvious chronological observation is that there is very little reported 
activity in the area of separation law from the mid-1980s, concerning the 
interpretation of the welfare principle. Two elements would seem to account for 
this. First, the majority of the basic elements on which cases would be brought 
were settled by this time. The above analysis of the cases, when attention is paid 
to their chronology, shows very few issues emerging after the early 1980S. The 
newer cases seem to accept the principles from the 1970s, when, possibly in the 
rush of cases following the reform of the divorce I aw, and certainly the case of 
J v. C (1970), many of the principal themes were established, which reflected the 
new ethos. For example, by the mid- to late-1970s the issue of conduct in 
separation caseý was settled; "divorce"- -conduct was accepted as 
irrelevant, and 
conduct had to have a direct bearing on the child's welfare. Likewise, the 
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understanding of status quo and the importance of the mother's r6le were equally 
consolidated. 
The overall effect of the litigation up to the early 1980s seemed to have a 
settling effect on the law. The judges did pot have any coherent justification for 
the different approaches, but the broad themes and approaches were fixed. The 
shift in practice moved more firmly onto the presentation of evidence within the 
guidelines the courts had indicated that they would accept. The second impact on 
the case law was the emergence of conciliation from the early- to mid-1980s. The 
process of mediated disputes took the intere st away from the case taw and placed 
it onto the alternative fora. In a strange way this shift could be seen to allow 
the courts further to consolidate their position. The focus of the problems 
arising out of the adversarial process for dealing with separations had been 
directly on the interpretations given by the courL With the advent of mediation 
the courts could be seen to deal with the hard, non-conciliated disputes, while 
the scrutiny now fell on the process, as it changed to accommodate the new 
procedures. 
With the establishment of the basic heads under which the courts will hear 
disputes, litigation on certain areas can be predicted with a greater degree of 
accuracy. This, it is suggested, occurred in separation law. Issues such as 
religion, which had been argued in the early 1980s, became non-issues, as they 
were predictable. Therefore negotiation could be more forceful. 
ii. new themes. 
The new issues in the case law tend -to- reflect 
two elements. First, the 
implications of change in the system. Thus the courts need to establish how the 
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wishes of the child will both be found and presented, and the impact that they 
should have on the decision has once again become an important issue in the 
reported case law. Another example is courts' examination of the r6le of the court 
welfare officer in the light of the officers in-creased mediation techniques. 
The second new element concerns changing social circumstances. Thus, in recent 
reported decisions the courts have - been required to address the issues of 
lesbianism and motherhood. Another important issue has been new court activity 
in the area of child abduction. The conventions signed during the 1980s are now 
being used increasing frequency, and require the courts to examine the efficiency 
of the sanctions available to them. 
The conclusion which can be drawn from this analysis is that it reinforces the 
notion that the courts have very little by way of a theoretical understanding of 
the child's best interests upon which they can base their interpretations of the 
law. The new issues cause the same theoretical problems. Using the thematic 
analysis perhaps makes the law appear more settled. It will also be noted that 
despite the thematic establishment of the reluctance of the judiciary to make 
joint orders in favour of the parents, which was established by the mid-1980s, and 
found convincingly in the Priest and Whybrow study of 1985, and accepted in the 
courts up to 1991, the Children Act 1989, effectively- overturns the case law on 
the point in the form of continuing parental responsibility. But it will equally 
be noted that this is the only issue on which Parliament has chosen to speak. - 
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D. Conclusion. 
There is a difficulty in understanding the caselaw, as was indicated at the 
begining of the analysis of the cases, in. that too much cannot be drawn from the 
language or a fine analysis of the law which is the meat of other legal analysis. 
Being centrally concerned with finding a solution which the courts believe is 
workable in a particular case, having seen the individual characters before the 
court, the decision must, to a certain extent, be an attempt to tell both sides 
what they want to hear, so that both sides retain their integrity as parents and 
can move forward to maintain their relationships with the child. Thus, what is 
said in one case may appear-to be contradictory in another. What is apparent is 
that the dependence on the judges common sense can lead to the development 
through successive cases of folklaw rules, and, as Lord Justice Ormrod points out 
in S(BD) v. S(DJ) (1979), the "rules" and phrases may be used too casually, 
blinding the courts to the true circumstances of the situation, The statute 
compels the courts to strip away the rules, but the practice of the adversarial 
law cannot work without rules upon which to hang arguments. This, as has been 
argued, overshadows the child's welfare, although the language is always able to 
justify any decision as being in the child's best interests. 
There are a number of interpretations, which could be drawn from the cases. 
There could be a welfare interpretation: that all the cases are resolved in the. 
child's best interests, and reading the cases, this is the belief that the 
language of the law portrays. There could be a conflict resolution approach: that 
the aim is to enable the parents to find their new roles. A Bureaucratic 
efficiency model: that all the cases have to be resolved, which is effective when 
they do not return to the law and regardless of the consequences, whether that is 
because the families live in peace with the new order or because the parents have 
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run out of emotional and financial resources to maintain the fight. There could 
also be a social control model: that the law seeks to maintain a subservient 
work-force, and this is achieved by focusing the language of the marital and 
family problems away from the economic hardships such as bad housing which are 
at the root of so many separations, and on the ability of the individuals to be 
good parents. A final approach could be the "game theory": to suggest that the 
law is irrelevant in the goals of developing a structure for the new family to 
exist within,, as the families only submit to the legal process for the duration 
which they perceive a need of it in acting out the drama of their separation - 
effectively the couples are in- total control of the situation; the law is a battle 
ground for as long and deep as the parents wish to play the game. 
Against all these models must run chaos factors which one could cast in the roles 
of "conspiracy theory" and "cock-up" theory. Conspiracy elements must be woven 
into the description, in that all the players in the drama from the judge through 
the legal personnel and para4egals, to the parents and their families and 
friends, are prejudiced. Each player holds a value system which reads like a DNA; 
some will be gay, some will hate gays, some will be feminist, others misogynist, 
others racist, and then below such conýcious beliefs will be the sub-conscious 
layers of schooling and life experiences, good or bad, which make the individuals 
human. The cock-up elements will act as "wild cards", acknowledging that the 
players are v ery much human and prone to failure and irrational behaviour. The 
last two chaos factors could be seen as models, but they are more useful if they 
are seen as the impurity which the theorists are reluctant to admit. They could 
stand as models, but to isolate them implie s that the models run with perfect 
human behaviour. Which model one subscribes to will largely be a philosophically 
and politically led choice. 
A further difficulty in the classical representation of separation law is that it 
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seems to indicate that all cases are argued before the courts. The truth, as shown 
in statistics, is far from that. The hard, log-jammed cases which have been 
discussed above are the minority. It could be easy to suggest that in a study of 
the best interests the minority are unimportant, but that is not the case. All the 
cases which go to lawyers to some extent must be affected by the legal perception 
of the child's best interests as presented in the courts. Thus, there is a body of 
belief which is held at the centre of the system which largely relies* on the 
chance interpretations of thejudges. 
Two investigations become necessary. -First, do those who service the vast majority 
of uncontested cases interpret the law in the same way as the courts? Secondly, 
the - question is clearly, 'are there any guides other -than common sense? In 
addressing the first question, the question emerges as to who are the 
professionals involved. 
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PART TWO: THE INSTITUTION OF SEPARATION LAW. 
The Development of Out-of-Court Negotiation. 
The work thus far has presented a picture of the law which relates to making 
decisions about children in separation law. What is apparent is that the picture 
does not indicate the daily practice of the law; so far the image is that 
separation cases are concerned with the courts, and that in some cases the courts 
are presented with an agreement made by the parties which the courts will accept. 
Statistically, the vast majority of cases do not concern the courts and the 
traditional presentation of the law can give an indication that they are not the 
concern of the law. The impression thus far could be that the parents are either 
forging their own agreements, or are relying upon the courts to impose an 
agreement for them. 
This picture does not reflect the importance of the wider institution of 
separatiorr law. Between the two poles, or minorities of parents, the vast majority 
forge their agreement with the help of lawyers and paralegals. The range of the 
negotiation which can take place is very wide. As Jane Hem (1989) indicates: 
"The parties may themselves go to their solicitors with matters already agreed. 
Solicitors may be able to sort something-out that will be acceptable to both 
parties. It may be necessary to go to an independent third party to facilitate 
discussions". This is the institution of separation law; the various professionals 
who attempt to facilitate the parents' agreement without recourse to the courts. 
This part of the thesis seeks to describe the institution, and to establish their 
expressed rules and philosophies of practice. 
The emergence of the middle process of para-legals is chronicled widely in the 
context of the development of the conciliation movement John Westcott (1989) 
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gives a succinct history of the development of the middle ground of the negotiated 
settlement. He indicates a threefold pressure to move away from the excessive 
formality of separation cases which could be seen up to the 1970S. The pressure 
came from the clients themselves, who believed that there was "no reason why 
marriage breakup should not be arranged in a more civilized way and without 
unnecessary conflict"; from family lawyers who saw it to be in the interests of 
parents and children to find a less contentious vehicle for the resolution of 
separation issues; and thirdly, a simple pressure to find alternative fora to the 
court process came from the rapid increase in clients between 1970 and 1976, 
when divorce petitions doubled. The professionals which have emerged (in an 
unstructured and largely unregulated way) in the middle ground of dispute 
resolution are lawyers, court welfare officers, conciliators, and mediators. 
A. Lawyers. 
For the vast majority of couples who seek a divorce or other separation related 
problem, the solicitor is the first and primary consultant, beyond which, the 
other para-legals are commonly seen as an adjunctl Davis (1988a) reports2 that 
in the various pieces of research of contested cases in which he has been 
involved, of the 299 persons interviewed only two had not sought the a: dvice of a 
lawyer. While the traditional lawyer has always been involved in door-of-the-court 
style and inter-solicitor bartering, many family solicitors have responded to the 
pressure to change their practice by a movement towards the "conciliatory 
approach". This has largely been developed through the Solicitors Family Law 
Association, which was founded in December, 1982. The group adopted a Code of 
Practice, which recommends the adoption of a style of advice, negotiation and 
conduct "calculated to encourage and assist the -parties 
to reconcile their 
differences", encouraging the client to see the nadvantage to the family of a 
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conciliatory rather than a litigious approach as a way of resolving the disputes". 
To achieve this conciliatory approach in the solicitors practice, he or she should 
avoid language inferring a "contest" either with the client - for example, 
avoiding opinions on the conduct of the other party - or with the other 
solicitors, especiaBy in correspondence. The children should be seen as the first 
and paramount consideration, accepting in the negotiation stages of a case the 
principles binding upon a court. Further, the issues of the child should be kept 
separate from issues of property and money, suggesting that "it is often helpful 
to deal with these two topics in separate letters". 
In practice, the solicitors are placed in an awkward position, because they are 
the first professionals the parents are likely to consult,. and because they are 
also the professionals who could ultimately steer the case through an adversarial 
court hearing. Further, the clients are not starting the process at the time they 
seek the advice of the formal process of separation. The parties have been 
engaged in an informal process of separation in which the formal process could be 
seen as a new chapter. They will be influenced by a folklaw of divorce, with 
preconceptions of the drama which the law involves fuelled by the media - as 
solicitors were keen to point out to this researcher at the start of the work: "we 
have to tell them it isn't L. A. Law! " - and most importantly, by their family and 
friends. 3 This produces two elements in the clients expectations. First, they have 
an idea of the law which, especially in the light of the changes in the Children 
Act 1989, is likely to be wrong and need, as Masson (1991) points out, careful 
correction. Failure to do this, she indicates, will "produce an impasse in 
individual cases, with clients unable to give instructions or make decisions 
because they are locked into ideas based on the old provisions", and one must be 
able to add, on incorrect perceptions. 
Secondly, the lawyer will be come one of the "partisans" either alongside or, as 
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Davis suggests4, against the family and friends. Advice and opinion as to the 
partner and the separation will have been offered, which can be used to 
strengthen the resolve of the fainthearted, or to push them down avenues which 
they do not wish to travel. There may also be an element of "she got X and I'm 
entitled to the same". Thus, the solicitor is presented in each case with an 
on-going process of divorce which may be fuelled by hate or reason, and may be 
following the direction which the client wishes to pursue or may not 
In this situation, the crucial element will be how the solicitor responds to the 
history which the client gives, or indeed covers up. The research of Murch (1980), 
and of Mitchell (1981) as. reviewed by Robinson (1989), indicates that the 
majority found their solicitors sprvices satisfactory, while over half found them 
to be "approachable, helpful and friendly". The finding was common that the 
clients' perceptions of their own solicitor depended on whether he or she was 
partisan, and their spouces' solicitor was often seen as "obdurate" and "inflaming 
the conflict". Further, Robinson notes the six types of lawyer5 found by Kressel 
(1985) in the United States of America. The range of approaches runs from the 
technical and anti-emotional to the therapist, who accepts the process as 
emotional, and to the moralist who places his or her own moral perception of the 
outcome on the case. He further argues that the lawyer is unprepared by training 
for the emotional minefield of divorce, seeing the lawyer-client relationship as 
strained by the clients emotional and financial circumstances; the adversarial 
nature of the case requires a combative approach against the lawyers' colleagues. 
This adversarial approach could make a supportive community of lawyers difficult 
to achieve, contrasting other areas of practice. 
The English lawyer, at the earliest development of the conciliation movement, 
saw it as a threat to business (Westcott, 1989. ) -However, 
this attitude has 
changed. [See for example the description of practice by Pemberton (1991). The 
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preliminary interviews for the author's study indicate that there are a core of 
lawyers whose practice is predominantly child and family law, and who subscribe 
to the Solicitor's Family Law Association. There are also a very small number of 
general practitioners who may or may not follow the views of the S. F. L. A., this 
group being subjected to a great deal of peer pressure to adopt the "conciliatory" 
approach. 
The question is, therefore: what is the conciliatory approach? Clearly the 
solicitors have three elements to their work. They are the first point of contact 
in the progression from informal to formal separation, they negotiate with the 
solicitor for the other spouse, and if that fails they take on a third r6le of 
preparing the case to go for a, full hearing. -The. code. of practice above 
indicates 
that the conciliatory approach could be described as non-combative - or 
non-inflammatory. The code concerns making sure the client is informed about 
what the solicitor is doing, and negotiating and preparing the case in a 
non-aggressive manner. Hem (1989) is vociferous in making the distinction 
between the conciliatory approach and conciliation. Conciliation is a process 
which requires "specific and additional training". The solicitors are 
"gatekeepers" [Newcastle] for conciliation but are not in themselves conciliators. 
Lawyer based negotiation is largely between the lawyers and at armslength. Davis 
and Robertfi, and this author7 found that the lawyers would not, indeed could 
not, act as lawyers for the both parties who were separating, and were very 
reluctant to engage in roundtable discussions with the couple and. both sets of 
lawyers. This was seen as the function of conciliation. 
The lawyers hold a great deal of power in terms of the process through which a 
separation case will proceed. Davis (1982) described it thus: 
The whole tenor of matrimonial proceedings is to a large extent 
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determined by solicitors. They are responsible for translating their 
clients' problems into legal terms, and also advising them to the limits 
within which they can operate in this framework. Since the client has no 
point of comparison, it is difficult for him to question the way in which 
his situation is interpreted. 
Because they are the first contact, they have to assess the needs of the. client, 
and perhaps the couple, and then encourage the client to move down a particular 
track. The control of the lawyers, as Davis and Roberts (1988) point out8 focusses 
"primar ily on the issues of access, care and control, and to a lesser extent upon 
reconciliation". He asserts that the lawyers see this as "messy", whereas he 
indicates that the conciliators are happy to deal with what is a familiar social 
work type of area, while the lawyers are keen to separate and run the property 
and finance side of the proceedings, an area that the conciliator is not as happy 
to deal with. Thus the separation occurs between the two parts of a dispute. 
Davis notes two further problems with this separation. First, given the solicitors 
unease with the emotional aspects of the cases,, the clients observed felt that the 
solicitor was attempting to rush them into decisions about what they wanted from 
the law and which process they would follow. The clients felt that they lost 
control of the situation to the lawyer, even to the extent of turning a 
preliminary inquiry as to the legal position, into a divorce, when the parties did 
not feel that they were yet ready to take decisions, and certainly not to go onto 
divorce. Secondly, he notes that while on the issues relating to the child, the 
solicitor was encouraging the clients to negotiate through the conciliation 
process, in the area of finance and property the solicitor was in control and 
would often be preparing for litigation. 9 This dichotomy is somewhat encouraged 
by the S. F. LA. code of practice, which suggests separate letters should be used 
for issues of children and finance. 
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It will be noted that the code of practice for solicitors recommends that 
solicitors should indicate to the parents that the focus in child issues is the 
welfare of the child, which is of paramount consideration. The code at 6.1 
recommends that "the solicitor should treat his work in relation to children as 
the most important of his duties". What is apparent from the research is that 
there is very little which seeks to establish how the solicitor perceives the 
child's welfare both in terms of the meaning of the concept and its relation to 
the rest of his or her work- The published research tends to focus on the 
perception of the clients as to how their separation was handled. 
Court Welfare Officers. 
The courts may request welfare reports in any custody and access disputes, 
whether it be in the High Court or county courtIO, a divorce courtll, or a 
magistrates' courtl2, Under the new law, the court retains a power to order that 
a welfare report be made. 13 The report should be requested of the courts' own 
officers - the courts welfare office - which is a branch of the Probation Service. 
A court is not bound to request a report, indeed in, uncontested hearings they are 
rare and in contested hearings there is a considerable variation in court practice 
as to the circumstances in which a report would be requested. 14 Factors which 
may influence this, beyond individual judicial preferences, may be the different 
working approaches of the officers, and the weight of work in different areas. 
The request for the report can be for a specific issue, for example how the 
children relate to their father, or, what appears to be more usual, a wider 
request which will assist the court by indicating the character of the family, and 
increasingly recount the wishes of the children. Thus, the traditional approach is 
to produce an investigative report on aspects of the family's life. The court 
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welfare offices are presently involved in a debate as to the correct practice 
method. This has resulted in a lack of uniformity in both reports and services 
geographically, as James (1990) has observed. He found a wide variation in the 
length, style, and content of the reports and of the types of service provided. 
The service is under the joint control of both the Home Office, as it is a branch 
of the Probation Service, and the Lord Chancellor's Department, as it is an office 
of the court. This leads to problems of funding, but more fundamentally, to 
problems in. theoretical control or direction. 15 The affices are run in 
-geographical areas corresponding 
to the division of the courts, but each area and 
to a certain extent each office is free to develop its own practice method. As the 
National Association of Probation Officers indicate in their policy document on 
the r6le of the welfare officer: "in the past ten years the service has been in a 
state of flux as officers have attempted different approaches to the work in order 
to minimise the polarity and bitterness between the parties which have been 
compounded by the adversarial legal system". 16 The policy statement does not 
extend to outlining the relationship between the child's welfare and the welfare 
officer's duty, or between conciliation and reporting, The debate over practice 
stems from the fact that the service has only recently become a specialism within 
probation social work, having been a part of the general workload of all probation 
officers. This, coupled with the lack of central direction from the split masters 
of the service, has allowed the new specialists to see their work in the context 
of other para-legal developments in conciliation and also in the developments in 
family therapy. Thus, the philosophy differs from area to area as different 
theoretical beliefs develop different practice methods. 
This can be seen as particularly exciting, or it can be a further indication that 
there is no recognizable norm in separation law. The different interpretations of 
the interests of children have been seen in the caselaw, and here, the type of 
137 
court welfare approach which will be followed will differ according to 
geographical area. The courts are largely unhelpful on the direction of the court 
welfare office, perhaps because the courts are legally minded and the issue of a 
welfare report is basically a social work endeavour, and therefore the courts look 
to the welfare reporters not as servants to the courts request, but as experts who 
will provide an authoritative statement of the needs and potential welfare of the 
child. 
This is not admitted directly by the court, as this would undermine the authority 
of the court, -but it can be seen in the importance placed on the welfare report. 
If the report was simply, as it purports to be, an evidential aid to the court 
which did not give the court the answer to the welfare problem, but rather gave 
the court the material to base its decision upon, then the cases would reflect 
this. The cases, as has been seen, indicate that appeal courts will require full 
arguments from the judge which justify the departure from the welfare officer's 
recommendations. This gives a very strong indication that the welfare officer is 
seen, not simply in the fact finding r6le by the court, but rather as a surrogate 
judge. The courts, in the opinion of the welfare officers interviewed in this 
study, see the welfare officer as an expert whose training gives him or her an 
ability to answer the question of the child's best interests. The problem only 
becomes more difficult because the welfare officers are keen to indicate that 
their knowledge does not allow them to make judicial decisions, and they are not 
empowered to make the judges' decisions for them. 17 
The courts, in the light of this confusion of authority, send out rather 
contradictory signals. The courts claim that they do not have power to instruct a 
welfare officer how to conduct the investigation, 18 but the courts have been keen 
to offer the view that the welfare officers duty is to prepare a report which win 
assist the court, on the basis of a detailed investigation. 
19 The court's reaction 
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to the movement of court welfare officers towards conciliation rather than 
reporting can be seen in Clarkson v. Winkley (1987) and Merriman v. Hardy 
(1987). Here the courts were faced with welfare officers who engaged the families 
in conciliation, and, in the case of Merriman, when that conciliation failed after 
two sessions, the welfare officers reported the fact to the court: the extent of 
their inquiry was that the parents could not agree arrangements for the children. 
The court held that the welfare officer's duty was to provice a full report as 
requested by the court within the traditional model, and that the r6le of the 
court welfare officer and the conciliator should not be confused. The 
contradictory signals come when the courts indicate to the officers that they may 
"encourage the parties to settle their differences if the likelihood of a 
settlement arises during his enquiries-. 20 
Thus, the dilemma of the court welfare officers is not aided by the courts, or 
from codes of practice from the centre. Under the section 7 of the Children Act 
1989, the Lord Chancellor "may make regulations specifying matters which, unless 
the court orders otherwise, must be dealt with in any report under this section". 
As yet, there have been no such directions, nor any guidance as to what is 
expected of the court welfare system. What is clear from the Newcastle Report on 
conciliation is that the court welfare offices are engaged in the practice of 
conciliation as well as reporting, and are one of the valuable services offering 
the process. 21 The debate has, however, been lively in the journals between 
academics and officers attempting to understand and evaluate the potentials of 
competing systems. 
The traditional approach of preparing a report has received attention following 
the Law Commission's view that there should be a more objective or standardized 
procedure in gathering information and presenting it -to 
the court. 22 The 
check-list in the Children Act 1989 has been indicated23 to leave open the 
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question of the best method to use in preparing reports. Two examples of 
responses made by court welfare officers to this have indicated that a check-list 
could give the basis of a report. Davies (1992) suggests that the Law Commis sion's 
proposal was no more than existing good practice, and that the crucial issue was 
to move reports away from "soft" impressionistic reports, towards "hard" 
information. Thus, he presents a comprehensive check-list which could form the 
core of the report and allow the courts to make its discussion on the -basis of 
clear information. The impressions of the officer could then be placed alongside a 
more standard presentation: the check-list would be a tool for "monitoring and 
supervising welfare work" and for a more "systemic approach". The layout which 
he suggests would move away from the tendency to attempt to find the "best 
parenf'. Davies argues that "a form of welfare inquiry which takes shared 
responsibility as axiomatic should, in our view, focus on child care issues which 
are agreed and ask questions which anticipate agreement". 
This is very much the view expressed by Gibbons (1989) who suggests that the 
presentation of "explicit criteria" in the welfare report would serve the end 
which he sees both conciliation and welfare work as serving, namely "helping 
parents improve their communication to the point where the children can move 
from one to the other without feeling guilty or disloyal to either". While the 
check-list is not as developed as Davies's examplej by. -including evidence under 
eight headings - the explicit criteria - Gibbons argues that the welfare report 
would have three benefits: to clarify the boundaries for the courtroom discussion, 
indicate to the parents the evidence which the court was using to make its 
decision, and to improve the communication between the officer and the judge. 
These benefits would help to break the logjams in communication which can 
make the proceedings long and harmful, especially to the children. 
The potentials offered by a more systemic approach to forming the actual report 
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would be accepted as valuable by the vast majority of welfare reporters, and 
rejected only by those who argue that if the parents cannot agree then no-one has 
the right to impose a settlement upon them. This is an extreme position. A 
slightly more moderate approach was found in the author's study where the 
officers reported that the experience of conciliation work with the families made 
the officers reluctant to make recommendations to the court. These officers 
sought to present a clear account of the facts but did not wish to make 
judgements, responding to the reversal of r6les which the judges appeared to wish 
to make. The judges, for the latter group of officers, had authority to make 
decisions. 
The most difficult debate in court welfare practice, as in the solicitors' 
dilemma, stems from the understanding of the "conciliatory approach". There is a 
strong indication from the case law, which has already been discussed, that the 
Court Welfare Officers should be engaged in the enterprize of preparing reports 
for the court. Even where this is the accepted aim for the officers, the value of 
conciliation seems to muddy the waters. Latham (1986) indicates the separation of 
the two issues and the desires which have created the overlap thus: 'Welfare 
officers will naturally and desirably wish to assist the parties - to come to 
realistic agreements, especially in respect of issues relating to their children. 
However, it is important that a clear distinction be drawn between the functions 
of a welfare officer attempting conciliation and the duties of such an officer 
when appointed to investigate the case with a view to Plaking a report to the 
court". 
Judge Nigel Fricker Q. C. eloquently expresses the belief that the business of 
welfare reporting is far removed from the job of conciliation. At various 
places24, he indicates that welfare reporting is a function of the court, and that 
the officer is empowered to investigate and has a duty of disclosure to the court, 
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whereas, conciliation is voluntary, controlled by the parties, and is accepted as 
legaUy privileged. This would be clear; that welfare officers should not, on 
these arguments engage in conciliation. However, despite stfong words aimed 
against the, welfare officers who are using the opportunity of the welfare report 
to conciliate between the parties - he suggests that the "remit of, and 
limitations on the authority being exercised in each case must be respected", 25 
having said that the remit is to report and not to conciliate - he, with -Coates, 
argues that a 'conciliatory approach' "can and should" be adopted by welfare 
officers. 26 This view is also expressed by Latham: "the welfare officer may, 
therefore, approach his investigation in a manner indicating his readiness to 
assist the parties to resolve their differences-. 27 
Fricker and Coates (1989) argue that "provided that the fundaintental distinction 
between conciliation and welfare reporting is respected, the authors contend that 
a court welfare officer may encourage parties to resolve their differences". 
Subject to the parties being aware that the court welfare officer is making an 
investigation for the court, he or she should explore the likelihood of parental 
agreement The officer, then, can adopt the conciliatory approach and make the 
report, to the courL This is termed a "consecutive approach", which gets around 
the problems of privilege and confidentiality, because the parties have agreed to 
any disclosure by a signed form. 
The consecutive approach flies against the accepted principles of conciliation and 
confidentiallity as expressed by both the Booth report28 and by Sir John Arnold, 
. as 
President of the Family Division29 Both indicate, as has been accepted in 
caselaw and Practice directions, that conciliation and reporting must be performed 
by separate officers. Fricker and Coates (1989) argue that the distinction need 
not apply with the permission of the parties, and that thedirection of the court 
has always suggested that in reporting, a conciliatory approach should be adopted. 
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Although they do not express the view directly, one wonders how much of an 
influence on this stance the argument that Fricker and Coates quote from Pugsley 
et aL has. 30 This. suggests: "[the separation of reporting and conciliating] does 
not provide a rationale for the costly division of welfare officers into separate 
teams on the basis of a separation of tasks that is inherently artificial and 
unhelpful". 
The greatest problem in the inclusion of the "conciliatory approach" when welfare 
officers should not engage in conciliation, is one of drawing the line between the 
two practices. How is an officer to investigate the possibility of an agreed 
settlement without resorting to concilation techniques? Fricker is not clear on 
this point It is not clear whether the investigation of the possibility must end 
should the parties indicate they do not wish to participate in conciliation, or 
whether it should be a thread running through all of reporting technique. 
Reference is made to a "switch from a facilitating role in coniciliation to an 
investigative role, in which settlement is still encouraged". This may be 
appropriate to the work which a welfare officer may be required to do in-court, 
where the assessment as to the likelihood of agreement has to be made quickly, 
but the difficulty of how an officer encourages the parties to agree without 
stepping into conciliation, especially out-of-court, seems to remain unclear. 
The difficulty can be seen clearly in a short article by Pugsley and Bums (1991) 
Here, a system of welfare reporting is outlined which is based upon meetings 
where the parents are seen together by two court welfare officers, one with the 
couple, the other observing and making suggestions as to "how best [the family] 
may be helped", from behind a two-way mirror. The workers write the report if 
the conciliation fails on the basis of the parties' consent and the theoretical 
view that using new workers would be costly and probably would not give such a- 
detailed report. Clearly this method has advantages over a single worker seeing 
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the individuals separately and on the individual's home ground; advantages 
discussed in the article. What is apparent is that the process of investigation 
involves the discussion of the issues of the breakup, and does so unashamedly: 
"those of us who work in this field continually find ourselves moving into 
an area that overlaps with 'conciliation'.. We cannot ignore the emotions 
which parents exhibit: the anger, the grief, the wish to re-write -history. 
In many interviews the parents hardly talk about their children, but talk 
about themselves. It is not useful to argue that these matters should be 
dealt with in 'conciliation'. Court welfare officers deal with ten times the 
cases handles by voluntary conciliation agencies. Because most People may 
not have opted for 'conciliation', are we to say that we should not address 
the central issue of their relationship, past and future? " (p 254) 
Thus, from Fricker's initial statement that the welfare officer is not engaged in 
conciliation, but should adopt a conciliatory approach, the practical difficulty 
of understanding how that difference is applied is very clear. It could be argued 
that, becaus e the parties are consenting to the process and the officers are 
ultimately reporting to the court, then what has been described is a conciliatory 
approach. However, it could equally be seen as conciliation, given the methods it 
is usin& To argue that this is a conciliatory, approach rather than conciliation 
simply because of the report back to the court seems to justify a difference 
between two methods which are the same, simply on the grounds of who is 
offering the service. It is suggested that the "conciliatory approach" argument 
does not move the dilemma on very far, as welfare officers are still left to 
interpret how they should encourage parties to agree between themselves, which 
is conciliation. Indeed, given the pressures on couples to conciliate, one 
wonders if they can chose not to. 
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Two approaches have already been indicated as to how the report should be 
made, first on the basis of a check-list of crucial information, and secondly 
through joint meetings exploring emotions and wishes of the parents. These could 
be seen as repon-centred, and conciliation-centred models, although they are not 
pure as there is overlap between the two. Cantwell and Smith (1990) argue that a 
third model - systemic, family conflict-centred - can be seen in welfare work. In 
an earlier article, Cantwell (1986) indicates that the conciliation process and 
the welfare process are different as the officers are charged with the duty of 
"addressing the best interests of the child". He indicates the difference between 
the two ser-vices thus: "in almost every contested custody and access case, the 
greatest risk to the child's welfare is that posed by the conflict between the 
parents. Accordingly, the service cannot in my view maintain, with any real 
consistency, an involvement that is both voluntary and privileged". 
Cantwell pushes the r6le of the welfare officer towards a very different kind of 
process, thus: "much past assessment by welfare officers.. has leant on moral 
judgement rather than any serious analysis of why conflict is now taking place 
between former parents. To be resolved, or at least eased, for the sake of the 
children, post-marital conflict needs first of aft to be made sense of; it is 
rarely stupid or senseless, even though it may seem thus to those outside at first 
sight". Further, he maintains that "the welfare officers first priority is to 
identify and assess the emotional damage that post-marital conflict between 
parents is causing to their children. Then, using his professional social work 
skills, the officer's duty is to seek to assist the family towards a speedy 
resolution of that particular conflict, or towards less damaging management of 
that conflict (in so far as it affects the children)". 
These opinions are worth reporting in full as they seek to move the- welfare 
officer away from the reporting r6le and even from conciliation, and introduce a 
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compulsory therapy element into conflict between adults, using as its 
justification the welfare of the children, on the basis that the welfare of the 
child is the reduction of the conflicts between his or her parents. In a more 
develpoed account of the position, Cantwell and Smith (1990)31 indicate that the 
court should be included as the formal authority in separation law. The feeling is 
that the Court Welfare officers should use the courts when they perceive it to be 
necessary: "we believe that the key is- to be more precise about how and when the 
active engagement of the Court is to be encouraged". The central theory 
underpinning the position of these authors is a family systems approach, that 
tensions and conflict arise naturally in the life cycle of a family, and therefore 
separation may be a response to a problem rather than a problem in itself. The 
difficulties appear when. the family in family therapy "cannot deal with the 
changes successfully and are in many respects 'stuck"'. 32 Within the systemic 
divorce, the welfare officers must accept that they are dealing with a system, of 
which the family and court are a part, that anger may be a necessary part of the 
parents separation, that there is a conflict in the legal system between authority 
and the family as the state's primary socializing unit The authors assert that 
there is a continuum of parenting; some parents will be unable to parent through 
the emotions of separations, others will have worked through this. The first job 
of the welfare officer is to place the family on the continuum by meeting the 
whole family; secondly, the officer should engage in systemic therapeutic 
techniques to help the "resumption of co-parentine; and thirdly, to report fully 
to the court, and advise the court within the context of the family's position on 
the continuum. The separation must be seen as part of the process, and the 
professionals should remain neutral to the process. 
The process of the welfare report would take the following shape. A first 
interview would take a detailed history, including a "geneogram-33 which the - 
children may help to prepare. The workers would gather impressions about the 
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emotional states of the parents and the relationship of these states to the 
separation. A second session would be planned "based on a positive connotation 
of both parent's attitudes". The session would be based solely on the impres sions 
of the workers who would control the questionning in order to achieve a certain 
end - for example, Cantwell and Smith (1990) drawing from one case example 
the points (reproduced here) - to draw a "firm contrast between the children's 
normal response to the mother's guidance abd their response with regards to the 
access issue, where they indicated that they needed a great deal of advice and 
guidance from their mother but were not getting it". It will be noted that the 
whole family is involved in the process and is involved in the questionning. It 
will also be noted that the mother reacted by "leaving the meeting". Further, what 
in voluntary family therapy would-be a difficulty in "re-engaging" the parent, "in 
the context of pbst-divorce conflict, a report to the Court at this stage can be 
used as an intervention and can be very powerful". 
The report should not be critical in the traditional sense, but rather should 
allow the family to find its own level in the problem that has been addressed, 
which it is likely to do regardless of the court order. The court should therefore 
be, acting so as to minimize the stumbling blocks it places before the parties. In 
the report, Cantwell and Smith attempt to show, using an individual case report, 
how they give a starting block from which parents can negotiate, but it is seen 
that the welfare officers are dependent on their interpretation of how the family 
has reacted to the therapy, and on their assessment of the family's problems: "the 
report was left deliberately unclear in order to see if the family .. could 
accommodate each other" around the proposition that the children needed more 
guidance to develop their relationship with the father more fully. The court is 
used very much to reinforce the assessment made by the court welfare officers, 
and the report is geared to a particular view of the family's position. - 
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Clearly these are radical views when placed against the views of Judge Flicker. 
Also, there are difficulties in this approach. The adoption of the family therapy 
technique removes any sense of the individual - it is the family that h as a 
problem, and not the individuals. As a therapy technique it is suggested that this 
may not always allow the individuals to realise their problems in relation to the 
family. There is a difficulty in the approach outlined, as it is dependent upon 
the court welfare officers' interpretation of the family dynamics on the basis of 
one meetin& It is submitted that the tensions and reactions exhibited by the 
family may have histories which are not disclosed within the context of the 
sessions, or may be based on individuals characteristics which are wrongly 
assessed. Further, the judgements are not the court's but seem to be the property 
of the welfare officers who choose when to involve the courts and how to frame 
the reports so as to gain a desired outcome. 
Perhaps most dangerously, the decision making is not owned by the parents in this 
context but rather it is based on the impressions of the welfare officers. One 
wonders why a family in this. therapy should be any better equipped to make 
future decisions unless it was predisposed to the outcome that was suggested. 
Essentially, this method will only work with a small number of families. Yet if it 
is a standard practice, how can it be imposed on all families? Had the mother left 
the second session and was not in an emotional state to hear what was being said, 
however accurate, it is suggested that this model would not empower her to make 
new assessments of her attitudes. This final difficulty of ownership has presented 
the model with its most damaging criticism, that the parents are being 
manipulated through a compulsory therapy, when this is not what the welfare 
team are empowered to do, and this is therefore a violation of civil liberties. 
This would have the effect of returning the argument full circle: a welfare 
officer is empowered to report, but should encourage the parties to arrive- at 
their own settlement - but how should they do this? 
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c Conciliators. 
The next group of para4egals within the institution of separation law are 
conciliators. The conciliatory approach has been discussed at length with 
reference to the court welfare officers and the confusion as to what it should 
entail is clear if not answered. The term used to describe the approach has been 
used in this analysis because it has been adopted in the debate as to its content. 
It will be noted that a distinction has been drawn by many of the contributors to 
the debate about "conciliatory practice" and "conciliation". It is constantly 
suggested that the two are very different processes. Conciliation, it will be 
seen, is in principle voluntary and confidential, whereas the relationship with 
the court demands that the welfare reporting process of conciliatory practice, 
cannot be. The reluctance of the welfare service to become conciliators as a 
matter of reporting practice has been seen in the writing of divorce court welfare 
officers, other critics, and in the recommendations of both the Booth Committee 
and Sir John Arnold. 
The difficulty of the relationship of conciliation and the conciliatory approach 
can be clarified in a semantic sense, if the work done by court welfare officers 
is called mediation, in the opinion of Jackson (1986). This stems some of the 
confusion as it reflects that welfare work which seeks-to- allow the parents to 
decide the arrangements for their children, while respecting the relationship 
between the officers and the court, is not conciliation. This helps to clarify the 
relationship between the work on court welfare procedure, and the next section 
on conciliation. It does not, however, resolve the central question of how 
mediation within the court welfare service should be practiced. Unfortunately, 
while making the distinction between court welfare work and conciliation, 
mediation is a term which has been adopted by a practice which-has developed 
out of conciliation involving co-working between a lawyer and a conciliator. Thus, 
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for the purposes of this study, the court welfare mediation will be refered to as 
CW-mediation while the other form will be known as mediation. 
Perhaps the single most important change in the practice of divorce and 
separation law since legislative changes of 1970 has been the emergence and 
development of conciliation as part of the process of the law. This is remarkable 
not only because it seems to answer the cry of both practitioners and clients for 
a more civilised way to separate, but because the process is completely outside 
the legislative process, and yet is fully accepted within it. Thus, today there is 
a National Association of Family Mediation and Conciliation ServiceS34 which 
regulates voluntary services throughout England and Wales, and a standard 
practice has emerged which the vast majority of services adhere to. This 
consideration of conciliation will concentrate on terminology, the distinction 
between in-court and out-of-court conciliation, the findings of the Newcastle 
Conciliation Project Unit, funding, and criticisms of conciliation. 
i. terminology 
Terminology in this area of the system has been somewhat misleading. The Finer 
Committee (1974) distinguish the terms reconciliation and conciliation. The former 
concerns the question of. reuniting the parties, whereas the latter concerns 
assisting the parties to deal with the consequences of the established breakdown 
of the marriage. Two further distinctions must be made at the outset. 
Conciliation, as it has developed, does not concern counselling. Conciliation 
concerns decision making, whereas counselling concerns helping the families in 
difficulty and involves therapy. 35 The researchers of the Newcastle Conciliation 
project Unit expressed the idea-- thus: "Conciliation is an informal, but 
structured, process in which the parties to a dispute meet with an independent 
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third party to explore the possibilities of reaching an agreement-. 36 It is not, 
to be confused with "reconciliation" which seeks to reunite the couple in their 
relationship as partners. This was somet hing which caused confusion to the 
families engaged in conciliation. 
Further, a distinction must be made between conciliation and and the recent 
development of lawyer and conciliator co-working known as mediation. This 
produces a clash of terminology with Jackson's definition of the work of court 
welfare officers. The clash is largely from the fact that the terminology has not 
been accepted at large. As has been noted, for the purposes of this study 
mediation will refer to lawyer / conciliator work, and CW-mediation refers to the 
court welfare process. In conciliation, the couple use the trained conciliator as 
a channel to make arrangements concerning the future of their children. In the 
latter, the parents discuss all the practical issues of their separation with a 
conciliator-mediator and a lawyer-mediator, to arrive at their own arrangements 
without resorting to the courts. 
Terminology, while fixed in the context of this thesis, is however still in flux 
The "mediation" problem has been identified already. However, that term is still 
open to different meanings which should not be confused. His Honour Judge 
Forrester-Paton Q. C., in his submission to the Booth Committee, makes a 
distinction between mediation and conciliation where mediation refers to an 
attempt to arbitrate a limited workable solution by a professional working as a 
go-between, whereas conciliation is much deeper, seeking to help the couple to 
reach an understanding of the elements of their relationship which promote 
disputes between them Conciliation would therefore allow a resolution to the 
dispute, implying genuine agreement or harmony, whereas mediation would allow 
a "settlement-. 37 Clearly, this is a matter of the philosophy of systems within 
conciliation practice, namely the "in-court" and "out-of-court" approaches, which 
151 
will be discussed later. 
Gwynn Davis also presents a difficulty of terminology in that his research on 
conciliation always refers to the process as mediation. The emergence Of Family 
Mediation has led the conciliation movement to challenge what it understands by 
the terms conciliation and mediation. It has already been noted that the National 
Family Conciliation Council has changed its name to include the term mediation. 
This is not to encompass the Family Mediation Services alone, but rather it is to 
assert a new terminology upon services. Fisher (1992) describes what was 
conciliation as "mediation", saying: "mediation itself is a creative 
problem-solving process; disputants are helped by a third party, the mediator, to 
extricate themselves from their conflict and find creative joint solutions to 
their problem. Family Conciliation Services are creative problem-solving agencies; 
themselves the creatures of co-operation between concerned people in the 
professions and local communities, they offer a fresh and clear focus of help to 
divorcing parents and their children". Parkinson (1992), along with Roberts 
(1988), uses the term "mediation" to describe the service offered in conciliation. 
Given this change, here the terms will not reflect the change in approach for the 
purposes of describing the range of services: mediation win be used to 
distinguish the concept of Family Mediation 
Roberts and Roberts (1991) indicate the wider European stage, where mediation 
is becoming widely accepted as in England. They report on the first European 
Conference on Family Mediation, that the philosophy underpinning conciliation is 
much the same throughout Europe. At the congress, Michele Andre, the French 
Secretary of State for women's rights described the process thus: "mediation gives 
speech back to the man and the woman". Roberts and Roberts comment: "in 
saying this, she neatly highlighted-the importance of dialogue, mutual respect and 
equity that constitute the ethical basis of mediation". Further, they report the 
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contribution of Jacques Barrot, a Deputy and former French Secretary of Health: 
"mediation is premised on an essentially humanist philosophy. Human beings are 
unique and free individuals, not social categories. Mediation is founded on an 
optimism about people, what Barrot called 'a positive prejudice about the 
future'". 
ii. in-court and out-of-court conciliation 
In 1982, the Lord Chanc ellor established an Inter-Departmental Committee "to 
review the. conciliation services then existing in England and Wales and to 
consider whether they should be promoted or extended-. 38 This was following the 
development of conciliation, and earlier studies, notably the report of the Finer 
Committee (1974) and the Booth Committee (1985) which both supported the 
concept of conciliation in helping to reach settlements in cases concerning 
custody and access of children. The Inter-Departmental committee could not, 
having acknowledged that conciliation, and especially in-court conciliation was 
valuable to the process, reach specific conclusions as to future policy, but did 
recommend a more rigorous study of conciliation should be undertaken. The 
University of Newcastle successfully won the tender for what could be seen as the 
most important, and certainly the most expensive, research into conciliation in 
1984. The results were reported in 1989. 
The Newcastle research project. 
The aims of the research were to measure the "cost and effectiveness" of 
conciliation services in England and Wales. The terms of reference for the 
research were devised specifically by the Lord Chancellor's Department, thuS39: 
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The overall remit of the Conciliation Project Unit is to submit a 
report to the Lord Chancellor which will enable him to decide 
whether a publicly funded national family conciliation service 
should be established; and 
if so, how such a service might best be organised andfunded. 
2. Within this general framework the Unit's detailed terms of reference 
are - 
i) to collect information from all in-court and out-of-court 
conciliation schemes in England. and Wales about their 
organization, staffink, funding and procedures, and on the 
basis of this to produce a classification of different types 
of conciliation schemes; 
to assess and compare the costs of different types of 
conciliation schemes, having regard to the costs of operating 
schemes, the effect on legal aid costs and lawyers' fees, and 
the cost of processing divorce cases through the courts; 
to assess the effectiveness of the different types of 
conciliation, with particular reference to the nature oand 
durability of agreements reached, reduction o conflict, the f 
satisfaction and well-being of parties, and the professional 
skills and training of successful conciliation; and 
iv) to act as a clearing house for new ideas about conciliation 
developed in other countries. 
What is apparent from the terms of reference is that this -could 
be seen as a 
constraining way of funding research. Davis (1989) is highly critical of this 
154 
approach to research. He is concerned that researchers must be free to address 
the problems as they see fit through their study, rather than being tied to a 
perception of the problem, especially when the perception is from a govern ment, 
Further, he sees the granting of one very large bounty to one successful 
institution as a difficult step, in an area where he sees the need for small scale 
research to allow the researcher to understand a "field which is bedeviled by 
imprecision of language, by acknowledged differences in degrees of coercion, and 
also by differences in the aspirations of the various professional groups 
involved-. 40 However, he stresses that these are problems made by the Lord 
Chancellor's Department and not the Conciliation Project Unit (CPU). 
The CPU found that there were - essentially two types of conciliation: either 
in-court conciliation, or out-of-court conciliation. The CPU found that 83 % of 
Divorce county courts had conciliation available, and the vast majority of the 
services were offered by the court welfare office. Typically, the in-court process 
involved one meeting centred exclusively on the particular practical problem, for 
example, access. The CPU also found that 42 independent conciliation services 
operated out-of-court services. Here the process typically entailed more than one 
meeting, which allowed the parents to explore some of the issues surrounding 
their separation. 
Of these two processes, two further divisions could be made according to the 
degree of authority involved in the conciliation. The resulting four categories 
formed the basis of the study. Thus, in the in-court conciliation, Category A were 
services which had a high degree of judicial involvement, with a judge or 
registrar participating at either the beginning or the end of the conciliation. 
Category B was again an in-court service but differed from A in that there was 
little judicial; involvement. Thus, in A the judge or registrar would perhaps 
interview the couple and then suggest a conciliation meeting, or even participate 
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in the conciliation, whereas in B, the meeting would be under the authority of the 
court welfare team, perhaps set up on the basis of a court welfare officer 
inviting couples to conciliation on the basis of their application papers to the 
court 
The out-of-court services were again divided on the basis of the involvement of 
"authority' figures. Thus, category -C encompassed any services where the 
conciliation was independent of the court, but the link with the judiciary or the 
court welfare team went further than a simple involvement on the management 
committee. Here the funding, premises, and even staffing of the service was 
strongly bound up with the court welfare team. It is interesting to note that this 
category did not produce a large enough sample for statistical purposes.. In 
category D, conciliation was offered by a completely independent service. Here 
the funding was often charitable and the "authority" figures of judiciary, 
registrars, court welfare office, were confined to holding seats on the management 
committee. In both out-of-court processes the referrals were made by solicitors or 
perhaps self-referrals by the clients. 
_ 
Having established a distinction, the approach and philosophy of the two main 
methods of conciliation should be examined. Broadly, in-court conciliation arises 
where a. 
-meeting 
is held immediately before or during a court hearing for custody 
and access, or divorce, at which the couple and a conciliator - most usually a 
court welfare officer, and sometimes with the registrar, attempt to come to an 
arrangement concerning the children. Out-of-court conciliation occurs where there 
is a series of meetings during the negotiations as to the terms of the separation 
with an independent conciliator. Both processes use the same techniques, only the 
timing and expectations can be said to differ. In the former the process may last 
over a number of sessions, and could be likened to plea-bargaining at the door of 
the courL 
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In-court conciliation simply seeks to give the parents a "last chance" to make the 
decisions about their children for themselves. Usually, the process involves the 
parties arriving at the court for a full hearing before a registrar or judge, and 
being instructed to leave with the welfare officer to discuss the arrangements for 
the children. The meeting will either produce a set of arrangements which the 
courts largely accept, or it will quickly allow the welfare officer to report to 
the court that agreement is impossible between the parties. In this respect, the 
process could be likened to His Honour Judge Forrester-Paton's mediation, in that 
it is an attepmpt to arbitrate a limited workable solution. Clearly, there is no 
time for analysis of the parents feelings, the issue is one of 'will this solution 
work? ' As a process, it is very close to the negotiation which occurs between 
solicitors or barristers on the day of the. hearing, If the parents cannot meet 
face-to-face, the solicitors act as go-betweens, offering ground to the other side 
in a negotiation of their relative positions. 
For example, the mother may wish to have custody with no access, the father may 
be attempting to regain custody. Alongside this, there could be a dispute about 
maintainence; the father may be in arrears and the mother may be wishing to get 
an increase. Thus the initial position, which could not be solved in the 
negotiations between the solicitors, will be brought to the court The lawyers 
will then start to argue. The father's solicitor will realise that the custody 
claim will be an uphill struggle, so the offer will be made to drop the custody 
issue in exchange for some access. This may be accepted by the lawyer who then 
offers this to his or her client as acceptable. The lawyer returns having 
convinced the mother, and offers one day per fortnight in return for a sum of Ex 
for the maintenance. The father's lawyer could then argue for a greater amount of 
access against the maintenance issue. Ultimately the final result will be a 
settlement which the parties have been persuaded to accept, or the judge will view 
that enough time has been spent and the parties should argue in court In which 
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ever situation, if the parents are unable to argue face-to-face, the agreement 
will be imposed on the basis of the judgements of the professionals. In-court 
conciliation allows those parents who, confronted with the reality of the 
courtroom, can face each other and attempt a very similar negotiation for 
themselves. 
The mechanics of the in-court conciliation will differ from court to court 
However Mr Registrar Price of Wandsworth County Court gives a useful account 
of the practice at Wandsworth, and a philosphy which shows the value of the -- 
in-court conciliation. 41 At Wandsworth, all applications for an order concerning 
the children, whichever channel they should emerge through, would be given a 
"preliminary.. conciliation appointment" with the welfare office. The - effect of 
sending all applicants to conciliation caused two developments. First, the welfare 
office started an out-of-court service and prepared reports, and an independent 
service emerged. Secondly, the solicitors started to send the clients directly for 
conciliation before making an application. The result of these developments saw a 
drop in the number of applications, a greater number of direct referrals to 
conciliation, and a finding that the cases that did come to court were more 
entrenched, with unsolvable situations needing imposed arrangements. While Mr 
Registrar Price finds a short in-court conciliation rarely successful, he feels 
the., preliminary meeting can explore the nature of the disput6 and whether the 
parties can make arrangements alone, or with the help of conciliation, or whether 
a full hearing is needed with the preparation of welfare reports. 
The in-court appointment could be seen to have a dual function in Price's view. 
While not conciliation as such, it can be an effective method of ensuring that 
information about the services available to the clients is known to them, 
although this function should have been dealt-with by the solicitors before an 
application is made to the court. But more importantly, it will give the court an 
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indication of the correct process for the case. For example, a case where the main 
dispute concerns the finances with the children as a secondary issue, may benefit 
from being instructed to try conciliation, whereas a case where conciliation has 
failed, or would be inappropriate, could be sent for welfare reports and a full 
hearing. This is suggested as a great saving on court resources, however, it could 
be seen as a reflection of the historical development of conciliation. 
Initially, the courts were a major influence in the use of conciliation. Solicitor 
reluctance toinvolve conciliators could be remedied by the courts stepping in and 
suggesting, if not ordering a conciliation meeting. Today, the position has 
changed immeasurably. Solicitors refer to conciliation in the majority of cases, 
although there seems to- be -a remaining belief that some cases are too hard to 
conciliate, and therefo re the screening nature of in-court conciliation is not as 
important, if practised at all. However, such meetings were a valuable catalyst 
along the way to a conciliated separation. In some areas they still exist, largely 
as the last chance to settle, although the success of these hearings will be 
limited as the cases themselves are only coming to court when conciliation has 
failed. 
As the Newcastle study indicated, while the courts and court welfare officers have 
developed what are essentially emergency sessions to attempt a negotiated 
settlement at the door of the court, independent individuals, especially from the 
social work discipline, developed the same basic concept of parental, face-to-face 
negotiation as an alternative to the preliminary process of solicitor-centred 
negotiation. The desire to respond to the needs of the couple outside an 
adversarial battle can be seen in many of the professionals involved in separation 
law. Unlike the solicitors and court welfare officers, the out-of-court 
conciliation process became regulated by its own professional body, the National 
Family Conciliation Council, very quickly after its emergence. 
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iii. the Newcastle Conciliation Project Unit findings 
To study the differences between the categories of conciliation defined by the 
CPU, and with two control areas which had no conciliation services., the CPU 
adopted a twofold approach. To establish the costs of the process, the team 
gathered extensive data from the couples, concilation services, lawyers, judges 
and courts. To establish the effectiveness, the team used questionnaire surveys of 
the couples at three stages in the process and some interviews with the lawyers to 
establish the value and appropriateness of the agreements made. This formed the 
core of the study. 42 
The central concerns of the CPU study, as has been noted, were cost and 
effectiveness of conciliation. The cost was measured in real terms to show the 
impact of funding a service over and above the cost of the existing, 
non-conciliated system, with a view to examining the thesis that conciliation 
would reduce the cost of litigated settlements. Effectiveness was examined in 
terms of the effects upon and duration of settlements, client satisfaction with 
the outcome, the reduction of conflict, the impact on the health and well-being of 
the clients, and the clients satisfaction with the process. This, it was 
acknowledged would be a necessarily short-term view of the perceptions of the 
clients, as the study would only last for 18 months. 43 
Cost. In answer to the question of what the cost of a national conciliation 
service would be, the conclusions of the CPU are blealc The Unit could find "no 
support whatsoever for the hypothesis that the 'beneficial' effects of 
conciliation on cost more than outweigh, or even substantially mitigate, the 
resource costs of providing the service". 44 The result of the statistical 
analysis, using methods designed to isolate the impact of variables upon the 
overall result45, showed that conciliation involved a significant net addition to 
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the cost of providing separation law. When the costs from the conciliation areas 
were analysed against the costs of the non-conciliation control areas, 
conciliation could be seen to increase the cost of separation law by betweeri f-150 
and f-250, including an increase of between f-25 and M for the -couples. The 
projected cost of providing a national service, based on 15,500 conciliations 
added between f, 1.9 million and D. 2 million to the present costs of providing the 
non-conciliated service. The importance of the findings on cost cannot be 
underestimated. Thus, it is alarming that the results are subject to criticism on 
in . any levels. 
The scope of the research could be criticised in that the costs and effects which 
were studied over a particularly short-period were used to establish the long-term 
effects of conciliated separation disputes. However, the understanding of "cost" 
which was adopted by the CPU causes more difficulties. Both Davis and Fisher 
question whether any additional service could achieve a saving in overall costs, 
and thereby call into question the usefulness of the questions being asked of 
conciliation. 46 If one accepts that an issue in the public provision of 
conciliation is the cost of such a service, even if its introduction on a cost 
free basis is questionable, then the study still has to answer two major 
difficulties in its findings -on costs. The research rejects what could be the real 
savings of a conciliated system in two fundamental ways. First, the Unit organised 
the costing of conciliated divorce by analysing those cases which went through 
conciliation, but then required a court hearing, as opposed to those cases which 
only required a court hearing. 47 Clearly, this disregards the implications for 
costing on the cases which are resolved at conciliation and do not require further 
court work. Fisher (1989) expresses this concern thus: "in the words of one 
person, 'they [the findings on cost] seem to defy common sense' by excluding the 
strong probability that much out-of-court conciliation prevents lengthy and costly. 
disputes or even any court hearings at all, especially in the case of post-divorce 
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access disputes". Given the numbers of cases involved, and that this is the 
central plank of conciliation, that cases may be resolved without further recourse - 
to the courts, this is a very damaging omission when considering the findings. 
Secondly, while the first problem concerned the omission of visible cost 
implications, the study also found that they could not evaluate the hidden cost 
implications claimed for conciliation. The CPU state: "of course, given. the time 
constraints. of the study, it was impossible to address claims that conciliation 
generated longer-term beneficial effects, such as a reduction in National Health 
Ser-vice costs, an improvement -in. the educational attainment of children or a 
reduction in juvenille delinquency". 48 To these costs, the possible reduction of 
lost days of employment and other emotional factors could be added. While 
difficult to study, the CPU seem to a'ccept that there may be benefits, but then do 
not admit them in their cost analysis of conciliation. Thus, the two main areas 
where conciliation may have an impact on the cost of providing a service for 
separation were not investigated. The figures, and especially the projected 
costing of a national conciliation service, are presented as authority for the 
fact that the overall effect of a national conciliation service will be a greatly 
increased cost to the public and private purse, and yet earlier in the study, the 
CPU admit that the analysis may not reflect the true costs. In this light, the 
claims of million pound additions to the cost of-separation are unhelpful to the 
question of the value of the process, and dangerous given the study's political 
value. 
Davis (1989) suggests that it is fanciful to imagine that a service can be added 
to an existing system without incurring extra costs. Indeed, he argues that it is 
not a simple system to which the conciliation is to be attached, but a system 
which is controlled by the lawyers, and who therefore have a vested interest 
Clearly, he argues, the implication of a cost saving implies a change in the 
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system of separation law, and therefore a reduction in the number of lawyers or 
their salaries. Lawyers are in control of the range of disputes and this control 
remains unchallenged. The implication of these arguements suggest that a much 
more radical research frame is needed to challenge the fundamental assumption 
that the lawyers service the disputes, rather than manipulate them as a means of 
generating income. It has already been noted that the introduction of the 
Children Act 1989 was warmly received by the profession. This is interesting when 
compared to the outcry of the legal profession over the planned introduction of 
licenced conveyancers which would directly eat into the lawyers' income. In the 
Children Act, the extent of the vested interest of established practitioners is 
not challenged. This is worrying, given that the research frame was devised for 
the CPU by a government department An alternative costing analysis could have 
been devised to challenge the lawyers' position rather than the conciliators, 
giving very different results, especially if the legal aid bill for prolonged 
access disputes was considered. 
Effectiveness. The CPU, therefore, held that a national conciliation scheme could 
not be "justified on economic grounds alone, since the hypothesis that 
conciliation generates a net saving in social costs has effectively been 
rejected-. 49 The second issue of the research, the effectiveness, becomes central 
tothe question of whether the additional cost is acceptable, given the benefits 
of conciliation. 
The effectiveness of conciliation was largely measured by researching the 
perceptions of the couples who used the systems offered under the four 
categories. In terms of the narrow goal of dispute resolution, the CPU found that 
71 % of the cases agreed on some of the issues of their separation, and of that 
group, 74% felt satisfied with the agreement It was found that Category A- 
in-court with a high degree of authority control - were less likely to reach an 
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agreement, and the couple were significantly less likely to be satisfied with the 
agreement reached, especially access arangements. This supports the view 
expressed above that in-court conciliation is a last chance, and as much concerned 
with giving authority to the court to impose decisions upon a couple. 
The broader goals of conciliation beyond simple decision-making brought more 
mixed reactions. While the research -showed that couples reported an improved 
quality in their relationship after conciliation, there was no significant 
difference in the quality reported by the couples in the non-conciliation areas. 
This could indicate a difficulty in research which relies upon the participants of 
a system assessing their feelings when they have only experienced the one system. 
While the sample size was large, each couple had. a limited experience against 
which to measure "satisfaction" and "quality of relationship". 
The CPU found three areas emerging from their qualitative study of effectiveness, 
namely confusion, pressure, and setting. The Unit found confusion over the 
terminology of both the mechanics of the process and the law itself, over the 
personnel involved in the process, especially in the in-court services; over 0" 
objectives of conciliation, most notably couples confusing conciliation and 
reconciliation; and over related processes with couples reporting confusion as to 
the objectives of the related' processes of the law. The research showed that 
female respondents felt a greater pressure to attend conciliation, fearing 
prejudice if the "option" of conciliation was not taken. Likewise, the time 
available for conciliation caused pressure, with respondents likening their 
experience to "being pigeon-holed". It was felt that conciliation had its own 
agenda of decision-making and norms into which the participants were pushed. 
Pressure was also felt from the authority held by other individuals to impose a 
settlement; a passive authority which would be activated should the parents 
continue with their dispute. As to the setting of the conciliation, in-court 
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conciliation was associated with the anxiety and waiting for a full court hearing. 
Of the samples, 15 % were dissatisfied with the process of conciliation and- 75 % 
would recommend it to others. Category A again received less favourable rates of 
satifaction to the other categories, and was generally less successful than the 
other categories. As to the overall conclusions, the CPU found that the research 
was inconclusive as the severity of -cases presenting to each category. and the 
control areas were not uniform; the category A cases may have been more 
difficult than category D, and hence the data could not be reliably compared. It 
was clear to the Unit that in-court conciliation was less successful than 
out-of-court systems. 
Conclusions. The CPU found that, given the inconclusive nature of the 
effectiveness data and the increased cost of introducing conciliation, the 
decision was a policy decision, and therefore a political decision which was not 
for the researchers to make. They suggested three models for a national service: 
maintain the status quo, introduce a national service on the basis of the best 
features of all the categories, or introduce a national service on the basis of a 
new model. The CPU indicated that it would favour a "Family Advisory, 
Counselling and Conciliation Bureau"50 which would offer a range of services to 
the family alongside, and separate to, the legal service. Thus, by accepting the 
research frame which indicated that conciliation had to pay for itself, and by 
costing the systems on the basis that conciliation would be additional to fixed 
costs, their detailed "effectiveness" research is somewhat dulled by the 
presumption that the service will cost more than the court structure. 
The reluctance to challenge the position of the lawyers in relation to separation 
law has been noted above. The findings and reluctance to make recommendations 
by the CPU, given the political origin of the research, could be fatal to the 
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national provision of conciliation. Indeed, for such a large piece of research, 
the government has been notably silent in the three years since its publication. 
It is notable that the Law Commission No. 192. in the recommendations for the 
reform of divorce law - perhaps the golden opportunity to introduce a system of 
national conciliation - said little to encourage hopes of a national service. 
51 
iv. Family Mediation 
Conciliation, as it emerged in the early 1980s, focussed upon the single issue of 
arrangements for the child, and avoiding the issues of finance and property. This 
sat well, as it has been observed with the social work training of the 
conciliators and the legal background of the lawyers. However, this has 
increasingly been seen as an artificial separation of what are essentially 
disputes which stem from the separation of the parents' partnership. The response 
has been the development of the Family Mediation service, largely under the 
direction of Lisa Parkinson. It is increasingly accepted within the frame of the 
para-legal services, although as will be seen, its relationship with the 
solicitors remains uncomfortable. 
Despite its relatively recent emergencp as a process in the English system, 
Westcott (1992) points out that mediation is available in fifty local services, 
increasingly in centres offering a range of techniques for family separation. 51 
Parkinson (1989) shows that the development of the FMA has its concept in the 
Finer Committee indication that conciliation should cover all areas of dispute, 
and in the practical link between child issues and financial issues in separation. 
From Parkinson's (1990a) description of the first year of the Family Mediation 
Association, it can be seen that Family Mediation seeks to address all the issues 
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which a couple would formerly have addressed through a solicitor, within the 
process of conciliation. Mediation therefore addresses both child issues and 
financial problems, and is termed by the FMA "comprehensive mediation" to 
denote that the mediation covers all the-practical areas of the conciliation. 52 
Thus, the focus is to give a forum to couples where they can negotiate their own 
separation settlement 
The process is facilited by two mediators, one with skills in social work, the 
other a solicitor. The mediation is in the hands of a professional with expertise 
in child matters and one who can advise in the financial aspects; it should be 
noted that this joining of ýkills is the primary rationale. The mediators undergo 
the same training in the teqbnique§. of conciliation and therefore a secondary 
aspect of the process is that effectively there are two conciliators co-working 
throughout each case. Westcott points to the rigorous training and selection of 
mediators and the interdisciplinary nature of the concept as factors in the rapid 
success of mediation. 53 
The relationship with the existing solicitor based process is difficult. The Law 
Society has been dogmatic in its insistence that the solicitor mediator, as with 
any solicitor, cannot act for both parties, following the "conflict of interest" 
rule. Parkinson (1990b) describes the position of the . solicitor-mediator clearly 
in relation to this rule, as offering a service throughout the separation 
negotiations, gathering evidence and informing the couple's solicitors of what is 
disclosed. Its most recent statement on the position of the solicitor-mediator 
points out that a client will be refered to his or her own lawyer, and that the 
mediated settlement is not legally bindin&54 The referal to the individual's own 
solicitor seems to fling the couple directly back into adversarial comers, having 
reached the arrangements through face-to-face negotiation. 
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This could be seen to undermine the very priciple of the system as part of a range 
of fora from which the clients chose. However, it is justified on the basis of 
protecting the interests of the individual client. Further, it protects the 
position of the conventional solicitors within the process of separation. 
Westcott states that "mediation ought not to be seen by family lawyers as a threat 
to their work, bui as an opportunity to develop new areas of work with other 
disciplines, eventually offering our clients a greater more flexible range. of ways 
of handling their problems-. 55 The position of the legal profession in insisting 
in referral to the individual parents solicitors in the event of any settlement 
and the generally luke-warm reception to mediation, could alternatively be seen- as 
protecting its income as the logic of the mediation is that the parents are 
encouraged to see their 
-settlement 
as workable without outside reference. 
The central concern of Family Mediation, as with conciliation, is the reaching of 
arrangements, or settlements. This very practical approach is seen in Mediation 
when Parkinson (1990a) states that: most disputes Centre on financial and property 
issues and may also involve conflict over arrangements for the children". As was 
noted in the discussion of conciliation, the "problems" are arrangements rather 
than the making of the arrangements. Family Mediation again serves as a vehicle 
by which couples in disagreement can seek a solution. The similarity between this 
and the court as another vehicle is very great It is clear that mediation is not 
primarily Concerned with the ability to make the decisions, but rather offers a 
service to couples who are at a level of communication which win allow them to 
benefit from negotiations with mediators. There is a feeling generated by the 
large cost of FMA sessions, which do not attract legal aid support, that the 
process is one for the Guardian reading couple56 who are attuned to "sensible 
discussion". The danger is again, that if a couple cannot respond to such a 
format, then they could be seen as a troublesome case. 
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funding 
The CPU report has not produced a government response to the funding of 
conciliation. The debate as to how the system should proceed does not remain 
dormant and, within the context of the expansion of conciliation to encompass 
mediation, a number of writers and units are presenting a similar solution to the 
difficulty of funding the para-legal services. 
The CPU suggested that the way forward for conciliaition would be to move 
towards an all encompassing family centre, which would offer an alternative 
starting point for the family experiencing separation problems. The "Bureau" 
would encompass many of the facilities of the para-legal spectrum, and also 
provide opportunities for counselling and "Relate" type facilities. This theme has 
been used in Cambridge under the direction of the Cambridge Family and 
Divorce Centre. Richards (1990) describes the work of the Centre, which offers a 
spectrum of services for the separating family, indicating that "we aim to assist 
in the creation of workable arrangements by attending to psychological 
difficulties that many spouses experience when a marriage ends". Thus, if the 
couple need legal information, then a joint meeting with a solicitor will be 
arranged. If the individuýl needs psychological help, then-the centre can offer 
.I "short-term focussed work which would deal with issues such as coming to terms 
with the consequences of the ending of the marriage and moving forward in the 
divorce process". 
Such an approach to the organization of para-legal services is reflected in the 
thinking of Fisher (1992) and of Parkinson (1992). Both these writers, highly 
influential in the conciliation and mediation worlds, separately indicate that the 
range of negotiating services which are an alternative to the courts, should be 
offered through a centralized clearing house. This would allow the correct 
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channelling of the resources available to the couple. Further it would allow for a 
coherent explanation of the services to be offered to the couples. Further, Fisher 
sees a need for a central professional body to regulate the development of 
mediation. These are advocated on an independent level, requiring some degree 
. 
of government funding over and above the legal aid funding to separation. The 
issue that is left out of many of these discussions concerning funding, and indeed 
the philosophy of the negotiated settlement sector, is how the law should respond 
to the developments. 
vi. criticism: Davis, and Dingwall and Greatbatch 
A difficulty in the approach to conciliation, especially by the courts, is 
reflected in the language of describing couples able to use conciliation. Price 
indicates it in his article (1989) when he says: "I suggest that these factors - 
together with the fact that people stick better to agreements in the making of 
which they have played a substantial part - ". This is often the phraseology of 
the assumption. However, it could make for a problematic assumption. The 
assertion that parents who make agreements for themselves keep them better than 
those on whom decisions are imposed sýems to claim that if th. e latter parents 
went through conciliation th en they too would keep to their agreements better. 
The difficulty is simply that there is no proof between the two parts of the 
statement that conciliation breeds acceptance of agreements in all couples, and 
yet this is the image presented. All that it can be said to show is that couples 
who go through conciliation accept their own arrangements better than couples 
who go through the courts: the emphasis being on the couples. The assumption 
rather indicates that all couples, if channelled into conciliation, could make 
_their own agreements and 
follow them. This is not proven. What could be the case. 
is that couples who go to conciliation are at a level of communication which 
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allows them to profit from the conciliators intervention, while other couples are 
at a level which allows them to make their own agreements, and still others are 
at a level at which they cannot communicate with the aid of anyone, and for 
whom the way forward is a court order. This is largely the objection which critics 
such as Davis hold to the wholesale acceptance of the rhetoric of the conciliation 
movement Davis argues throughout his work that the need is to respect the 
position of parents. Ownership of the dispute, for Davis, rests squarely. with the 
parents in whatever communicative state they are in as they seek to separate or 
fight over their children. He argues that what is needed by parents is an 
appropriate forum within which to develop a position for the future. This could be 
solicitor negotiation, conciliation, or the courts. The crucial element which 
Davis sees in the development of 
_the 
modern law concerning the child in 
separation cases is that there are a substantial number of parents who cannot 
agree, and they need and have a right to the courts as a vehicle of justice which 
has safeguards of due process. Davis sees the conciliation developments as a way 
for the courts to avoid the difficult cases by funnelling the couples into a 
quasi-court process which equally imposes a settlement on parents who cannot 
control the conciliation process, but imposes the agreement without the safeguards 
of justice. 
The recent work of Dingwall and Greatbatch57 presents the conclusion that the 
claims of the conciliators are not met in reality. The study which they undertook 
examined recordings of "mediation-58 sessions in both independent and court 
welfare settings. The research was primarily concerned with the claims that the 
process was encouraging "party-controlled settlements" - that the agreements were 
created by the separating couple rather than by third party intervention - and 
that the. process Was more identifiably "child-centred" thanother fora. 
i 
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In relation to the ownership of the settlement Dingwall and Greatbatch found that 
the "mediators in all settings studied routinely exert pressure in favour of some 
options and against others-59. They formed the opinion that the mediators 
identify with some parties, and generally use a great deal of power to pursue 
goals which the mediator perceived as good. They point to techniques the 
mediators use to avoid certain discussions in favour of others. They conclude that 
"by a variety of direct and indirect means, mediators exercise considerable 
influence over the shape of any agreement-60. Ownership of the settlements does 
not vest solely with the parents. 
As to the chiId-centred claim, the research indicated that references to the child 
tended to be in pursuit of a particular outcome, "a means of applying moral 
pressure rather than urging the parents to consider their children's well-being in 
an objective fashion-61. This is not to deny the experience of the mediator in 
identifying outcomes more likely to succeed, and the child-centred ability of 
mediation may rest in this expertise, rather than in an essentially procedural 
advantage in the system to determine the child's welfare, as against other fora. 
They conclude that, while not fulfilling the claims of child-centred neutrality or 
settlements owned by the parents, the actual value of mediation is in the expert 
guided settlement and the efficiency in reaching the settlement. Such research 
suggests that there is a need to clarify the effect of the paramountcy principle 
on the para-legal fora. 
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Conclusions. 
What is clear from the examination of the para-legal developments in separation 
law is that over the -past 10 years the focus of the intervention of professionals 
into the private arena of family life at the crisis of separation has changed from 
the protection of the child to parental decision-making. This is not a complete 
shift The court system is still the dominant feature of separation law, with the 
language of para-legal dispute resolution justifying the development as an 
"alternative" to a court imposed settlemenL62 Thus, the conventional 
justification- of the child's best interests remains for the court system, and is 
not clarified by the involvement of the para-legal systems. The only definition 
which could be said to emerge from the philosophy of the new separation 
professionals is that the parents are best placed to decide the child's welfare. 
In its pure sense this is an unassailable statement, and its acceptance by the 
alternative separation processes seems to give them an edge over the process of a 
court imposed settlement. This assumes that the alternatives offer the parents 
control. 
The research of Dingwall and Greatbatch begins to crack open the faqade of 
parental control. What is clear is that the alternative processes do not 
necessarily offer the parents control over their separation, rather the processes 
offer a range of fora where decisions can be imposed. The imposition will have a 
degree of parental involvement, and indeed, where the parents are strong enough 
to use the forum through which they pass, - the arrangements may be designed by 
the parents. However, the evidence is emerging that the control is not with the 
parents. This confirms Davis's argument that the problem with para-legal systems 
is that they provide the same function as courts but do not have the safeguards. 
The question emerges then, in the changed provision of servies for separating 
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families, essentially the same as it emerged from the caselaw. The law 
consistently challenges the professionals involved with the determination of 
disputes over the children of separating couples, to hold as the paramount 
consideration the welfare of the child. It is clear that some investigation is 
needed into the practice of the law of separation to determine what is understood 
by the child's best interests in a day-to-day sense. 
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